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Abstract:
Debt has become increasingly important as a source of capital for firms. Ninety
percent of the new capital issuance is in the form of debt and leverage ratios have
increased from 10 to 30 percent in the past century. However, we still do not fully
understand the corporate debt market, because the data on the debt market are not as
widely available as the stock market. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repealed part of
the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 which allowed financial companies to become more ac-
tive in financial markets as both issuers and investors in securities. One benefit of this
regulatory change was the disclosure of more data regarding who issues and/or owns
bonds. A comprehensive bond ownership database is eMAXX by Thomson Reuters.
Unlike CRSP and COMPUTSTAT, eMAXX is underutilized by academics. The first
chapter includes, first, a discussion of the importance of public debt markets. Second,
different bond databases are compared and contrasted with eMAXX. Third, I analyze
bond characteristics, investors, issuers, managing firms, and fund managers in turn.
The last part of the first chapter includes analyses of bondholding during different
corporate events such as bankruptcy and rating changes. Then, the second chapter
delves into the aspect of strategic default premium and credit spreads. The previous
literature examining the effects of strategic defaults on the pricing of debt contracts
has focused primarily on the bargaining power of equity holders. However, in the real
world the negotiation of a strategic default involves both equity and debt holders.
Omitting debt holders from the analysis results in an incomplete picture of strategic
default process. In my dissertation my analysis of the strategic default process includes
both equity and debt holders. I find that the bargaining power of bondholders plays
a significant role in determining the credit spreads of a bond. Moreover, I find the
bargaining power of bondholders to be a new proxy for the decision to enter into a
strategic default, a proxy that has the same predictive power of current proxies that
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CHAPTER I
An Analysis of Corporate Bond Ownership
1. Introduction
My first chapter discusses a variety of issues and problems in corporate finance, invest-
ments, and capital markets revolving around debt as a financing and/or investment
vehicle. A new database, eMAXX, provides information that makes it possible to an-
alyze questions that could not be analyzed in the past due to a lack of data. In this
chapter of my dissertation, I will address and analyze some of the interesting questions
that show the importance of corporate bond ownership research. The institutional cor-
porate bond holding data are unique to eMAXX and it will also be a central theme
of my dissertation. With the potential to make important contributions to finance
literature in many areas, there are many interesting questions that can be addressed
using this data. Some people may ask “Why and how is corporate bond ownership
important?” “Why do we care?”. A straight forward and a little blunt answer would
be because bond ownership may relate to the value of debt which, for most firms with
leverage, is directly related to the firm’s value. There is an extensive finance literature
examining the intrinsic value of firms. For example, in the area of asset pricing, finan-
cial economists conduct research seeking to understand factors that can explain asset
returns or a firms’ value. In corporate finance, for instance, researchers examine how
capital structure decisions impact the value of firms or how executive compensation
affects firm value. One area of finance that has not been extensively analyzed, because
of the lack of data, is the effect of institutional corporate bond ownership on a firm’s
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value. This dissertation is a first step in the development of a broad research portfolio
in this area.
In general, a firm’s capital consists of equity and debt. The asset pricing literature
has explored the determinants of the market value of equity extensively while under-
standing about the firm’s debt is limited owing to the private nature of the data and
low liquidity in the secondary market. Some of corporate debt, such as bank loans
and private-placement bonds, is not revealed to the public. Moreover, for public debt
such as corporate bonds, the trading volumes are very thin. This lack of volume is,
partly, caused by high trading cost and large minimum trade size. Consequently, most
market participants in the secondary markets of corporate bonds are large financial
institutions which usually make large transactions. With eMAXX bondholding data,
we are able to conduct more extensive analyses of the debt market. Still, we may not
understand everything about the corporate debt, but we make a little step forward.
This chapter is organized as follows. I will first discuss the process of raising capital
in the US. In this section, I will discuss the corporate decision making process that
results in the creation and sale of debt contracts to investors. Then, I discuss how
corporate bonds become an important source of corporate capital and how eMAXX
data can help us address interesting questions in the corporate bond market. In the
next section, I will give an overview of bond databases that can be used with eMAXX
to analyze the public bond market in more depth. The bond databases in the overview
section consist of Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE), SDC Platinum
- Corporate Securities Issuance Data, and Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database
(FISD). At the end of the overview section, I provide a case study of General Electric
(GE) using all four bond databases. The purpose of the GE case study is to illustrate
the completeness of bond analyses when all four bond databases are examined together.
Then, I discuss interesting questions that can be addressed using eMAXX database
in the following order, bond characteristics, bond investors, issuers, managing firms,
and fund managers. Lastly, I examine the effects of events such as bond ownership on
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bankruptcy, rating changes, and accounting restatements.
1.1 The Process of Raising Capital in the US
Firms or idea generators are generally capital constrained and require outside funding
to fund investment. Start-up firms have limited access to external sources of capital
while going concerns may have access to internal and external sources of funds. Internal
sources of funds, for example, are retained earnings and idea generators’ own funding.
It is internal because it does not involve obtaining funding from an outside party.
When firms have enough retained earnings generated from their businesses, they use
the earning to supply a firms’ investment needs. If the retained earnings are not
enough to fund the businesses, the owners of the firms may put more money into the
businesses. Both are considered internal sources of funds. On the other hand, external
sources of funds involve attracting funds from outside parties. The funds could be
obtained either through the issuance of debt or equity. Debt is a contract whereby a
borrower promises to pay returns to a lender at a specified rate based on the principal
amount borrowed. At the end of the contract, the lenders will receive the principal
back. In case of debt, the borrowers have no right to the assets of the lender. The
only claim that the borrowers can make is the principal amount and the promised
payments from the lender. When issuing equity, a firm receives funding in exchange
for a contract that extends ownership rights to the investors. In this case, a party
who gives funds to the firm is called an equity holder or a shareholder. In contrast to
the purchaser of debt, equity holders have residual claim on the firms’ assets. Equity
holders also have the right to vote for any issues raised in the shareholder meeting.
This voting right is important to determine the future of the firm. To understand
more why firms acquire funding using debt which is an external source of funds, it is
useful to include a brief discussion of capital structure theory.
Given a need to raise funds, why would a firm’s manager choose either an internal
or external source of funds? Starting with a general economics optimization problem
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where idea generators either maximize returns on investment (ROI) given the cost
of funds or minimize the cost of funds given the ROI. With either a cost or profit
objective function, firms then choose either an internal or external source of funds
appropriate for their objectives. In addition to the general optimization model from
economics, there are some corporate finance theories that play a very important role in
explaining a firm’s choice of internal or external source of funds. Pecking order theory
of Myers and Majluf (1984) is one of the well-known theories developed to explain
why firms choose an internal over external source of funds or vice versa. It argues that
firms prefer internal sources of funds because of the asymmetric information problem
associated with selling contracts. This choice determines a firm’s capital structure
and Myers and Majluf (1984) showed that investors interpret equity issuance as a
signal that the stock being offered for sale by a firm is overvalued by the market under
the basis that informed managers usually issue equity when it is cheap to do so (i.e.
expensive stock price). Because retained earnings have no adverse selection problem,
managers prefer to use retained earnings to fund investment. If firms have to choose
between debt and equity for the external source of funds, managers will choose debt
because the cost of adverse selection for debt is lower. Though the external funding
creates asymmetric information problems and the cost of issuance could be expensive,
most firms have some degree of external financing in place. Therefore, external sources
of funds are important as means of raising funds for firms. When a firm decides to
acquire funding from an external source. Why does a firm choose debt over equity
or vice versa? This choice determines a firm’s capital structure and there are several
theories explaining the capital structure decision.
1. Irrelevancy model: Modigliani and Miller (MM 1958) show in their work that
debt or equity has no difference in terms of generating firm’s value or, as we know
as MM irrelevance theory of capital. MM uses the no-arbitrage argument with
many important assumptions associated with this theory, such as no tax and
transaction cost. MM shows that investing in levered firm can be replicated by
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investing in unlevered firm and borrowing money. As a result, capital structure
is not relevant to a firm value.
2. Tax incentives: When we add the element of tax in the model, debt is more
tempting in this regard. Firms could reduce taxable income from tax deductible
interest expenses. In this case, in order to obtain the highest value of a firm, the
firm should borrow as much as it can. The firm value depends on the product
of tax rate and amount of debt of the firm.
3. Trade-off Theory: Firms trade off cost of debt and equity and try to find an
“optimal” capital ratio. The benefit of using debt is tax advantage. The cost
is the higher likelihood of bankruptcy. It is true that tax incentive encourages
firms to use more debt. However, higher debt increases the firm’s bankruptcy
probability. On the other hand, using too less debt could result in firm’s lower
ability to generate income. Trade-off theory shows that there is a sweet spot
between using too much or too less debt. The theory emphasizes that the capital
structure plays a role in determining firm value.
4. Market timing: Firms issue equity when their stock prices are perceived to be
overvalued. One of the important objectives of the firm’s managers is to find the
cheapest source of funds. Baker and Wurgler (2002) empirically find that firms
issue more equity than debt when their market values are high relative to book
value.
The choice between debt and equity, though, depends on many factors, but we,
perhaps, cannot argue that debt has become more important over time. Graham et
al. (2015) show that, during 1921-1930, the average leverage ratio of industrial firms
was 12.23% and leverage ratios have been rising to around 30% in 2001-2010. The
data include all firms in CRSP database that are also covered either in Compustat
or Moody’s Industrial Manuals excluding financial firms, utilities, and railroads. The
growing importance of debt as a funding source is not only true for large and mature
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firms which are major component in CRSP database. It also applies to new firms. A
widely held view that new firms cannot access formal capital markets and mostly rely
on equity funding from family and friends is challenged by Robb and Robinson (2012).
Robb and Robinson (2012) demonstrate that formal debt financing, on average, is the
largest source of fund for startups during their first year of operation. This formal debt
financing is mainly from owner-backed bank loans, business bank loans, and business
credit lines. Overall, we can see that debt financing has continued its growth and
importance over time. However, we still do not have a full grasp of the debt market.
Even though the choices of external sources of funds are debt and equity, debt
issuance is more complicated than equity issuance. Since the main focus of my analysis
is the corporate bond issuance, I would like to demonstrate how bond issuance is more
complex than equity issuance. In general, when firms need to issue a bond, they need
to decide on the characteristics of the bond contract with many factors considered.
To issue bonds, firms need to make many decisions. I can illustrate the complexity
of the corporate bond decision issuance by discussing some of the decisions managers
must make when raising capital with debt through bond issuance. Managers must
decide what type of bond to sell to investors. For example, do they issue zero-coupon
or coupon bonds. For zero-coupon bonds, investors will not receive the periodic interest
income as they do with coupon bonds. An investor purchases a zero-coupon bond at a
discount to the face value. For example, a $100 face value bond is sold for $90. Assume
that this is a one year zero-coupon bond. An investor will receive $10 or, equivalently,
11 percent of return at the end of the year without receiving interest income while
holding the bond. On the other hand, coupon bond will pay interest periodically, such
as every six months. Managers need to analyze which type of bonds will minimize the
cost of funds. Second, the concept of bond price, yield to maturity, and face value are
usually discussed together. The bond face value is a fixed amount that is usually equal
to $1,000. The price of bonds could be either lower, higher, or equal to the face value.
If the price of bonds is lower (higher) than the face value, the bond is sold at discount
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(premium) and the yield to maturity will be higher (lower) than the coupon rate. The
yield to maturity will be equal to the coupon rate when the price and face value are
equal. Third, the issuance amount depends on the amount of funds needed, which,
usually is highly correlated with the firm’s size. Larger firms tend to borrow larger
amounts of funds. Fourth, the coupon rate is another important aspect that an issuer
has to consider. The coupon rate is based on the credit risk of the issuer and the market
interest rate. If the issuer has higher credit risk which could be indicated from the
financial statements or the credit rating of the firm, the coupon rate should be higher
than an issuer in the same line of business but has a higher credit rating. The choice
to issue fixed or floating rate bonds is also determined by the interest rate trend. For
instance, if the interest rate will increase in the future, it would be more cost efficient
to issue fixed-rate bonds. Fifth, bond options and features are also complex issues.
For instance, convertible bonds may be converted to equity in the future. Bonds and
equity are a very different contracts. Existing shareholders may not want to share
the residual income with the new shareholders who convert the bonds to equity. In
addition, the decisions of a management team and the shareholder could be different
as the objectives of the two parties could be different. The investment portfolios of
managers are less diversified than the shareholders. Therefore, managers tend to take
less risk than a shareholder. Moreover, managers weigh between the pecuniary and
non-pecuniary benefits. For instance, managers are likely to shirk and spend more
time on their personal businesses. The manager and shareholder conflicts make bond
issuance even more complicated. The brief discussion about the bond characteristics
in this section shows that issuing bond is much more complicated than issuing equity.
Choices of debt for firms are private and public debt. eMAXX data offer infor-
mation on the public debt side and it will be the focus of my analysis. When firms
decide on the choice between the private and public debt, they consider several factors,
such as cost of issuing and monitoring degree. For instance, it could be too costly for
small firms to issue a public bond. Issuing public bonds involves hiring investment
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companies or underwriters and the service fees could be very expensive for the small-
size bonds issued. If firms have a high asymmetric information problem, they may
consider borrowing from a bank which will help monitor the firms under a certain
condition of loan covenant. However, either private or public debt issuance, issuers
have to consider many factors that are not only appropriate for the issuers themselves,
but they also consider factors from the investor’s point of view. Selling bond is about
creating contracts that potential investors will purchase at a “fair” price. “Fair” in
the eyes of the potential buyers and “fair” in the eyes of the sellers. Therefore, one of
the most important factors that issuers of the corporate bonds also need to consider
is the demand of the lenders. Selling a bond is similar to selling other retail products.
The issuers of a bond would want to sell all the bonds they are issuing. Therefore,
they have to offer products (bond contracts) that buyers want. If the product is too
expensive, very few buyers would want to buy. If the product is too cheap, firms leave
money on the table. In the context of bond issuances, for instance, firms would not
want to set the coupon rate too low so that no buyers (decision makers) would want
to purchase the bond. It is relatively new to analyze the debt market from the lenders
perspective. Whether lenders (or bondholders in this case) affect any aspect of public
debt market is an interesting issue to further explore.
To this point, we have some idea how bond ownership could relate to firms making a
decision on the characteristics of bond issued. What about the investors? Which bonds
do they choose to purchase and why? This takes us back to a decision making theory
of how a person or a firm make a decision on the investment. From the perspective of
decision makers, investors are making a decision on how they will use their resources,
either consuming or investing. We are talking about a general economics optimization
problem in which people maximize utility given their limited amount of resources. In
deciding not to consume today (or invest now), investors expect to have more resources
to consume in the future. Similarly, investors invest in bonds, because they hope to
consume more in the future. They want to invest in bonds with highest return given
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risk, because high-return investment will allow investors to consume more in the future.
The question is what kind of investment generates good returns for investors. A simple
answer is “a good idea with high expected returns”. If firms can signal that they have
a good idea and can generate enough income to pay their debt obligations, investors
should be willing to purchase their debt contracts. Here is the equilibrium where
supply of funds (investors) meets demand of funds (firms). My focus is on the public
debt market. I hope that my analysis on the public debt market, which is only part
of the whole debt market, would help us understand more about the capital structure
decision and firm’s value and, perhaps, encourage researchers to explore this area.
1.2 Importance of the US Corporate Bond Market
Our limited knowledge of the debt market is directly related to the limited public
data on bond issuers, bond investors, and trading activity in bond markets. Less than
one percent of the US corporate bonds outstanding are traded in a secondary market
each day1. Traditional bond investors have purchased bonds at issuance and hold the
bonds to maturity. The buy-and-hold strategy is still true for insurance companies and
pension funds because of the nature of their business. The main function of insurance
companies and pension funds is to provide clients with funds to cover for contingencies.
For example, life insurance companies pay out funds when an insured person dies.
Pension funds provide fixed-amount of income for pensioners for a certain amount of
time or for life. Therefore, both life insurance companies and pension funds have a
long-term investment horizon. Unlike insurance companies and pension funds, bond
mutual funds are much more active in bond trading. To achieve the total returns in
excess to market returns, bond mutual funds become more aggressive in bond trading.
Nevertheless, bond trading volume is still small relative to equity trading volume,
1Based on SIFMA report, in 2017, the corporate bond outstanding value is 8,826 billion dollars
while the average daily trading volume is 30.7 billion dollars. This pattern of small trading activities
is the same for other types of bond, such as MBS and municipal bonds. The largest trading volume
relative to the total outstanding is treasury bonds. In 2017, the treasury bond outstanding value is
14,468 billion dollars whereas its average daily trading volume in the secondary market is 505 billion
dollars
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because other large bondholders still adopt the traditional strategy of buy-and-hold.
As for the private debt side, private debt issuance such as borrowing from banks is
not disclosed to the market. Though the information in the debt market is limited,
a way to understand more about the debt market is still possible with eMAXX by
Thomson Reuters. Thomson Reuters has collected data on institutional bondholding
and bond issuance since 1998. eMAXX provides quarterly data on bond issuances,
bondholders, and managing firms which are investment firms that manage funds for
bondholders. It is natural to restate the importance of bondholding analysis here.
Ultimately, most analyses in debt financing, if not all, lead to a better understand
of debt value which directly impacts a firm’s value given that most firms have some
degree of debt in place. With eMAXX database on institutional bond ownership, we
have an opportunity to understand more about the debt value and firm’s value. That
is we can analyze whether the bond ownership affects the debt value and/or firm’s
value.
In my analysis, I focus on the market for US corporate bonds. The US bond
market accounts for almost 40 percent of global value of bond outstanding. One of
the reasons that I focus my study on the US market is that no other country has
value of bond outstanding nearly as large as the US’s. From Figure 1.1, based on
Bank of International Settlement (BIS) in 2017, US bond value outstanding account
for 39% of the global bond market value outstanding. The second largest group are
the 28 countries in the European Union (EU28) which account for 28% or, on average,
1% of bond value outstanding percentage share for each country in the EU28. As
for the US debt market, from Figure 1.2, corporate bond is around a quarter of the
total debt value in the US. The largest bond market in the US is the Treasury bond
market. Specifically for large firms about two-thirds of their total debt is characterized
as corporate bonds [Massa et al. (2011)]. Overall, we can see that the US corporate
bond market is important and worth investigating more because this could lead us to
understand more about the firm’s value. Moreover, to my knowledge, there is no bond
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ownership data for international bonds available. Therefore, the analysis on bond
ownership is not possible for international bond markets.
To emphasize the importance of debt financing, the decision by managers to ac-
quire new funding through external sources is made by comparing marginal costs and
benefits of using debt versus equity. From 2017 SIFMA report, Figure 1.3, ninety
percent of the new corporate capital issuance is in the form of debt. Specifically, out
of $2.67 trillions total corporate issuance, $2.44 trillions is debt and the rest is equity.
Corporate debt includes public and private, investment grade and high yield bonds
issued in the U.S. Common stock includes initial public offerings and follow-ons issued
in the U.S. This is also true for other years in the past. Over time, from Figure 1.3,
the gray bar is the total issuance of the US corporate from 2002 to 2016. The blue
and the orange bars are debt and equity issuances, respectively. We can see that most
of the US corporate issuances are in the form of debt. Therefore, understanding the
dynamic of the debt market is important as it is a major channel for a firm to acquire
fundings.
1.3 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and Bond Ownership
The Banking Act of 1933, commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act, created separa-
tion between banking and investment banking businesses. After the Great Depression
wiped out thousands of banks, the US congress responded to the Great Depression
by issuing the Act to reduce the conflicts of interest between banks and customers.
To reduce bank risk taking, regulators constrained activities of banks and investment
banks. Banks could not deliver investment banking services and investment banks
could not provide banking services. Meanwhile, banks specialized in the creation of
private debt. Investment banks specialized in the issuance of public debt. Banks are
heavily regulated, investment banks are not. The Securities Act of 1933 and 1934
enhanced capital market transparency and the power of regulatory authorities. The
Securities Act of 1933 requires capital seekers to disclose important financial informa-
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tion through the registration of securities. This is to help investors make informed risk
taking decisions when purchasing a security. There are certain types of securities that
are not required to register with SEC to promote lower cost of offering securities to
the public. This includes private offerings to a limited number of investors, intrastate
offerings, small size offerings, and securities of municipal, state, and federal govern-
ments. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 gave more power to the SEC to regulate
and oversee firms issuing bonds or equities to the public. For instance, it requires
firms with more than $10 million in assets whose securities are held by more than 500
investors to file annual and other periodic reports.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repealed part of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 to
allow financial service firms to offer banking, insurance, and investment banking ser-
vices. GLBA repealed parts of the Banking Act of 1933 that separated commercial
banking from the securities business. GLBA also repealed parts of the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 that separated commercial banking from the insurance business.
In short, GLBA allows single holding companies to offer banking, securities, and insur-
ance, as they had before the Great Depression [Barth et al (2000)]. In an attempt to
increase transparency, GLBA required increased disclosure by financial service firms.
The disclosure requirement made it possible to create eMAXX, a database on bond
ownership.
The Glass-Steagall Act lasted more than six decades after several attempts to
repeal it. Why was it finally repealed in 1999? First, a number of studies found
that securities activities of commercial banks bore little responsibility for the Great
Depression (Puri, 1996, Kroszner and Rajan, 1997). Second, many developed countries
that allow banks to perform extensive activities have not shown that the permission
creates problems in their economy. Last, the technological advancement and the big
data era should reduce the cost of banking if banks can expand their businesses into
larger portfolios. The information from one business should benefit another business
in the bank’s portfolio. Consequently, this should benefit the whole economy.
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Major changes are also made in financial holding companies and the financial sub-
sidiaries of national banks. The Banking Act of 1933 and the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956 greatly restricted the ability of banks to conduct the activities related to
securities firms, insurance companies, merchant banks, and other financial companies.
Banks as well as bank holding companies were significantly limited in their capability
to enter these markets either directly or through subsidiaries of the bank. After the
GLBA, financial subsidiaries of banks were allowed to conduct most financial activities.
Major exceptions are that they cannot involve with insurance or annuity underwriting,
insurance company portfolio investments, real estate investment and development, or
certain aspects of merchant banking. However, GLBA permits formation of a holding
company, the financial holding company, which can own banks as subsidiaries and also
own other subsidiaries that engage in all other financial activities – including those
that the financial subsidiaries of banks cannot engage directly [Barth et al (2000)].
As for the bondholder or lender side, from Schultz (2001), insurance companies hold
over one-third of outstanding investment-grade bonds. GLBA changed the landscape
of who can own or issue bonds. Now, financial companies can participate in this
market either as a facilitator for any entity that needs to raise funds or as an issuer
themselves, and also as an investor. With the current requirements of the SEC and
IRS, financial companies as well as insurance companies have to submit filings showing
their holdings of bonds. For example, insurance companies are required to disclose
information on bond trading (schedule D). As a result, Thompson Reuters created a
new database, eMAXX, that details the bondholdings of institutional investors. The
eMAXX database permits analysis of both issuers of corporate bonds and investors in
corporate bonds.
In 1999, see Figure 1.4, insurance companies held more than 70 percent of corporate
bonds with mutual fund holdings approximately 20 percent of corporate bonds. By
2013, mutual funds held 40 percent of corporate bonds with the percentage of corporate
bonds held by insurance companies falling to around 50 percent.
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In my dissertation, I use the eMAXX database to analyze the corporate bond
markets from the perspective of lenders and the perspective of borrowers. Overall,
there are still not many publications using eMAXX data compared to other popular
databases such as CRSP and COMPUSTAT. Therefore, the motivation of the first
chapter is to explore interesting finance questions using the eMAXX database. This
is to contribute to the finance field any undiscovered question in the bond area. In
the following section I demonstrate the overview of bond databases including eMAXX.
Each database has its own strength. For instance, TRACE and Mergent FISD contain
transaction information. SDC Platinum (SDC) and Mergent FISD provide bond char-
acteristics. At the end of the overview of bond database section, I provide an example
of bond analysis using all four databases. I choose General Electric (GE) as my case
study, because GE has issued many bonds with various maturities and features.
2. An Overview of Bond Databases
2.1 A Comparison of eMAXX and Other Bond Databases
A brief description of eMAXX database is that it contains data about institutional
bondholding such as the information of bondholding by insurance companies and pen-
sion funds. eMAXX contains quarter by quarter of how much each institutional bond-
holder holds an issue (9-digit CUSIP). On the issuance side, eMAXX provides detailed
information about the bonds issued, such as issuance amount, call feature, and num-
ber of bondholder. In addition, eMAXX also provides data on the managing firms
which are the intermediary who helps the bondholders manage their investments. To
have the full details of bond analyses, we can analyze corporate bond markets using
eMAXX and other bond databases. This will give us more information to analyze an
issue and more angle to address questions.
1. Issuer related data (corporate)
Issuer related data contain information about the issuer such as name, country,
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CUSIP, and ticker. eMAXX has its own entity identification for each issuer, such as
public corporation and government treasury. eMAXX has very detailed information
on entity identification. It has more than 100 entity identifications. However, some
data in this section are not accurate. For instance, a discrepancy that I found is that
on a variable named State Code. The description in eMAXX manual stated that it
applies to North American Municipal Issuers only, but I found that it also applied to
corporate issuers as well. Most of the states are in Delaware where many corporate
bond issuers registered their headquarters. Delaware is known as one of the friendliest
state for a business in the US.
2. Issue related data (corporate)
The data contain information about the characteristics of the issue such as matu-
rity, coupon rate, collateral status. These information are similar to the FISD issue
and SDC information. The information that is unique to the eMAXX data in terms of
the issue information is number of bondholders, number of buyer and seller, and total
dollar amount held by the institutional investors in a given quarter. These unique
variables are very useful for an analysis of bond ownership effects on any concerning
issue. For instance, it could help us address the issue of renegotiation friction dur-
ing firm’s financial distress. In other words, the number of bondholders is important
for an analysis of bond’s holding concentration. Large number of bondholders given
the same amount of par value leads to higher cost of negotiation for a firm when it
comes to renegotiation between the firm and its creditors, because the likelihood of
disagreement among many creditors is high. Numbers of bond buyers and sellers are
also important to analyze the dynamic of bondholdings. Since the bond market is
thinly traded, numbers of bond buyers and sellers are important variable to analyze a
decision making process of bond investors.
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3. Corporate descriptive data
Corporate descriptive data provide information about call feature (e.g., call type,
next call date), sinking fund date, and asset claim (e.g., senior, subordinated). How-
ever, SDC provides more detail on this aspect. For example, while eMAXX only
provides sinking fund date, SDC also provides not only the date but other aspects
such as amount retired by sinking fund per year and total amount retired by sinking
fund. Also, eMAXX only provides call feature, but not other types of options, such as
put option. Redemption information is important because, usually, we would want to
know the current total amount of bond outstanding. With many types of redemption
(e.g., call, put, repurchase), the total amount of bond outstanding will change over
time after a redemption is executed.
4. Fund/sub-account data
This set of data gives information about the characteristics of bondholders such as
name, type, unique ID. In eMAXX, sub-account means a holder or a portfolio. There
are also interesting summary statistics such as total amount held by each holder and
total numbers of individual bonds held by each holder. To understand the depth and
breadth of bondholder perspectives, these aggregate summary statistics are important.
For example, we might perceive that one million US dollar of a bond portfolio is large;
however, if the total portfolio value is one billion. One million US dollar portfolio is
only 0.1 percent of total bond portfolio and it might be considered small. Therefore,
aggregate value of bondholding for a given holder is of important to analyze the full
picture of each bond investment relative to the total bond portfolio of each institu-
tional bondholder. These data are unique to eMAXX.
5. Holdings data
Holdings data show the amount of bonds held in US dollars for each issue (9-digit
CUSIP) by each holder in a quarterly format. This is unique to eMAXX and perhaps
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one of the most valuable information in eMAXX. However, an issue concerning the ID
of the holder is that the eMAXX holder ID is not common to other databases. For
example, CRSP ID is PERMNO whereas COMPUSTAT ID is GVKEY. Therefore,
it is quite difficult to match the eMAXX holder ID to other databases. Moreover,
some types of holder stated by eMAXX may be misleading. For instance, there is a
type of holder called “Hedge Fund” or HFD in short. HFD in our understanding is
either a firm with intensive use of derivative or a firm with an investment strategy
that is not traditional such as very high leverage or high frequency trading. However,
HFD in eMAXX is mutual funds with an investment strategy similar to hedge fund.
Hedge funds are not required to disclose their holdings; therefore, based on a tradi-
tional meaning of hedge funds, eMAXX does not contain information about hedge
funds. Holdings data are also linked to managing firm ID which gives information
about investment companies that manage bond portfolio for bondholders. Some of
the bondholders manage bond portfolio themselves, but some of them hire managing
firms. From my investigation, the bondholder ID in eMAXX takes into account the
name changes. A prevalent example is in the mutual fund industry. Many times, a
mutual fund company was bought by another mutual fund company, which usually
a bigger one bought the smaller one. For example, a bondholder ID associated with
a mutual fund A after it was bought and changed its name was still the same. This
property makes the analysis of bondholding much easier.
6. Insurance company brokerage transaction data
Even though there are many types of institutional in eMAXX data, the brokerage
transactions are only provided for insurance companies. This data give us information
about who are the brokers, cost and amount transacted, and transaction date. This
data are also unique to eMAXX. This set of data will be very useful for the market
friction research, such as cost of trade or liquidity. The data link three counterparty
together: bondholders, managing firms, and brokerage firms. Managing firms are in-
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termediaries who manage funds for bondholders. Brokerage firms’ role is to transact
the trade for bondholders.
7. Managing firm data
Bondholders hire managing firms to manage their investments. Managing firm data
provide information regarding total amount in US dollar a managing firm managed
and total number of issues held by managing firms. In many cases, a managing firm
manages funds for many bondholders. For example, BlackRock manages funds for
its own mutual funds and also manages funds for other investment companies. Some
bondholders invested themselves, especially large companies such as AIG and JPMor-
gan Chase. Usually, large companies already have the investment resources in place
such as investment managers and dealers. For some small companies, it could be too
costly to set up everything from scratch from a research unit to trading desk. There
are a lot of research on the value of investment companies for investors. This could be
another area of research that one can extend using eMAXX data on bond area since
the research on the value of investment firms on the equity side has been done quite
thoroughly. Managing firm information is unique to eMAXX.
8. Investment personnel data
Investment personnel data give information concerning who manage funds for hold-
ers. Again, this set of data is only provided by eMAXX. We can see that holders hire
managing firms and we also know the detailed information of who are the fund man-
agers in those managing firms. The data provide a name, job title, and their area of
expertise. Similar to the managing firm data, one can apply this data to study on
the performance of investment managers. The research on consistency of investment
managers on equity portfolio is largely conducted, but the research on performance of
fixed-income portfolio is still very limited.
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2.2 Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE)
In this section, I give a summary of Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE)
data administered by FINRA. All brokers and dealers who are the members of FINRA
have to submit a report of corporate bond transactions to TRACE. The purpose is to
enhance the transparency of the fixed-income trading. There are three main files in
TRACE: (1) Bond trades (2) Daily trade summary (3) Master file.
1. Bond trades: The data give detailed information about bond trading trans-
actions such as timing, price, and yield. A variable that is unique to TRACE
is the trading party report. TRACE reports whether a transaction is bought
or sold and by who. For instance, TRACE reports three letters: B, D, and S.
The meaning of each letter is a dealer bought securities from a customer (B), a
dealer sold to a customer (S), and an inter-dealer trade (D). Currently, the most
comprehensive corporate bond transaction database is from TRACE. After its
started in 2002, there have been many publications related to the bond trades in
secondary markets using TRACE data. Even though TRACE provides informa-
tion about the name of buyers and sellers, but those information are mostly not
completed. Many of them are missing. The combination of TRACE and eMAXX
would provide a more comprehensive dataset that leads to answer many more
interesting questions.
2. Daily trade summary: For each day for a given bond, it gives the summary
for the highest, lowest, closing, price and yield of a bond. One of the interesting
variables in daily trade summary is the ID linked to Bloomberg data. If we
need more information about the macroeconomic data and pricing of aggregate
markets, we can extend the analysis using this Bloomberg ID. Merging database
across many datasets through common ID gives us more power to analyze in-
teresting questions across databases. With the TRACE-Bloomberg ID link, we
have five data that we can analyze at the same time, namely eMAXX, TRACE,
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Bloomberg, FISD, and SDC. Each database has its own unique information that
can give us a broader and deeper perspective.
3. Master file: This file gives information about bond characteristics such as
coupon rate, type of contract, and maturity. TRACE also gives information
whether a bond traded is convertible. This convertible feature is important for
further analysis because it is a hybrid feature between equity and debt securities.
For example, how a convertible bond affects the value of firms through different
mix of debt and equity is an interesting question and the data on convertible
bonds should help us understand more about the issue. Compared to Mergent
FISD and SDC Platinum, TRACE information on firm characteristics is not as
detailed as the other two bonds databases.
For each file, there are types of bonds we can choose: corporate, agency, 144A2,
and securitized products. TRACE contains trading information of various types of
bonds from general corporate bonds to asset-backed bonds.
Another set of data from TRACE is called Enhanced TRACE. Enhanced TRACE
is more comprehensive than standard TRACE by providing information previously
not disseminated to the public. For example, some disseminated bonds, such as non-
investment grade corporate bonds, have been reported only in Enhanced TRACE.
Enhanced TRACE includes all the data aged at least 18 months.
2.3 SDC Platinum – Corporate Securities Issuance Data
SDC Platinum (SDC) is the financial market data provided by Refinitiv, which is
jointly owned by Thomson Reuters and Blackston Group. The data contain infor-
mation about the newly issued securities, syndicated loans, mergers and acquisitions,
private equity, and global financial markets. The part that I will focus on SDC is the
newly issued securities information. The followings are the major datasets of SDC
2144A is private placement bonds exempted from 2 years holding. It can be traded by qualified
institutional investors.
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concerning the new issues.
1. Date
SDC provides important dates such as offer date of issues, maturity date, date
sinking fund starts, etc. These dates are similar to eMAXX. However, SDC provides
more date details on other bond process, such as date filing withdrawal or postpone-
ment.
2. Issuer Information
Other than the basic characteristics of the issuer, such as name and CUSIP, inter-
esting variables provided by SDC are immediate parent CUSIP and ultimate parent
CUSIP. Immediate parent CUSIP is a company that owns the issuer or it is only
one-step apart from the issuer. Ultimate parent is the real owner of the issuer. Ulti-
mate parent could be more than one-step apart from the issuer. For example, General
Electric owns GE Capital and GE Capital owns Synchrony Bank. In this case, GE
Capital is an immediate parent company for Synchrony Bank and General Electric
is the ultimate parent company for Synchrony Bank. If one works in an ownership
area, these variables are very important as it gives a real view of total ownership for a
certain firm. For an analysis of insurance companies, these variables will be very useful
because an insurance company has many subsidiaries operating in different locations.
Therefore, having identifications that links them together as one aggregate company
is useful and convenient. However, the universe of companies covered in eMAXX and
SDC is not overlapped. For instance, issuers in eMAXX may not appear as part of
the issuers in SDC database.
3. Dollar Amount
Regarding the issue amount, SDC provides more information than eMAXX. For ex-
ample, SDC has information about shelf-registration, thus we can see total amount is-
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sued from the start to the last issue of bonds within the same batch of shelf-registration.
Interesting information in SDC is that, for a given 9-digit CUSIP (i.e., for each issue),
there are different bond characteristics based on each lot of bond issuance in the same
set of shelf-registration. For instance, within the same 9-digit CUSIP, there are bonds
with different coupon rates, yields, maturities, etc. If it is a mortgage-backed bond,
the sum of tranche amounts is also provided.
4. Pricing and Premium Information
Since SDC has information about shelf-registration, SDC can provide the ranking
of the filing price in each round of issuance in the same batch. If the prices are differ-
ent, we would have another interesting research question that what could be a factor
that affects firms to issue different bond prices in the same shelf-registration filing? It
could be related to the market rate or firm’s characteristics. One of the variables that
eMAXX does not provide is information about conversion rules. SDC provides detailed
information about conversion rule such as conversion price and premium. Similar to
eMAXX, SDC gives information about call feature such as initial call price.
5. Security Information
Rauh and Sufi (2010) show that an analysis of capital structure that ignores debt
heterogeneity miss crucial capital structure variation. For example, they find that
low-credit-quality firms are more likely to issue several levels of debt claimants. They
lose abilities to acquire funding from the same channels; therefore, they need to ex-
pand their borrowing channels. For instance, high-credit-quality firms rely mainly on
two channels: senior unsecured debt and equity, but low-credit-quality firms resort
to multi channels such as senior unsecured, senior secured, and subordinated debt.
Therefore, to understand more about debt financing, it is vital to take debt hetero-
geneity into account. For security information, SDC and eMAXX are similar in this
aspect. They provide information about type of security such as subordinated note,
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first lien, etc. The information about the different levels of claimants from assets when
a firm or borrower goes bankrupt is important. The recovery rate is definitely an ele-
ment of debt pricing. Each level of claimants possesses different degree of recovery rate.
6. Managers and Fee Information
eMAXX does not provide information about managers and fee information. This
information is important to study about the bond price in market friction literature.
How much underwriters or distributers of bonds charge for their services is important
to determine the bond price in general. SDC also provides the information about the
expertise of underwriters in terms of how many times or how much value in total an
underwriter has underwritten for a certain period. A convenient function in SDC is
called league table which provides information about a ranking of underwriters or any
other information that one wants to rank so long as the SDC contains the information.
In addition, another interesting question from managers and fee information is an
incentive issue. In mutual fund literature, Bergstresser et al. (2009) find that there are
more fund inflows to funds with higher incentive fees paid to advisors or brokers (12b-1
fee). This phenomenon could also be tested on the bond market. For example, if we
group bonds, first, by the date of issuance and, then, by the issuance fees, we may find
something similar to the mutual fund industry that higher-incentive-fees bonds may
be able to offer lower yield for investors. A rational could be similar to Bergstresser
et al. (2009) that even though the bond has lower yield, underwriters or distributors
manage to successfully sell it because of the higher incentive paid to them. If we
also merge the managers and fee information with bond ownership information from
eMAXX, we would be able to perform a more rigorous analysis. For instance, we may
address a question whether any specific type of institutional bondholders purchase a
bond with high incentive fees and lower yield on average relative to other bonds issued
at the same period.
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7. Additional Data Items
For some other popular variables, some variables are both provided by eMAXX
and SDC such as ratings of bonds. However, there are many variables that eMAXX
does not provide. For instance, SDC provides IPO indicator while eMAXX does not.
From eMAXX, we do not know whether the bond is IPO or seasoned offering. Another
identification that is interesting and only available in SDC is high yield debt indicator.
The high yield debt indicator could be very useful for the analysis of bondholding of
insurance companies, because most insurance investment policies have a limit on how
much they can invest in non-investment grade bonds.
2.4 Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD)
1. Issuers
Mergent FISD issuers information is similar to other databases. A variable that
could be only unique to Mergent FISD in this file is bankruptcy indicator that shows
whether an issuer is bankrupt or not. The rest of the information, such as CUSIP,
SIC, and name of the issuers, are also available in other databases.
2. Issues
Issues file in Mergent FISD contains many interesting characteristics of bonds which
are similar to SDC and certainly much more than what eMAXX provides. For exam-
ple, Mergent FISD issues provide flags for bonds in the followings: Yankee, Asset
Backed, fungible, MTN, make whole, pay-in-kind, 144A, 415 Shelf registration, etc. It
is very easy to filter a bond with special characteristics in Mergent FISD because of
these flags. For other bond data, we need to construct all the flags ourselves if they
are available.
3. Ratings
As for the rating information, Mergent FISD consists of more elements than eMAXX
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rating which only shows what the rating for each bond is in a given quarter. Mergent
FISD rating shows the date of rating, type, status, and reason. In addition, Mer-
gent FISD also provides a credit watch variable, both positive and negative watches.
It would be interesting to see how bondholding changes when rating or watch-status
changes. Since eMAXX provides many types of institutional bondholding, another
interesting question is whether any type of institutional bondholding has more infor-
mation than others. We might find that some types of institutional bondholders may
trade well in advance before the watch-status change. For instance, before the watch
status of an issuer changes to negative watch, mutual fund A may already sold the
bond of that issuer while others start to trade after the watch-status change. This
advance trade could be related to the asymmetric information issue that one party
possesses information that others do not have.
4. Redemption
Do bondholders prefer to hold puttable, callable, non-callable, make-whole bonds?
We can address these questions with the combination of eMAXX and Mergent FISD.
For instance, insurance companies try best to match their assets and liabilities. If
insurance companies hold large amount of callable bonds, they will definitely face a
problem of duration mismatch when the bonds held are called. It could be costly
both in terms of searching and trading costs. When large amount of bonds held
by insurance companies is called, insurance bond managers have to search for other
bonds with the duration matched their liabilities and every transaction incurs trade
fees. Other than the usual call characteristics (e.g., call date, call amount), Mergent
FISD also contains information about maintenance/replacement fund date, sudden
death par, make whole date, etc. The information about different types of redemption
could help us understand more about the dynamic of the bondholding.
Another interesting question that can be addressed by redemption and bond own-
ership data is that the bondholders may prefer a certain type of redemption depending
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on the interest rate view of fund managers. For instance, when there is a period of
increasing market rate, insurance companies may prefer to hold callable bonds be-
cause it offers higher yield at the lower risk to be called. On the other hand, insurance
companies should prefer to hold non-callable bonds during the period of decreasing
in market rate. We can see that this could link to macro variables such as economic
cycle (e.g., employment, GDP, and PMI) and how it may relate to a pattern of bond
ownership.
5. Transactions
One can also address a regulatory issues using this combined database. There is a
decent amount of literature in mutual funds about window dressing that, before the
end of a quarter, some mutual funds try to hold a certain security that is considered
“winner” so that when it comes to the performance and holding report, the mutual
fund companies would make the report as if the funds had held the position for a
long time or since the beginning of the quarter. If we can see what happen during
the quarter using both TRACE and FISD transaction data, which provide minute-by-
minute and daily summary trades, and bondholding during the time from eMAXX,
we would have a more complete picture of who owns bonds or who redeems the bonds.
Transactions in Mergent FISD has more details than TRACE in terms of firm’s char-
acteristics. For example, it contains accrued interest and settlement price whereas
TRACE only provides the settlement price. Mergent FISD and TRACE both provide
data about bond transactions. However, the two data are not fully overlapped. Some
issues are only available in TRACE and some are only available in Mergent FISD. As
for the overlapping portion, Mergent FISD provides only summary of trade in a given
day, but TRACE shows minute-by-minute trades. It would be very insightful for the
dynamic of bondholding analysis to merge all three data together: TRACE, FISD,
and eMAXX. eMAXX is a summary of bond held by quarter.
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6. Time sales
The data show historical records of bond transactions. The records include can-
celled and corrected transactions. Other characteristics of transactions are also in-
cluded such as sale condition and number of days until settlement. For the time sales
data, when it merges with the eMAXX bondholding, we may perform an analysis on
the cancelled transactions as a tendency to buy or sell. First, we analyze cancelled and
corrected transactions. Then, we may try to come up with some patterns. For instance,
there might be a group of buyers or sellers that usually cancel their transactions. It
could be an internal operation or investment strategy. Based on my experience, mu-
tual fund companies sometimes received a transaction from brokers quite late because
brokers also received orders from customers a little late. Occasionally, brokers can
refuse to execute the transactions because it is too late, but sometimes they cannot
because customers insist to have their transactions executed on that day to get the
price of a desired security on the same day. In other words, customers are afraid to
lose their pricing opportunity on that day. This is considered as an internal operation
issue. For the investment strategy, if the pattern persistently occurs that some buyers
or sellers always cancel their transactions. This could be an element of price manipu-
lation on a security price. Price manipulation is illegal in the US and most countries
around the world. Many papers such as Hart (1977) and Jarrow (1992) analyzed price
manipulation in a model of asset pricing.
2.5 Summary of Bond Databases
Previous sections describe each bond database and we can see that there are some
overlapped and non-overlapped parts among databases. It is complementary to analyze
these databases together so that the analysis is more completed. From Table 1.1 and
1.2, they show types of data that are in common and some types of data that are
unique to a database. For instance, all data contain corporate, agency, and 144A
bonds. However, only SDC data provide ultimate parent CUSIP. The longest history
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is FISD issues which started in 1950. The shortest history is TRACE which started
in 2002. Except TRACE, other databases contain redemption and rating information.
The most important information contained in TRACE is the detailed transactions of
bonds traded in the secondary market. Research in bond micro structure mostly rely
on TRACE data. However, when it comes to the characteristics of bonds, TRACE
needs help from other databases, such as Mergent FISD and SDC.
Figure 1.7 shows number of firms issued bonds in each dataset. The number of
firms issued bonds is in the range of 1,000 to little over 10,000 for all four datasets.
For the time line, I only scope based on the eMAXX data that cover from 1999Q1 to
2013Q2 though some data start before 1999Q2. eMAXX covers number of firms much
more than other types of data. eMAXX covers a number of firms in the range of 8,000
to 10,000. Mergent FISD and SDC Platinum are very stable in terms of number of
firms they covered. The range of firms covered by Mergent FISD and SDC is from
2,000 to 4,000. TRACE started the data in 2002 and sharply increased in coverage
ever since and became the second largest dataset that covers number of firms issued
bonds. After 2011, TRACE covers more than 4,000 issuers. The same pattern can
also be observed from Figure 1.8 that Mergent FISD and SDC Platinum are very
stable in their coverage in terms of the number of issue (9-digit CUSIP). eMAXX
has the largest coverage following by TRACE. Again, I would like to emphasize the
importance of merging different bond datasets to have a more complete information of
a bond market, because each dataset contains different information and unique bonds.
2.6 GE Case Study: An Example of Four Databases Merged
I would like to show how merging the four bond databases useful by creating a case
study on General Electric (GE). Assume that the CFO of GE would like to understand
more about its bond buying and selling activities in case the CFO can come up with
a plan to make the bond issuance process more efficient. Some interesting questions
would be “Who buys our bonds and by what amount?” “Do we have many bondholders
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or only a few bondholders purchase our bonds?” “Can we reduce the cost of issuing
bonds by selling our bonds to some specific institutional investors directly?” and so
on. These questions can be addressed with the combined bond databases. The reason
that I choose GE as an example is that GE has issued a variety of bonds, such as
different sizes and redemption features, and has a long history of bonds issuing since
1966. First, in order to have complete information of GE about its bond issuance,
I merge all four databases: TRACE (T), Mergent FISD (F), eMAXX (E), and SDC
Platinum (S). Then, I subset only information about GE for further analysis.
From Table 1.3, the column “FLAG” means the bond issues (9-digit CUSIP) appear
in which database. For example, if the FLAG shows a single letter such as T, it means
the issues only appear in TRACE. If the FLAG shows two letters such as TE, it
means the issues appear in both TRACE and eMAXX. The four-letter FTSE means
the issues appear in all four databases. The data in Table 1.3 are bonds issued by
GE from 1966 to 2013. The number of all bonds issued by GE is 2,648. Majority of
them appears only in TRACE. In other words, 637 issues out of 2,648 only appear
in TRACE database. 2.5 percent of issues appear in all four databases. We can see
that there is no single database that contains all the issues from GE. This gives us an
interesting conclusion that considering only one database may not be able to refer to
the universe of bonds.
How many bonds offered by each database is an interesting question. Some types of
database may cover more bonds. We can use GE as an example to illustrate this point.
Table 1.4 shows a unique number of GE bonds available in each database. TRACE
covered largest number of bonds 1,624 following by eMAXX 1,350. However, TRACE
only provides data about the transactions of bonds in the secondary market. To have
information about the bonds characteristics, one needs to resort to other databases,
such as Mergent FISD and SDC.
Starting from TRACE, we would want to see the most important information that
TRACE can offer, which is bond transaction data. Since FINRA has been encouraged
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transparency in the bond market in the same way as equity market, over time, we
have more detailed information about the bond trading. From TRACE, Table 1.5
shows summary statistics of all GE bonds’ transactions from issuance to maturity.
The highest number is 150,411 which is very high when we compare to the mean and
median of the bonds traded. The maximum number of transaction at 150,411 is an
outlier because at percentile 99th, the number of transactions is 48,010. The maximum
is three times larger than the percentile 99th. The minimum number of transaction
is as low as one transaction. The mean of the number of transaction of GE bonds is
2,849. This means, on average, from issuance to maturity of a given GE bond, it was
traded around 2,849 times. We would be interested in the bonds with a high number
of transactions and see their characteristics. Table 1.6 shows ten highest-transaction
of GE issues. The highest transaction for the GE bond is GE:AAD or the GE bond
with a CUSIP 36962GYY4. To this point, we use all four databases to obtain the
universe of GE bonds and use TRACE transaction data to find the bond with highest
activity in the secondary market.
One of the interesting questions is to examine the market reaction before and after
the offering and maturity dates, respectively. Stoll and Whaley (1990) showed in their
work that at the opening of the NYSE market, the volatility is greater than when the
market is closing. The cause of greater volatility could be attributed to asymmetric
information in which some parties possess private information. The same idea could
be applied to a bond with early opening (before offering date) and late closing (after
maturity date). What could be a price or volatility pattern during these abnormal
trading periods? and why do we have such special periods? With combined bond
databases, especially SDC for this context, we have information about the underwriter
of bonds both IPO and seasoned. Some bond underwriters may associate with a degree
of asymmetric information in that they first survey the bond prices from interested
investors, then underwriters suggest what could be the price of bonds or yield at
issue. In this case, underwriters have an incentive to sell the bonds as much as they
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can in order to grow their reputation in the market. With eMAXX bondholding
data, we might address a question “Does underwriter affect the type of bondholders?”
Some underwriters may tailor their set price to a certain investors. For instance, if
underwriters survey the potential bond price from interested investors and they know
that large bondholders prefer a certain price, will they set price so that it favors those
large bondholders? If underwriters can sell all bonds out successfully, they will be
rehired by other firms to help issuing bonds. If underwriters do tailor their selling
to a certain bondholder, what will be the reaction of the CFO after he or she finds
out? The CFO could bypass the underwriter service and offer the bonds to the major
bondholders directly. This could reduce the issuing cost and, perhaps, increase the
returns for bondholders. If GE chooses not to increase the returns for bondholders,
GE will have higher revenue because of the lower issuing cost. An interesting question
that can be addressed is whether issuers with high concentration in bond ownership
or issuers with only a few bondholders per issue have higher yield at issuance or
higher profit margin. Consequently, we would be interested in the characteristics of
the highest transaction bond GE:AAD. We can obtain the bond characteristics from
Mergent FISD data. GE:AAD is a ten-year bond. The offering date of this bond
is May 31, 2002. The maturity date is June 15, 2012. When we cross check with
the Mergent FISD transaction data in Table 1.7 and Table 1.8, we can see that there
were transactions before and after the offering date and maturity date, respectively.
This emphasizes an interesting bond market mechanism whether underwriters or other
market participants play a role here.
Even though the liquidity in bond markets is far less than the stock market, the
volatility in bond market could be very high similar to the stock market during the
crisis period. From the market maker point of view, this is very interesting. We
may come up with a question “Who were the market makers during the period?” and
“What was the degree of asymmetric information in the bond market during the crisis
period?”. Therefore, we would like to see a plot of GE:AAD transactions over time.
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The graph of GE:AAD bond transactions is plotted in Figure 1.5. We can see that
during the financial crisis in 2007 the bonds have extremely high trading activities.
From Table 1.9, the daily average number of transaction for this bond was 60, but
during the crisis the number of transaction went up as high as 1,237 transactions.
If we look carefully at the graph, we will see two spikes on the graph. GE at that
time were struggling to get bailout money from either government or private sector
(Berkshire Hathaway was part of the deal at that time). When the news came out
that GE was close to get the bailout, the market calmed down. During the normal
period, the bond trading volume was very stable; however, during the crisis period,
the volume was much higher and this indicated high volatility.
Then, I merged the data with eMAXX and analyzed the bondholders for this high
activity bond. Figure 1.6 shows that the largest holder for this bond is life insurance
(pink color) following by mutual fund (light brown color). The third largest holder is
property and casualty insurance (green color). On average, life insurance held around
60 percent of total bond outstanding. Mutual fund gained its turf during 2009Q2 to
2011Q1. An interesting observation is that, in 2008Q3, the portion of government
pension (GPE in dark brown color) is much higher comparing to other quarters. At
the same time, the portion of life insurance is much smaller comparing to the previous
quarter. This may imply an exchange in bonds between the two parties during the
crisis period. Another interesting observation from Figure 1.6 is, after the 2007 crisis,
mutual fund had higher proportion of holding. We may want to investigate further
why mutual funds held more of this GE bond during the two-year period after the
crisis. It could be that the investment policy of mutual fund and insurance is different.
Mutual funds, especially active funds, can have a very flexible investment policy to
invest in risky bonds as long as they can expect higher return. However, insurance
companies cannot really take high risk, because their liabilities are in effect and their
policies are mainly to match the duration of liabilities and assets. If the volatility of
their assets are too high, they may have to find other alternatives, such as treasury
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bonds which have less volatility. Moreover, insurance companies are subject to capital
requirement similar to banks. If their assets have higher risk, the risk-weighted asset
value would be higher and they may be required to increase capital. If they do not
want to increase capital, they may have to sell those assets. This is an interesting point
that could relate to “fire sale” literature. Whether mutual funds exploit the fact that
some institutional bondholders (e.g., insurance) are subject to a holding constraint is
an interesting research question.
The pattern of bondholders whether it is more or less concentrated over time is
also interesting, because the number of bondholders could affect the renegotiation
process when GE is in financial distress. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) find that it is
costly for distressed firms to negotiate the debt term with many creditors who may
have different decisions during the negotiation process. From Table 1.10, we can see
that the number of holders for this bond was increasing until 2009Q2, then it kept
decreasing, with a brief increase in 2010Q3, from the highest number of holder at
380 in 2009Q2 to 215 in 2012Q1. Similar to the number of bondholders that proxy






Bi is the percentage holding to total bond value outstanding of the i
th bondholder.
The maximum value of HFI is one and it means that there is only one bondholder
holding the bond. The lower the number is, the less concentrated the bondholdings are.
We can see from Table 1.11 that the increasing Herfindahl Index (HFI) is consistent
with the decreasing number of bondholder. That means the concentration of holding
is higher. From Figure 1.6, the mutual fund held less and life insurance gained more
holding when the time was approaching the maturity. Usually, life insurance should
have longer bondholding horizon, because the nature of its liabilities has very long
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period of time. Based on the data from WHO, life expectancy of people in all regions in
the world has been increasing. This could lead to a longer bond investment horizon for
insurance companies. In other words, the pattern of insurance holding increasing when
a bond is approaching its maturity could be from the nature of long-term investment
policy of insurance business.
After we understand the general ownership structure of GE:AAD bond that it had
increasing in ownership concentration over time, we analyze in more details regarding
the ownership by observing top five holders of the bond for each quarter. At this
point, the CFO may want to know who are the top holders or largest holders of GE
bonds. We may ask a question “Does holding higher share in bonds has a relationship
with bond trading or performance?”. From Table 1.12, AXA Equitable Life Insurance
Company is the largest holder from 2006Q1 to 2008Q3, except for 2007Q1 which
ING USA Annuity & Life Insurance Co took the position of the largest bondholder.
From 2008Q4 to 2012Q1, John Hancock Life Insurance Co Is the largest holders and
AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company was not in the top five until 2011Q4 that it
came back to be number five. Among the top five over time, we can see big names
in insurance and mutual funds took turns to be in the top five holders of GE:AAD
bond. For example, large insurance companies such as ING and American Life were
the second largest bondholder of GE:AAD in many quarters. Large mutual funds from
T. Rowe Price and Vanguard also invested largely in this bond. It is useful to see the
dynamic of bondholdings in terms of identifying the influence of who own the bond at
a point in time. As mentioned in the beginning of the analysis, the CFO may want to
know these large institutional bondholders so that GE may increase its bond issuance
efficiency by understanding more what these institutional bondholders need. The
uniqueness of the eMAXX data is we can see who had been purchasing the bonds over
time or who had been selling. For instance, John Hancock Life Insurance (Hancock) as
the third largest bondholder of GE:AAD purchased the bond since 2006Q1. In 2008,
Hancock became the second largest holder and finally the largest holder since 2008Q4.
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The position of large bondholders, such as Handcock in this case, may have an effect
on the bond’s return. There are literature about the relationship between informed
investors and firm performance. Mostly, when investors have large holding in a firm,
they could arrange a special meeting or visit the firm to learn more about the firm’s
current situation. This close relationship may result in a better performance of bond
investment.
Some people may ask why bondholding is more concentrated or less concentrated
over time and what could be the determinant. The previous information shows the
name of top bondholders, but it is also interesting to see the percentage holding to
overall bond outstanding from these top bondholders. Table 1.13 shows top five per-
centage holding out of total bond amount outstanding for GE:AAD bond. We can
see that in the beginning the largest holder held around 6 percent of total bond out-
standing. In the first quarter of 2006, top five largest holders held 27 percent of total
bond outstanding. Over time, the largest holder increased the portion from around 6
percent to more than 10 percent in the last quarter of bond life. In the last quarter, the
top five holders held 38 percent of bond outstanding which increased from 27 percent
in the first quarter.
In conclusion, the GE case study here shows us that it is much more comprehensive
when examined bondholding through the lens of combined four databases. We can
see the transaction activities through TRACE and bond characteristics from both
Mergent FISD and SDC Platinum. Lastly, the dynamic of bondholdings comes from
the eMAXX institutional bondholding data. Even though the data on debt financing is
not as prevalent as equity financing, we could understand more about the debt market,
especially corporate bonds in this report, by aggregating different databases in order
to have a more complete picture of the debt market. The next section describes the
eMAXX data starting from bond characteristics.
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3. Bond Characteristics
eMAXX data come with many different text-delimited files. These files represent
information of bonds in each aspect: issuers, holders, managing firms, personnel, etc.
For bond characteristics, the main file is “security master” file or SECMAST. The file
provides information in the following.
1. Maturity date
2. Market sector: A=asset backed, C=corporate, G=government, M=mortgage-
backed, R=Local/Regional (including, municipal issues and issues of non-us mu-
nicipal issuers i.e. Hydro-Quebec, City of Berlin, Province of Nova Scotia, etc.),
N=US firms investing non-domestically
3. Collateral code
4. Private placement
5. Issue amount outstanding
6. Net change: Total net change in total par amount held from previous reporting
period
7. Number of holding sub-accounts 3: Total number of sub-accounts currently hold-
ing the issue
8. Number of buying sub-accounts 4: Total number of sub-accounts who have in-
creased/purchased positions in the issue
9. Number of selling sub-accounts: Total number of sub-accounts who have de-
creased or sold-off positions in the issue
3Sub-accounts in eMAXX means the name of bondholders. These sub-accounts have their own
unique sub-account ID that identifies each holder.
4This data is in quarterly format. The change in buying and selling accounts reflects the trans-
action in each quarter
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10. Total par amount held: Total par amount held of issue by all “holding” sub-
account
11. Pledge code: Type of bonds such as debenture, bond, certificate deposit, etc.
12. Rating by Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch
13. Coupon rate and type
The time range of my analysis is from 1999Q3 to 2013Q2. The characteristics of
issuers are analyzed in this section. For a quick summary of data, total number of
observation of the aggregated SECMAST file is 2,467,413. The number of unique bond
issued in this data is 199,875. This number of unique bond issued takes into account
9-digit CUSIP. Based on the number of unique bond issued in this data, eMAXX is
one of the most comprehensive bond databases.
One of the interesting information from eMAXX is the identification of 144A bonds.
144A rule is a SEC rule modifying a two-year holding period restriction. For private
placement bonds, the investors have to hold it for at least two years. However, 144A
rule allows qualified institutional buyers to trade these bonds among themselves im-
mediately without the two-year holding restriction. This modification of 144A has its
purpose to increase the liquidity of the securities and, in turn, increase the number
of new issuance in the bond market. Out of 199,875 bonds, 24,487 bonds are 144A
bonds. Special characteristics of 144A bonds may result in different types of hold-
ers. Bondholders of 144A bonds may require higher liquidity. Without the two-year
holding period restriction, 144A bonds would be very tempting for short-term holders.
For instance, some active mutual funds which trade bonds quite frequently may find
144A bonds very interesting as they can trade the bonds at their desired time without
two-year holding restriction.
For this section, I discuss eMAXX bond characteristics in the following orders:
coupon structure, currency, collateral, private-placement bonds, credit ratings, matu-
rity, and callable feature.
37
3.1 Coupon Structure
The first information of bond characteristics from eMAXX data that I would like to
consider is coupon structure. In finance, there are many types of coupon such as fixed
rate, floating, zero, etc. The question is “what is the majority of coupon type in the
US bond market?” If most of the bondholders are insurance companies which need to
invest in assets with certain income, we would expect that most issuers would issue
fixed-rate bonds. The main strategy of the insurance companies is to match assets
and liabilities or we call it duration matching. In order to reduce the risk of income
uncertainty, insurance companies would prefer to hold fixed-rate bonds so that they
know their durations of the assets precisely. From Table 1.14, 81 percent of bonds
issued are fixed rate type. 15 percent are floating rate. The rest consists of zero
coupon, step-up rate, stripped coupon, and inverse floating. As we expected, most of
the bonds are fixed-rate bonds since the cost and benefit are easier to calculate. The
floating rate bonds can be higher or lower cost and benefit depending on the interest
rate trends and whether you are the borrower or lender. On the borrower side, floating
rate could reduce the cost of borrowing when the market interest rate is decreasing;
however, when the interest rate is increasing, it could increase the borrowing cost of
a firm. These two opposite consequences and difficulty to predict the interest rate
trend could be the reason for the popularity of fixed rate bonds. On the lender side,
similar reasons could be considered. Investors may want to know exactly what the
return of the investment is going to be. As mentioned, insurance companies perform
the asset-liability duration matching. If an actuary does not know their certain bond
investment returns, it could be very difficult to match liabilities with assets. Moreover,
there are 10,143 bonds with changes in coupon type over time. For example, some
bonds had their coupon type changed from fixed coupon to floating coupon at some
point in time.
After we see the big picture of coupon type that most bonds are fixed-rate coupon,
it would be also interesting to analyze coupon types by different types of bonds, such as
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private placement versus overall bonds issued. Different types of bonds could exploit
a certain type of coupon. For example, floating-rate bonds should be issued more
when the market interest rates favor the issuers. From Table 1.15, there are five
types of coupon payment: fixed-rate, floating-rate, zero, step, and strip. Majority of
the bonds issued is fixed-rate coupon bonds. For all types of bond filters (all data,
private placement, 144A), fixed coupon payment is around 70 to 80 percent of total
bond outstanding. However, for 144A bonds, the floating-rated coupon payment is
significantly higher than all data and private placement bonds on average. 144A
bond is a bond that is privately sold to qualified institutional investors such as large
banks and investment funds. In other words, the investors for 144A bonds are more
sophisticated and should understand the structure of the floating-rated bonds; hence,
this could be a reason that the proportion of the floating-rated bonds issued for 144A
bonds are higher. However, non-financial US 144A bonds are the only type in 144A
bonds that did not exhibit higher floating-rated bonds on average.
Another possibility that could explain why the 144A bonds have higher portion of
floating-rate bonds is the interest rate trend. We would expect that the bond this type
should be issued when the trend of the interest rate is decreasing and this is true in this
data for 144A bonds. If the logical reason described is true, a next related question is
whether issuers exploit the 144A rule channel to issue bonds to capture other benefits.
For example, if an issuer knows that it has a chance to be downgraded in the near
future, will they quickly issue bonds to exploit the current lower borrowing cost before
the downgrade? After the downgrade, definitely, the higher credit risk will be added on
to the borrowing cost. As stated, Issuers use 144A bonds to quickly capture the current
interest rate environment. The result of the analysis can be found in Table 1.16. When
I analyze the issuance year of the 144A bonds, I find that 144A bonds usually issued in
the years that interest rates were peak. For instance, from 1930 to 2013 time period,
20 percent of 144A bonds were issued in 2006 and 2007 where the federal funds rate
was peak at 5 percent. After 2007, the interest rates were decreased shapely to almost
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zero in 2009. The reason might be that 144A is more flexible and liquid. A demand
to issue floating rate bonds during the downward trend of the interest rate should be
high from the perspective of issuers, because the cost of borrowing will be decreasing
over time. However, predicting interest rates are difficult. It requires analyses of many
aspects of economy both public and private sectors as well as international perspective.
Therefore, an issuer cannot be so sure about the downward trend of the interest rate
until all the economic indicators show an obvious sign of economic slowdown. Hence,
issuing a type of bonds that can be quickly issued such as 144A bonds in this case
may be preferred. 144A rule bonds do not require SEC registration and 2-year holding
period. Exempt from these two requirements, 144A rule bonds can be distributed to
bondholders faster and their liquidity is enhanced significantly.
3.2 Currency
In my analysis, I focus on the US corporate bonds. However, there are bonds issued
in different currencies other than the US dollar in eMAXX database. In this section,
we move on to illustrate different currencies of bonds issued. A research question
here is whether issuing a bond in a certain currency would benefit the issuers in
some way. Do bondholders behave differently when the currency of bonds is not
the US dollar? Whether bondholders behave differently when they invest in bonds
with different currencies is an interesting question that can be addressed by eMAXX.
Some currencies such as USD and EURO are very liquid. Bonds denominated by a
liquid currency might be preferred to a less liquid one. For instance, in terms of the
repo market, some bonds with currencies that have much lower liquidity than other
currencies may receive less return or have higher haircut because of the currency risk.
Table 1.17 shows top 20 of the currency issued from eMAXX data. Majority of the
bond issued is in USD with the proportion of roughly 77 percent. This makes sense
because the data focus on the corporate bonds issued in the US. The interesting point
for this data is it also contains other currencies other than the US. The second and
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third largest currencies are Euro and Japanese yen, respectively. Interestingly, there
are 1,505 bonds with changes in currency over time. Some bonds, for example, a
bond with CUSIP 00087MAA in the year 2000, the currency is USD but in 2002
the currency changed to CAD. Top-five currencies take almost 90 percent of overall
currencies. However, I would expect all major currencies in the US dollar index as
top currencies. Based on the US dollar index consisting of six major currencies in
the world: Euro (EUR), Japanese yen (JPY), Pound sterling (GBP), Canadian dollar
(CAD), Swedish krona (SEK), and Swiss franc (CHF), two currencies, SEK and CHF,
did not make it to the top list here. In fact, both of them have the lowest percentage
in this data at around less than 0.2 percent. On the other hand, Indian rupee (INR)
and South Korean Won (KRW) have the percentage very close to CAD and GBP. It is
interesting that these two currencies are quite active in the US bond market. Studies
of international bonds show that the excess return of bonds in different countries,
especially large countries, is highly correlated. Ilmanen (1995) finds that the same
set of variables can predict the variation in long-maturity government bond returns
in six countries. In the same manner, we would expect the bondholding from large
institutional bondholders to trade on the same set of information. Therefore the
directions of trade could be either overbought or oversold. This consistent with the
herd behavior in bond market observed by Cai et al. (2019). Cai et al. (2019) actually
find that the degree of herd behavior from institutional investors in corporate bonds is
higher than the equity markets. Moreover, they find that the buy-side herding helps
increase price discovery, but the sell-side herding results in price distortions. The
section of bonds that has the highest level of herding is speculative-grade bonds.
3.3 Collateral and Type of Bond
Another interesting aspect of bond is its collateral. In asset-backed bonds, the col-
lateral could be anything from housing loan to a personal loan. In debt literature,
collateral is important when firms decide to borrow either from the public or from
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private entity such as bank. There are mixed theoretical predictions regarding this
issue whether collateral status affects the choice of debt issuance, for example, by
Johnson (1997), Cantillo and Wright (2000), Denis and Mihov (2003), and Rauh and
Sufi (2010). eMAXX data also provides information about the bond collateral. From
Table 1.18, almost 100 percent has collateral as general corporate obligation. Since
most of the bonds in this analysis is corporate bonds, that is the reason most collat-
eral is general corporate obligation. General corporate obligation means no specific
assets assign as collateral. There are two bonds with single family mortgage loans as
collateral. As with coupon structure and currency issued, there are six bonds with
collateral status changed sometime before they matured.
Types of bonds could also affect the decisions of firms when they need capital
from external debt. For example, short-term or long-term bond issuances depends
on the cost of funding and investment horizon. This data may answer interesting
questions in the aspect of type of bonds and holding. For example, why do some firms
issue Medium Term Notes (MTN)? The benefit for MTN issuers is the flexibility to
re-issue bonds without registering with SEC again. For the investors, the medium
term duration and the fact that they can expect the MTN to be issued regularly
help investors effectively plan out their investment portfolio. Similar to the property
of 144A previously mentioned, both MTN and 144A have the flexibility of quickly
turnaround. We might be able to test the association of MTN and the issuing period
that MTN may be usually issued during the downward trend of the interest rate.
Because MTN does not require SEC registration every time it is issued, issuers may
want to issue series of MTN during the downward trend of interest rate. For the type
of bonds or in this data eMAXX named it “pledge”, from Table 1.19, 63 percent of
the pledge is Note/Bond. 20 percent of the pledge is MTN. More than 80 percent
of bonds are either Note/Bond or Medium Term Notes. This pledge is the type or
category of debt issuance. We can see that the data consist of several types of bonds;
therefore, we can address this issue using eMAXX that a certain characteristics of an
42
issuer should be associated with a certain type of bonds issued.
3.4 Bonds Placed Privately and Bonds Issued in Public Markets
An important question is why do some firms issue private debt, such as bank loan,
and some of them issued public debt? Prevalent literature are on the determinant of
choice between public and private debts. For example, Johnson (1997) find that firms
use more public debt when they have low information and monitoring costs, lower
cost of inefficient liquidation, and low probability of taking actions that are harmful to
lenders. Moreover, on the private debt side, researchers have tried to understand the
determinant of choices in private debt. For instance, Ojah and Manrique (2005) find
that the likelihood of using bank debt is increasing with the firm size and information
availability, but decreasing with the firm credit worthiness. They explained that the
positive relation between the firm size and the use of bank debt is the lower cost
of information gathering for large firms. As for the negative relation between the
bank debt and the firm credit worthiness, the higher the credit worthiness the firm
possesses, the more firms have an access to the public debt markets. In other words,
it is more optimal for creditworthy firms to issue public debt than borrowing privately
from banks. Creditworthy firms have lower asymmetric problems, therefore the cost
of borrowing in the public market is lower. In the public debt market, to issue a
bond, most firms hire credit rating agencies to assign a rating for them. The rating
is one of the main proxies for investors to judge firms’ credit worthiness. If firms
have a high rating, they would have a lower cost of borrowing than the lower rating
firms. Therefore, it could be more efficient for firms to reduce the private bank debt
and increase the public bond issuance when they have higher credit worthiness. We
understand more how firms make a decision between private and public debt from
debt financing literature, such as Houston and James (1996), Krishnaswami, Spindt,
and Subramaniam (1999). However, none of them focus on the types of private debt,
bank loan and private placement bonds, except Denis and Mihov (2003) and Kwan and
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Carleton (2010). Denis and Mihov (2003) analysis is on the rule 144A bonds whereas
Kwan and Carleton (2010) focus on non-rule 144A bonds. Because of a lack of data,
there has been limited research on the determinant of public debt choices.
My analyses document that, on average, 70 percent of bonds are non-private place-
ment or registered for public sale in eMAXX. In other words, most of the bond in
eMAXX are offered publicly. For more details of the dynamic of bonds issued pri-
vately and publicly, from Table 1.20, the percentage of private placement of issuers
out of total bond outstanding was decreasing. In 1999, the proportion of private place-
ment bond to total bond outstanding is 40, but, at the later time, the percentage is
lower to around 30 percent. The lowest percentage bonds issued privately is in 2011
and 2012 with as low as 27 percent. From the literature, the lower portion of private
placement bonds compared to the public bonds should be related to a certain degree of
asymmetric information problem. Smaller portion of private-placement bonds implies
lower asymmetric information in the corporate bond markets. These questions can
be better addressed by using the eMAXX database since we will also know a type of
bondholders. The type of bondholders could imply the level of asymmetric informa-
tion. For instance, passive investors such as insurance companies and pension funds
may not care much about the asymmetric information, because most of the bonds
they purchase are investment grade bonds. Investment-grade bonds should have lower
asymmetric information problem since they should have higher corporate governance
and efficiency.
The timing of private and public debt issuances should also be an interesting re-
search topic. We would expect that the public bonds should be issued less during a
financial crisis or during the capital market downturn, because investors would be very
risk-averse and do not want to lend the money easily during the financial crisis period.
Therefore, the chance of unsuccessful bond issuances is high. In my analysis of the
private-placement bonds issuance timing, an interesting observation in Table 1.21 is
that, during a crisis, bonds were mostly issued privately as expected. For instance,
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from 2008 to 2010, the median of public issued bonds is very small compared to other
years. This might come from the fact that investors were not confident with the capital
market. Consequently, there was no liquidity in the market. However, for the private
placement channel, both counter parties could strike a deal that satisfy investors such
as additional collateral or haircut. In other words, when the public has low confidence
in the capital market and economy, it could be preferable for firms to issuer bonds
privately.
3.5 Credit Ratings of the Issuers
A rating of bonds is one of the most important topics for corporate bonds. When
the bond’s rating changes, it could impact many things from the price of bonds to
the perspective of investors on bonds. With eMAXX bondholding data, when bond’s
rating changes, we can see the dynamic of bondholdings during the event. Therefore,
it is worthwhile to look at the rating of bonds in eMAXX database. From Table 1.22,
more than half of bonds in eMAXX data have no rating or are unidentified. From
Table 1.23, majority of the bonds that have a rating is investment grade (76 percent).
Top three largest are Aaa, A3, Aa3, respectively. The largest portion of rating is Aaa.
From Table 1.24, on average, a rating of bonds in the eMAXX data is Baa1. However,
the median shows higher rating as A3. Overall, both mean and median show that the
rating of bonds on average is investment grade. For the US financial companies, the
average rating is higher than the data overall. The rating for the US financial firms is
A2 while the overall rating is Baa1.
It is very interesting that half of the bonds is not rated. We would be interested
in the characteristics of bonds without rating. These bonds could be church bonds
or bonds issued by small regional companies that are not required the bonds’ rating.
There is a literature that examined some types of non-rated bonds. Reeve and Herring
(1986) examined non-rated municipal bonds and find that the cost of borrowing was
higher because of the larger par value, but not because of lower quality as prior studies
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indicated. One can conduct research along the line of Reeve and Herring (1986) on
non-municipal and non-rated bonds to see the structure of the interest cost whether the
different interest costs are from a factor that could be different from the rated bonds.
We may find that the determinants of bond value for non-rated bonds could be very
different from the rated bonds. Next, I discuss another specific type of bonds which
are very popular as another asset for investors to enhance yields of their portfolios.
Another popular topic for both finance researcher and also for investors is the
topic of “junk bond”. Junk bond or high-yield bond is a bond with lower rating than
investment grade or rating lower than BBB. Since junk bonds have higher risk of de-
fault according to their ratings, they should provide more return as a compensation
for higher risk. A literature on high-yield bonds is generally extensive. For instance,
Alexander et al. (2000) tested the agency conflict between stock holders and bond-
holders using an event that was associated with the agency issue. They consider the
directions of returns from stocks and high-yield bonds. If the two returns had the op-
posite direction during an event associated with the agency conflict, it indicates that
there is an agency conflict between shareholders and high-yield bondholders. With
eMAXX, we could delve deeper into how high-yield bondholders react to an event
that is associated with the agency conflict. Some interesting questions could be “Who
is the new bondholders after the agency conflict event?” Whether the new high-yield
bondholders have confidence that they can help reduce the agency conflict or whether
they are just uninformed investors who do not know about the situation are interesting
research questions to further explore. Therefore, it is of interesting to observe the pro-
portion of junk bonds to overall bonds over time. From Table 1.25, from 1999 to 2004,
the proportion of junk bonds is in the range of 30 to 50 percent. After 2004, the junk
bond proportion is around 30 percent. From Figure 1.13, we can see that there was a
decreasing in investment grade bonds from 2000 to 2002. During those time periods,
the telecom industry faced a downturn and it was also aggravated by the downturn in
the US economy resulted in high default rates and downgrade of bonds. On average,
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the default rate during this period was 9.2 percent. This number is four times higher
than the average in the period of 1992 to 1999. In fact, 2002 had the record for defaults
and bankruptcies. The number of default and bankruptcies decreased sharply in 2003.
We can also see a drop in investment grade bond proportion in 2007, which is also a
crisis year. In this case, the agency conflict between the stock holders and bondholders
during a financial crisis is an interesting issue that can be addressed using eMAXX.
3.6 Maturity
Rating of bonds can give investors an idea how risky those bonds are or how much
the default risk is. Other than the default risk, liquidity risk is another aspect that
affects yield or price of bonds. Longer maturity bonds should result in higher yield
than shorter maturity bonds, because investors should be compensated more owing
to giving up more consumption for long-term bond investment. Some bond investors
would prefer a certain period of maturity. For example, insurance and pension bond-
holders may prefer long-term bonds to short-term ones, because the structure of their
liabilities tend to be long. Whether bondholdings by these long-term bondholders af-
fect bond value is another interesting question that can be addressed using eMAXX.
What are the determinants of corporate debt maturity? Researchers have made signif-
icant progress to answer the question. For example, Barclay and Smith (1995) found
that larger firms issued more long-term debt whereas small firms issued short-term
debt. They showed that their findings were consistent with contracting-cost hypothe-
sis. Contracting-cost hypothesis was first mentioned by Myers (1977). Myers (1977)
stated that firms with many growth opportunities tend to have less debt in their capital
in order that stockholders can earn net returns high enough after the debt holders take
their parts. Diamond (1993) also showed that a credit quality of a firm was associated
with the debt maturity. Lower credit rating firms are likely to issue more short-term
debt. On the other hand, high credit rating firms tend to issue more long-term debt.
Do demands from long-term bond investors, such as life insurance, result in longer
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maturity bonds offered by issuers? As for the maturity of bonds in eMAXX on av-
erage, from Table 1.26, median maturity of bond issues is 7 years. The maximum is
150 years. There are 48,962 missing issue date and 4,373 missing maturity date. For
bonds with the missing date, either issue or maturity date, there will be no information
about maturity for those bonds. To analyze in more details about maturity of bonds
in different sub-sample, Table 1.27 shows the average bond maturity for different types
of data. For all data, the average maturity of bonds issued are around 13 years. The
maturity for the US issuers are also around 13 years. However, US non-financial issuers
issued bonds with shorter maturity at around 10 years. For US financial and insurance
issuers, they issued bonds with much longer maturity at around 18 years. The range
is very wide for all types of data. The shortest maturity can be from a couple days to
as long as 100 years. From the univariate analysis, we can see that, on average, the
maturities of bonds issued are long-term. The demand of the bondholders could be a
reason for the averagely long maturity bonds.
3.7 Callable Bonds
Another important feature of bonds is a call feature. A callable bond is an advantage to
issuers since, at an appropriate time for issuers, issuers can call back the bonds. When
issuers call back the bonds from investors, the issuers pay off debt and investors receive
principal back with a determined call price. The callable bond usually has higher
return than non-callable bond given other aspects are the same, because investors
have higher reinvestment risk. When a bond is called, investors need to find another
bond to invest and the new bond may have lower returns than the called bond. The
interaction between the shareholders and bondholders for bonds with and without
call feature could be very different based on the literature. We can understand more
about the issue of agency conflict between shareholders and bondholders and callable
feature of bonds. One can test the agency cost for bondholders using corporate bond
yield and bondholding changes each period between callable and non-callable bonds.
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The higher corporate bond yield and abnormal bondholding movement (i.e., excessive
buy or sell) may indicate the agency prospect of firms issued debt. Therefore, it is
important to perform a univariate analysis on the callable bonds. From Table 1.28,
the proportion of callable bonds in eMAXX data is on average more than 50 percent of
overall bond outstanding from 1999 until 2005. After 2005, the proportion of callable
bond is lower on average to 30 percent. Overall, we can see that first half of the
data the callable bond and non-callable bond proportion is close to each other. After
2005, it is interesting to explore more why callable bond portion has been smaller.
Robbins and Schatzberg (1986) explored why callable bonds became popular, which
is consistent with the bonds issued before 2005 in this data. Robbins and Schatzberg
(1986) associated the prevalence of callable bonds with signaling theory where good
prospect firms usually issue callable bonds. If the firms perform well, they can call
back the loan and enjoy the positive outcome without sharing it with bondholders.
However, since the opposite is true for bonds after 2005 in this sample, the signaling
theory may not be applied in this case. The decrease usage of callable bond I found
here is in line with Crabbe and Helwege (1994) that agency theory explaining the
increase usage of callable bonds may not applied in the later period. Crabbe and
Helwege (1994) pointed to the sample of previous research that mainly focused on
the bond issued before 1982. Bonds issued before 1982 were almost always callable.
The argument by Chen et al (2010) states that firms issue callable bonds to hedge
their investment uncertainty. When firms face risky future investment opportunities,
they issue callable bonds in case the project results in Negative NPV; then, they can
reduce their debt obligation by calling back their loans. This is opposite to Robbins




Overall, for bond characteristics, we can see that eMAXX provides lots of useful infor-
mation. The characteristics can be broken down to many segments, such as 144A VS
non-144A, private VS public, callable VS non-callable bonds. Each segment has its
own interesting research questions which will be summarized in the conclusion section.
The time range of my analysis is from 1999Q1 to 2013Q2. During the period, eMAXX
covers almost 200,000 bonds. Majority of the bonds in eMAXX has fixed-coupon rate.
Larger portion of floating-rated bonds is observed in 144A bonds. As expected, two-
thirds of the bonds is in USD currency since eMAXX focuses on the US corporate
bonds. 80 percent of bonds are either general corporate bonds/notes or medium term
notes. Around one-third of the bonds is issued privately. Bonds issued in eMAXX
data are mostly investment grade and most of them have long maturity, roughly 10
years. Over time, the proportion of callable bonds decreased from 50 percent to 30
percent in which the turning point is after 2005. Next, we move on to the bondholder
information.
4. Analyses of Bond Investors
Holder data are also from 1999Q1 to 2013Q2 with the total number of observations
500,496. Holder data provide names of the holder and classes of the holder which is
called “sub-account class” (or subclass henceforth). Subclass ID or subID is associated
with subaccount class. Holder information also has the information about managing
firms which manage funds for bondholders. For example, Templeton is a managing firm
that manages Templeton global strategy mutual beacon fund. Please see an example
of the data in Table 1.29. There are 23,692 number of unique subclass IDs and 40,377
unique subclass names. The reason that the number of unique name is higher than the
number of unique subclass ID is the bondholders’ name can change over time. The
subclass ID tracks the same entity even though the names are changed. There are
8,928 subclass IDs with name changes or the same name but different spellings. Some
50
holders have more than one managing firms and eMAXX calls this “co-managed”.
There are 2,398 subclass IDs co-managed. Holder data also contain information about
which sector a subclass holder has holdings, which is called “market sectors”. There
are six types of market sectors in the following below.
Market sectors:
1. A – Asset backed
2. C – Corporate
3. G – Government
4. M – Mortgage-Backed
5. R – Local / Regional. Includes U.S. Municipal Issues and Issues of non-U.S.
Municipal Issuers. (i.e., Hydro-Quebec, City of Berlin, Province of Nova Scotia,
etc.)
6. N – US firms investing non-domestically. Only applies to investment profile data
(files are per job, per fund, and fund)
A mixed market sector is possible. For example, if a holder has “CGN” as mar-
ket sector, that holder invests in corporate, government, and domestic firms bonds.
However, for my analysis, I focus only on corporate bondholdings.
Table 1.30 shows top ten subclass information by unique subid. We can see that
mutual funds are the biggest portion of overall holders. It is interesting that the data
categorize mutual funds into many types that could potentially conflict each other
• Open-ended mutual fund
• Close-ended mutual fund
• Mutual fund equity
• Mutual fund balanced
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• Mutual fund fund-of-fund
• Mutual fund money market
Each has only one unique subclass information in any quarter. The last four types
of mutual funds should overlap with the first two. In other words, for instance, mutual
fund money market should be either open-ended or close-ended fund. The next largest
holders by the number of entity is insurance companies; specifically property and
casualty as well as life and health insurance companies. Moreover, Annuity/Variable
annuity, Pension fund-government, and health care systems also make it to the top ten
of the list. The three smallest holders in this data is annuity-money market, pension
fund-union, and pension fund-corporate. However, this ranking is not based on the
size of the holding but based on the count of the entity. If we consider the size of the
holding, the ranking of holder type could be different.
4.1 Type of Bondholders
The largest number of bondholder type is mutual fund; however, if we take into ac-
count the size of holding and rank largest bondholders by size of holding, we may have
a different result. The type of largest bondholders is important when we examine the
issue of renegotiation between equity holders and bondholders during bankruptcy. A
determinant of the success or failure in negotiation depends on the bargaining power
of each party. There are many theoretical papers incorporating the negotiation fric-
tion between equity holders and bondholders into debt pricing; however, empirically,
we still lack full understanding of the bondholder’s side on the negotiation process
and how it affects firm’s value. Theoretical credit risk models incorporating strategic
default and bargaining power of bondholders are, for example, Anderson and Sundare-
san (1996), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), and Fan and Sundaresan (2000). Most
empirical studies on the negotiation between equity holders and bondholders during
financial hardship period of a firm focus on the equity holders’ bargaining power. This
is an interesting question that still needs to be explored further. Table 1.31 shows
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top 30 largest bondholders based on the dollar amount holding from 1999 to 2013.
Based on the size of the holding, 24 out of 30 largest are insurance bondholders. The
largest holder is PIMCO total return fund which is categorized as open-ended mutual
funds. We can see that, based on the size of the holding, mutual fund companies are
small portion in the top 30 rank. This means there are many small mutual fund com-
panies in the data but on average the largest holders are insurance companies. Size
of bondholding may imply the bargaining power of bondholders when firms fail and
equity holders seek protection from the bankruptcy court, because large bondholders
control the future of distressed firms when it comes to the voting on the firm’s proposal
to survive the debt obligation. In addition, usually the large bondholders are large
financial institutions, such as TIAA and PIMCO, as illustrated in Table 1.31. These
large financial institutions definitely have a strong legal team in place or have enough
resources to acquire one. After equity holders receive the protection from the court,
a long period of negotiation between equity holders and bondholders starts. Equity
holders may ask for some terms that are not acceptable by bondholders such as cut-
ting principal or interest. The outcome of the renegotiation between the two parties
depends on the bargaining power of each side.
After we have a big picture of the bondholder types that are the largest bondhold-
ers, we would want to also know about the percentage bondholding in general. The
percentage holding could be another proxy for bondholder’s bargaining power. With
eMAXX, we can test the effect of bondholder’s bargaining power on the corporate
bond value. Overall, institutional investors have held large portion of corporate bonds
in the US. How the holdings impact corporate bond value or credit spreads is still
unclear. With eMAXX data, we could test on the effect of bondholding on corporate
bond value. Table 1.31 shows us the 30 largest bondholders, but we still do not know
whether these largest holdings count as large portion of the total bond outstanding.
In other words, PIMCO holds the largest amount of bonds value, but PIMCO could
hold hundreds, if not thousands, of bonds. In this case, the total amount of bonds held
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by PIMCO would be distributed to many bonds. PIMCO may hold small portion of
some bonds and hold a very large portion of other bonds. To analyze the proportion
of bonds held by institutional bondholders in eMAXX, Table 1.32 shows amount of
total par held by institutional investors out of total par amount issued. On average,
institutional investors hold around 30 to 50 percent of bond amount issued. For all
data, the range is between less than 0.01 percent holding and 100 percent of holding.
The highest average holding is for the US non-financial issuer with the mean holding
of 49 percent. The lowest average holding is the US financial issuer. The skewness
and excess kurtosis show a degree of normal distribution with both statistics being
close to zero. We can see that a large portion of bonds are held by the institutional
investors. From the univariate analysis, we would expect that the institutional bond-
holders should have high bondholder’s bargaining power relative to the equity holders.
4.2 Top Bondholders
After we have an overall percentage bondholding in general, next, it would be in-
teresting to see the percentage holding by top holders. The aggregate percentage
bondholding is an important information. However, we would want to know the por-
tion of bond held by top bondholders. For example, what is the average percentage
holding by top ten holders? If the portion of the top holders is high, how will it affect
the characteristics of future bonds issued? To analyze more on this matter, we would
want to see how much top holders for each bond issued hold bonds relative to the total
bond value in percentage term. Table 1.33 provides information about the percentage
of bonds held by the specified number of largest holders. For example, top-10 is the
top-10 largest bondholders. For all data, the top-10 largest holders held 26 percent of
the bond outstanding on average. The largest holder or top-1 held 14 percent of the
bond outstanding on average. For the US issuers, top-10 percentage holding is higher
than all data. Top-10 percent holding of the US issuers is 34 percent on average. For
US financial issuers, the numbers are similar to the overall data. However, for the US
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non-financial issuers (Nonfin US), on average, the numbers for all types of top holders
are larger than all data. For instance, the top-5 or five largest holders held 37 percent
of total bond outstanding, which is much higher compared to 23 percent of all data.
In other words, for the US non-financial issuers, the holding is more concentrated to
the large holders. For the top-10 bondholders of the US non-financial issuers, the
top-10 held almost 50 percent of the bond issued. This is of interesting to the debt
pricing. Previously, we discussed that issuers should also consider the investor’s de-
mand. When non-financial issuers decide to acquire funding through external debt by
issuing bonds to the public, they may just focus their bond characteristics to a certain
group of large institutional bondholders. For instance, the ten bondholders may have
an effect on an issuing yield of bonds. If an issuer can satisfy the return expectation
of these top-10 bondholders in setting up issuing yield, their success in bond issuance
should be very high. In other words, not only do the traditional factors that affect the
debt price (e.g., market interest rate and liquidity) impact the firm’s decision on the
initial bond yield, the structure of bondholders may also have an impact.
4.3 Quantity of Bonds Held
After the percentage holding of top holders is demonstrated, it is also interesting to
observe the number of bonds held by each type of bondholders. The heterogeneity
of number of bonds held could be tested on the ground of Dass and Massa (2014).
Dass and Massa (2014) find that choices of bond’s maturity of each issuer matter for
investors. Specifically, they find that bondholders prefer to hold bonds from issuers
who issue bonds with various maturities. They explain the result by using information-
collection cost. Bondholders incur a cost to collect data about an issuer. If they can
focus on a few issuers that have all the maturities they desire, bondholders would want
to focus on those few issuers instead of spending more time to evaluate a number of
issuers. The flip side of Dass and Massa (2014) finding is whether bondholders that
hold many bonds means that they cannot find an issuer issuing bonds with various
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maturities or whether this kind of issuers is limited and its bond sold out very quickly.
If it is the case, a natural question is who got in to those bonds first and why? Are
there many bondholders who hold many bonds? What is the average number of bonds
held? From Table 1.35, my analysis shows average number of bonds held by an investor
for a given quarter. For all data, on average number of bonds held is 65. However, the
range is large from 1 to 4,151. The wide range of average number of bonds held and
the average of 65 bonds held per bondholder imply that bondholders may not hold a
few bonds following Dass and Massa (2014). However, this is only a univariate test.
A more rigorous test is needed.
A number of bonds held could also relate to the diversification story. Why do
some firms diversify their bond portfolios and some don’t? Roll (1971) emphasizes the
diversification motive for bondholders. Bondholders usually have short-term and long-
term bonds in their portfolio, because they try to diversify their investment portfolio;
hence, reduce portfolio risk. What could be a determinant of diversification degree
of bondholders? If we compare between the US financial and non-financial issuers
in eMAXX, the number of bonds held by the investors in the first group is much
smaller. The mean is 20 compared to 46. It seems that investors of US financial
bonds are less diversified based on the lesser number of bonds invested. We can see
from Table 1.35 that the range of number of bonds invested by a given bondholder
is very high. For example, for the US non-financial issuer, the range is from 1 to
2,408. The heterogeneity in number of bonds held by a bondholder indicates that
some bondholders did not care to diversify their investment portfolio and some did
very excessively following Roll (1971). There was a quote from Warren Buffett about
diversification stated that “. . . diversification is protection against ignorance. It makes
little sense if you know what you are doing”. In Buffett terms, he suggested investors
to understand in depth about a security or industry. Then, your investment should
be focusing on that security or industry only. In other words, if we understand the
security inside out, we do not need to diversify. Some bondholders hold a few bonds
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or undiversified portfolios. This could imply Buffet ideology or it could be something
else. For example, it could be about the supply shortage instead of a demand story.
What if bondholders want to invest in many bonds to diversify their portfolios, but
the bonds that they desire are not available in the market. For instance, for insurance
bondholders, a large portion of their investment portfolios has to be in investment-
grade bonds. However, at the time they want to invest, there could be only a few issuers
or an issuer that can offer sufficient supply and rating requirements. Consequently,
the situation forces insurance bondholders to invest in bonds only from one issuers or
a few issuers. In this case, to diversify or not, investors may not have a choice because
of the limited supply. This is another interesting question that we can examine using
eMAXX.
Now, let’s consider the average number of bonds held by types of bondholders.
Previously, we analyze the number of bonds held in general. It is also interesting to
see number of bonds held by types of bondholders, because the number of bondholders
may also affect the debt value. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) try to answer the
question “what determines the number of creditors a company should borrow from?”.
They find that too many creditors result in high cost of negotiation and sometimes
creditors never agree on a deal which results in costly liquidation or reorganization
of the firm. That is the larger the number of bondholders is, the higher the cost of
renegotiation becomes. The average number of bonds held for each type of holder is
provided in Table 1.34. That is, for each type of bondholders, I identified the type of
holder and counted how many bonds they held in a given quarter. Then, perform the
same counting procedure for each bondholder. From Table 1.34, excluding OTH holder
which is the sum of several types of small holders, the type of holders with highest
number of bonds held is Unit Investment Trust (UIT) with 187 bonds held in a given
quarter for all data. However, for the rest of the data (i.e., US, US financial, US non-
financial, insurance), the highest number for bonds held is by fund of fund mutual fund
(FOF). Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) also relate the number of creditors to strategic
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default in which a firm defaults because managers want to keep the residual cash. In
other words, if a firm continues its operation without sufficient income, the firm’s cash
would be depleted over time and there will be nothing left for managers. Since it is
costly to strike a deal with many creditors, the negotiation with creditors is too costly.
Hence, ex ante, managers’ incentive to default strategically is lower, because their
payoff from strategic default would be diminished. Concerning eMAXX bondholding
data, we can test whether Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) apply to a certain type of
firms or industry. For example, it could be a nature of some types of issuer that always
have many bondholders with no relation to the strategic default story. The optimal
number of creditors or bondholders in this case might be affected by some other factors
unexplored.
4.4 Country of Bondholders
Since the data in my analysis focus on the US corporate bonds, most of the holders
are investors from the US. However, there are bondholders from other countries and
some countries are interesting that they show up here. Another interesting question
we may ask is whether bondholders from a certain country possess higher returns than
other countries. If the difference in returns is related to the country of investors, what
could be the determinant? It could be, for example, investment skills of personnel, size
of the fund invested, or a country-specific factor. This is an interesting question that
can be tested using eMAXX. From Table 1.36 top three countries of the bondholders
come from the US, Canada, and Japan. An interesting country that does not make it
to other categories such as issuers or managing firms is Luxembourg which is in the
top-ten here. It is interesting to investigate more on Luxembourg as one of the top
holders’ country of the US bonds. Based on a report from PWC5, Luxembourg offers a
lot of tax credits and incentives for investors registered in the country. An interesting
question that could come up is whether the bondholders from Luxembourg have more
5The information is retrieved from PWC, http://taxsummaries.pwc.com/ID/Luxembourg-
Corporate-Tax-credits-and-incentives
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investment skills or earn more returns, because they could be more sophisticated to
find a way to get higher return. With eMAXX, we can test this hypothesis whether
it is true or not that bondholders from a certain country gain higher returns. This is
similar to the fact that most US corporates registered their headquarters in Delaware
because the state provides many benefits such as ease of legal processing, tax incen-
tives, business law protection, etc. Pirinsky and Wang (2006) wrote a paper about
the relationship between corporate headquarters location and stock returns. They
found that firms headquartered in the same geographic location have a very strong
co-movement in stock returns. The same concept could be applied here. Bondholders
headquartered in Luxembourg may exhibit a co-movement in investment returns. A
reason could be that those firms may have the same goal of acquiring the best return
by taking any possible way including the choice of headquarter location. Or they
may receive the same suggestion from the same group of consultant or lawyer to have
headquarters in Luxembourg. Moreover, this could be a “network” story. There could
be an elite investment manager group in Luxembourg and those investment managers
share material information within the group.
4.5 Buyers, Sellers, and the Size of Bondholder Positions
A set of information that is unique to eMAXX is a summary of the number of buyers,
sellers, and portfolio holdings for each bond of each quarter. With this information,
we can put together which bonds are active in the secondary market and who the
participants are. One may ask whether the number of buy and sell of bonds from
large institutional bondholders over time could help predict the returns or prospects of
firms issued bonds. There is a large literature on how institutional investors’ activities
impact the investing companies’ stock price and performance (e.g., Smith (1996), Nagel
(2005), and Yan and Zhang (2009)). However, research on how institutional investors
impact bond’s performance is still very limited. Again, I would like to emphasize the
potential of eMAXX data on financial economics research. Basically, we can address
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the same questions asked in the equity market in corporate bond market. Therefore,
with eMAXX data, we can address interesting questions, for instance, “Do institutional
bondholders impact the value of firms?” “Do they help in price discovery?” Table 1.37
shows three interesting summary statistics: number of portfolio holding, number of
portfolio buying, and number of portfolio selling for each issue in a quarter. First,
the number of portfolio holding means, for a given issue (9-digit CUSIP), how many
bondholders of that bond in a given quarter. We can see that the number of holders is
very varied from 1 to 1,062 in a given quarter. On average, the US non-financial issuer
has highest number of portfolio holding. The average number of portfolio holding
for the US non-financial issuer is 29.3 whereas the lowest average number of portfolio
holding is the US financial issuer with average of 19 holders for a given issue. For the
number of portfolio buying, this number shows how many portfolio buys an issue for
a given quarter. The number is also varied similar to the number of portfolio holding.
The number of portfolio buying ranges from 0 to 709 with an average of 6.2 per
bondholder in a given quarter. Usually, the high number of portfolio buying or selling
occurs during the financial crisis of 2007 or in some cases, when an issuer is in financial
distress. The same pattern of wide range is also observed for the number of portfolio
selling. The range of portfolio selling is from 0 to 758 for all data with an average
of 4.5 and narrower when the data is for the US issuers. All three statistics exhibit
the same pattern of skewness and kurtosis. Both skewness and kurtosis are positive.
This means there are extreme values on the right tail for all three statistics. Since the
number of portfolio buying and selling is of wide range, we may use these numbers
as our monitoring signal for a crisis or bad prospect for firms issued bonds. eMAXX
data contain only institutional bondholders which are deemed more sophisticated than
individual investors. Some large institutional bondholders such as PIMCO and TIAA
definitely have an in-house research department in place.
As I described that issuing bonds should be similar to selling a product, bond
issuers should care about their investors’ demands when they issue a bond. Issuers
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would not want to issue bonds that investors do not want to buy. For instance, if
issuers issue a bond with too low yield, they have a risk of unsuccessful issuing. In
other words, the sellers sell a product that buyers do not want. As in marketing, firms
analyze customer choices or what the alternatives that consumers have. In case of the
bond market, for example, firm A plans to sell a callable 8-year bond with a rating
of AA. It would be nice to research on other firms if anyone is selling bonds with
similar or the same characteristics (i.e., 8-year callable bond with rating of AA). How
much they are selling those bonds for could be a reasonable benchmark in addition
to the base rate from Federal Reserve. In retail banking, there is a fierce competition
for deposits during the upward trend of interest rate as shown in Figure 1.40. The
federal funds rate started to increase sharply in 2017. Currently (in 2018-2019), banks
compete for deposits. For instance, Ally Bank advertised high saving rate at 1.8
percent in August 2018. Then, American Express also advertised 2 percent saving
shortly afterwards. In February 2019, Ally Bank increased the rate to 2.2 percent and
clearly showed in its website that it was higher than the American Express which is
the second highest saving rate bank at the time. In the bond market, it is not clear
whether issuers compete for yield or coupon rate. However, with eMAXX data, we
can investigate this matter. Individual investors may not experience the competition
in bond investment directly, because the high minimum transaction size which is as
high as 1 million dollar lot. If bond issuers have an access to the eMAXX bondholding
data, they will be able to analyze the behavior of their investors and, perhaps, come
up with bonds that most investors would want to buy without setting the price too
high or too low.
4.6 Investment Horizon
One of the most important factors for institutional bond investors to buy a bond is
maturity. As discussed, issuers can analyze the profile of bondholders on the variety of
bond maturities they hold in their portfolios with eMAXX. Then, issuers will have a
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big picture of bond maturities that are in high demand. Financial economics research
has argued a belief that the longer investors invest in a stock market is, the better their
performances become (e.g., Bodie (1995), Hodges et al (2019)). However, the associ-
ation between the bond returns and investment horizons has received little attention.
We may ask whether short-term or long-term bond investors are more successful in
terms of the return of investment. In bond market, this question might be difficult to
be addressed due to the low liquidity in the secondary market. With the combination
of transaction data such as TRACE and eMAXX bondholding data, we could explore
more on this matter. Many questions can be addressed using eMAXX. “Are bonds
with a higher portion of short-term investors more volatile than bonds with a higher
portion of long-term investors?”. How the investment horizons of bondholders affect
the returns and volatilities of bonds is also a very interesting question.
To answer a question from the issuer perspective, “What type of bondholders invest
in my bonds?”. Are they mostly long-term or short-term investors? If an issuer issues
short-term bonds and there are a number of long-term investors holding the bonds,
are they holding it for liquidity purpose? Why do long-term bondholders hold short-
term bonds instead of long-term ones? These are interesting questions that eMAXX
can help us address. Summary of the average value-weighted portfolio maturity of
the bondholders for a given issue is provided in Table 1.38. The number in this table
is calculated by first compute the value-weighted maturity of bond portfolio for each
holder for each quarter. Then, for each issue, calculate the average value-weighted
maturity of all holders for each quarter. For example, we would like to calculate
the average value-weighted bondholder investment horizon of a bond issued by firm
Z (bond Z). Suppose there are two bondholders holding bond Z: bondholders A and
B. Assume that bondholder A, currently, invests in two bonds $50 in each bond (50
percent value-weighted in each bond). The two bonds have maturities of 5 and 10
years. The value-weighted maturity of bond portfolio of bondholder A is 7.5 years.
This is from 0.5(5) + 0.5(10) = 7.5. Assume that the value-weighted maturity of bond
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portfolio of bondholder B is 5 years calculated the same way as bondholder A. Then,
we can calculate the average value-weighted maturity of bondholders of bond Z by
averaging the value-weighted maturity of both bondholders and result in 6.25 years
[(7.5+5)/2].
This single number for each issue gives an overview about the horizon of bondhold-
ers for each issue or what types of bondholders hold the issue: long-term, medium-term,
or short-term investors. The result shows that most of the issues are held by long-term
investors. This is illustrated from all the means are more than 8 years. In other words,
on average, the value-weighted maturity of investors’ portfolio is greater than 8 years.
This is also due to the fact that the majority of the holders in eMAXX database is
insurance which generally has long investment horizons. The highest number is the
US insurance with 13.1 years of the average value-weighted maturity of investors. The
range is quite high from 0.1 (approximately 1 month) to almost 100 years. Following
from the information of Table 1.38, Table 1.39 shows proportion of each type of holder:
long-term (LT), medium-term (MT), and short-term (ST) investors. To identify a type
of holder, I first calculate the value-weighted maturity of each holder for a given quar-
ter as discussed previously. If the value-weighted maturity for a bond portfolio is less
than one year, the holder is identified as short-term investor. If the value-weighted
maturity is between one year and five years, the holder is identified as medium-term
investor. The long-term investors have value-weighted maturity of their bond portfolio
more than five years. For all data, the highest portion is long-term investor with 75
percent of overall type of bondholders. The group that has highest long-term investor
proportion is US non-financial issuers with 85 percent of long-term investor and seven
and eight percent of medium-term and short-term investors respectively. The group
with the highest proportion of medium-term investor is US financial issuers.
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4.7 Special Characteristics
Next, we would like to understand a bondholder that has special characteristics whether
they have different behaviors than other bondholders in general. First, I will analyze
bondholders that also issue bonds. This information can help answer a question, for
instance, what is a difference between the contract they issued and contract they held?
Do they try to match the characteristics between the portfolio bondholding and bond
issuance? For example, if bondholders hold short-term bond, will they be likely to
issue short-term bonds to match with their investment portfolio? This could be in
line with hedging story in which the receipt of the bond investment could be used to
pay the borrowing payment. With eMAXX, we can address these questions. From
Table 1.40, it tells the percentage of each type of holder that is also an issuer. In
other words, what percentage of each type of lender is also the borrower. 47 percent of
life insurance bondholder is also the bond issuer. 21 percent of property and casualty
insurance bondholder is also an issuer. We can see that large portion of bondholders
also issues bonds. Therefore, it is interesting to compare and contrast their investment
and borrowing portfolios.
Then I analyze the bondholders that like to invest in bonds from the same issuer.
This information could help us answer another question about the choice of bonds
invested by a given institutional investors. When bond investors choose which bond
to invest, do they consider the whole universe of bonds or they only consider the
bonds from the same issuers that they have experience investing in? Sometimes, it
could be too costly for bond investors to search for all available options in the bond
market. If the past investments work well, they would just invest in the same issuer.
Table 1.41 tells us about the percentage of investors that invest in the same issuers.
For all data, on average, a bondholder invests in bonds from the same issuance 40
percent of all the bonds issued. For example, if issuer A issues 100 different bonds,
on average, the same bondholder buys 40 out of 100 different bonds by the same
issuer (issuer A in this case). The reason that bondholders invest bonds from the
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same issuers may relate to the searching cost. Sirri and Tufano (2002) explain equity
mutual fund flow on the ground of searching cost. Mutual fund buyers may not have
time to search for all mutual funds available in the market. They may just choose
based on the advertisement and past performance. It is too costly for mutual fund
buyers to analyze all available funds in depth. This research about searching cost is
also along the line of Jain and Wu (2002) and Hortacsu and Syverson (2004). The
same concept could be applied to the bond buyers in which their choice of investment
may depend on the searching cost. Surprisingly, we may find that the portfolios of
bondholders are very concentrated to certain issuers. Hence, the risk of bondholders
could be higher than we expected or the portfolio risk largely depends on the financial
health of some large issuers. Most institutional bondholders are insurance, mutual
funds, and pension funds. The success or failure of their investments widely impact
the public. It is of interesting to analyze the tradeoff between the searching cost and
the tail risk of bondholders. In other words, if an insurance A invests largely in only
one bond, the insurance A saves the searching costs at the expense of the policy
holders owing to undiversified risk. If the bond fails, insurance A may not be able
to pay the policy holders as promised. If the decrease in searching cost results in
much higher undiversifiable risk for public, regulators may have to come in and set up
minimum number of issuers in the investment portfolio for large financial institutions
that associate with the public, such as insurance companies or banks. Again, with
eMAXX, we can address this very interesting question.
4.8 The Dynamics of Bondholdings
One of the most important information provided by eMAXX is the bondholding infor-
mation. We would like to see the dynamic of bondholding for each type of bondholders
over time. Who holds the largest share of the US corporate bond is an interesting ques-
tion that is overviewed in this section. For example, we can ask a specific question, for
the first quarter of 1999, what is the percentage bondholding by life insurance com-
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pared to overall bond market value? Figure 1.4 shows the distribution of the holder
over time for a given quarter. There are 22 types of holder in this chart but only
around ten of them are visible in the chart. The rest are very small proportion of
overall. The largest and most obvious holder is life insurance (in green). The blue
one is open-end mutual funds (MUT). Another color that is quite obvious is property
and casualty insurance (in orange). Figure 1.4 is interesting in the sense that we can
see the holding dynamic of all the holders at the same time. Whether the dynamic of
bondholding affects a bond in any aspect over time is an interesting question. Con-
sistent with Schultz (2001), Figure 1.4 shows that insurance companies are the largest
holder of bond overall. From 1999Q1 to 2005Q3, insurance companies held around
70 percent of overall bonds. However, after 2005Q3, mutual funds started to gain
more holding in bonds. At this time, the mutual fund industry is booming. Num-
ber of mutual funds grew at a very fast pace. We can see from the blue color that
it started to get wider over time. After 2011, mutual funds held bonds around 40
percent of overall. However, even at the later date, insurance companies are still the
biggest holder with 50 percent holding of overall bonds. From this Figure, it again
emphasizes the increasing importance of the mutual fund bondholders. The nature of
mutual fund and insurance bondholders is different. Usually, insurance bondholders
are long-term investors and hold very large portfolio. On the other hand, mutual fund
bondholders tend to be much smaller in size of holding and have a shorter investment
horizon than insurance bondholders. There are many small mutual fund bondholders
compared with insurance bondholders. Figure 1.9 shows average number of holder
over time. The number of holders grew from 5,376 in 1999 to 12,859 in 2013. In other
words, in around ten-year period, the number of holders is more than double. And
this increasing number is mostly from new mutual fund investors.
If we look at the breakdown of the type of holders over time from Figure 1.10. The
highest growth is open-ended mutual funds whereas the second and third largest are
property and casualty insurance and life and health insurance, respectively. The num-
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ber of insurance companies is quite stable over time both for life insurance (LIN) and
property and casualty insurance (PIN). Though there are numbers of new insurance
firms, this industry has a lot of merging and acquisition (M&A). M&A activity could
be the answer of why the number of insurance companies has not increased over time
as well.
Even though we see that the number of new mutual funds participating in the
bond market has been sharply increasing and we might think that bond fund managers
have superior skills to generate returns, a literature on the mutual fund return does
not support this conjecture. Philpot et al (1998) and Detzler (1999) found that bond
fund managers did not possess the skills to outperform the market. Their results
show that a bond fund’s past return does not predict future return. Moreover, recent
literature have found that larger size mutual funds have lower returns than smaller size
funds (e.g., Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Gorman (1991)), because they lose market
mobility when they become too large. This could be a reason that we see high growth
of number of mutual funds over years. Mutual funds may prefer to keep their sizes
not too large, because they do not want to get too large and lose market mobility.
4.9 Conclusion
Bondholder information, perhaps, is the most important information and only unique
to eMAXX. There are more than 23,000 holders in eMAXX in the time range of
1999Q1 to 2013Q4. Bondholder ID in eMAXX tracks the name change or merging of
the bondholders. This facilitates the analysis of dynamic of bondholding tremendously.
Three types of bondholders out of 22 types of bondholders have held large amount of
US corporate bond over time, namely, insurance companies, mutual funds, and pension
funds. The largest number of bondholders is mutual fund but the largest holder in
dollar value on average is insurance companies with the exception of PIMCO. PIMCO
is the largest bondholders and it is categorized as mutual fund. TIAA is the largest
insurance-typed bondholders. On average, the institutional bondholders hold around
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30-50 percent of total bond value. If we consider only the top bondholders, they hold
significant amount of total bond value. For instance, top 10 bondholders on average
hold 26 percent of bond value outstanding. The largest bondholder hold on average
as high as 14 percent of total bond value. This indicates that issuers may favor or
tailor their bond issuing characteristics toward these large bondholders to increase the
success of bond issuing. Averagely, a bondholder holds 65 bonds in their portfolio.
However, the range is very wide from 1 to 4,151. For the number of bondholders for
each issuer, on average, the number of bondholders is 24, but it could go up as high as
1,000 bondholders for each issuer. With eMAXX data, issuers can analyze the bond
demand and its characteristics in the same manner as a marketing department of a
firm analyzes the consumer behavior. Which type of bonds institutional investors have
invested and how their holding behavior changes over time could be different depending
on the business cycle. For example, during a financial crisis, institutional bondholders
may want to hold a certain characteristics of bonds, such as investment-grade bonds
and non-callable bonds. It is also interesting to understand if there is a difference in
holding behavior for special characteristics of bondholders. For instance, a holding
strategy of bond investors who also issue bonds could be different from a strategy of
bond investors who do not issue bonds. In sum, holding data from eMAXX give us
a good overview of the demand side in bond market and many interesting questions
could be addressed from this information.
5. Analyses of the Issuers of Bonds
The format of eMAXX file comes in quarterly format. Each quarter has its own text-
delimited issuer file. The aggregate issuer file consists of 880,681 total observations.
Total unique issuers based on 6 digit CUSIP are 55,017 issuers. However, for the
unique issuer name, the number of unique issuers is 52,092. Issuer data contain 6
digit CUSIP, issuer name, sector, country, entity, state, year, and quarter. There are
115 different sectors identified by eMAXX. For some sectors, eMAXX breaks down
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into small subsectors. For example, there are 10 different financial sectors, such as
insurance, investment, and mutual funds. Industrial has 49 different sectors, such as
tobacco, pet supplies, and mining. Please see Table 1.43 for examples of the sectors
available. For the issuer data during the period of 1999Q1 to 2013Q2, there are 101
different sectors out of 115 sectors created by eMAXX. It is an advantage to have a
breakdown of issuer sector in details, because each sector may have its own uniqueness
in terms of the characteristics of bonds issued. This granularity could help us answer
some specific questions that are unable to ask in some areas of bond literature. For
instance, only industrial sector alone has 49 different sectors which are enough to be
analyzed separately for industrial bond market. From previous sections, we can see
that non-financial issuers possess different characteristics than financial issuers. With
the detailed information of issuers by eMAXX, we can address a research question
for separate samples, namely, financial and non-financial sample. Next, the issuers
come from 118 different countries. There are four types of entity represented in our
data: Federal corporation/Agency (FC), Trust/Master Trust/Grantor Trust (MT),
Public/Private corporation (PC), and Supranational (SU). From Table 1.44, 94.18
percent is corporation either public or private. The second largest issuer entity is
Trust with 5.41 percent. The only one Federal corporation is Korea Development
Bank (KDB). This observation is in 1999Q2.
5.1 Quantity of Issuers
A number of issuers in each quarter are illustrated to show a big picture of issuers.
What is a determinant of the issuer numbers? Is it related to the macroeconomics
variables or firm-specific variables? From Table 1.45, on average, there are around
15,000 firms issued bonds in each quarter for all data. The highest number of firms
issued bonds are 21,725 firms. Out of 15,000 firms, two-thirds are the US firms and
one-third of the firms in the US data are financial companies. Approximately three
percent of the issuers in the US are insurance companies. This is opposite to the
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story on the lender side that insurance companies are the largest lenders to most
issuers. In other words, insurance needs a place to invest their money rather than
to acquire funding. For the median, the numbers are not much deviated from the
mean. For all data, the number of firms issued bond is as low as 11,800 in a quarter.
The skewness and kurtosis show that the distribution of the quarterly number of firms
issued bonds is normally distributed with the skewness and excess kurtosis close to
zero. The relationship between the number of issuers and economic condition is quite
high. From Figure 1.11, this figure shows average number of issuer over years. In the
beginning, the issuer number is around 8,000 issuers. In 2013, the average number is
around 10,000 issuers. This indicates that more issuers come into the bond market
since the number is 25 percent increase in the period of ten years. However, when we
look into the graph in more details, we can see periods of the drop in number of bond
issuers. There are two large drops in the graph, early 2000 and 2007. The two periods
are the two important financial crises in the world history. The first one, early 2000,
is the dot-com bubble. It was a period of internet adoption and many technology
companies started their business during that time. Starting in 1995, there had been
a speculation in the stock market until the year 2000 that the stock market crashed
and many of the technology companies went out of business. The second period of the
drop in number of issuers was during the subprime crisis where asset-backed security
markets collapsed.
However, the story of the number of issuance and the value of bonds issued could be
different. In other words, the number of issuance is pro-cyclical to the economic cycle,
but the value of bonds issued could have different relation with the economic cycle. It
is still unclear whether the value of bond issuances are pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical
to the macroeconomic condition. This is another interesting research question that
can be addressed by eMAXX. Korajczyk and Levy (2003) study about the capital
structure choice during different macroeconomic conditions. They find that equity
issuance follows the macroeconomic condition pro-cyclically but debt issuance varies
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counter-cyclically. Moreover, they also find that firms with low financial constraints do
not exhibit the counter-cyclical pattern when issuing debt. It is worth mentioning the
two important capital structure theories as an explanation for the finding of Korajczyk
and Levy (2003). The first theory is the tradeoff model in which firms weigh between
the cost and benefit of using leverage (i.e. bankruptcy cost VS tax incentives). The
second theory is the pecking order in which firms prefer to use internal source of funding
first then external later because of the asymmetric information problem. The tradeoff
theory would predict the pro-cyclical leverage to the macroeconomic condition, because
during the boom period the cost of bankruptcy is lower and the benefit of tax incentives
is high. On the other hand, for pecking order theory, during the expansion, firms
should enjoy high earnings and use the earnings as a primary source. Consequently,
the leverage during the expansion should be lower for pecking order theory. In other
words, pecking order theory predicts counter-cyclical leverage to the macroeconomic
condition. Erel et al (2011) added the credit quality of the issuers into the mix.
The cyclicality pattern of each security type also depends on the credit quality of
the issuers. For instance, they find that equity issuers are pro-cyclical only for non-
investment-grade borrowers. Overall, from the eMAXX data, the number of bond
issuers is pro-cyclical to the macroeconomic condition because of the downturn that
discourages new investment.
5.2 First-Time Issuers
Similarly, an interesting question could be “what is a determinant for the number of
first-time issuers?”. First-time issuers are firms that issue bonds for the first time
based on the data time range in my analysis. Along the same line as Table 1.45, Table
1.46 shows the first-time issuers proportion. The column “FIRST” means the issuer
(6-digit CUSIP) that never issues a bond in the previous year. However, the first year
is 1999. Therefore, all bonds in 1999 are the first time issuer and that is the reason
we have 100 percent for the “FIRST” column in the year 1999. In 2000, 11 percent of
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them is the first-time issuer. The number of the first-time issuer keeps increasing until
its highest in 2007, which is the financial crisis year. Then, the number of first-time
issuer dropped to the low level at 12 percent in 2008. In 2010, the percentage of new
issuer is highest at 23 percent, then it keeps going down again to 12 percent in 2013.
The pattern of first-time issuer is consistent with the number of issuers in Table 1.45
that we see drops during early 2000 and financial crisis 2007.
5.3 Industry Effects
It is useful to examine characteristics of issuers in terms of the industry. What industry
the issuers are from and what characteristics of bonds they choose to issue. For in-
stance, do certain industries prefer to issue public bonds to private ones? For example,
for private placement and 144A channels, the benefit of these two channels is a faster
issuance processing, because, for private placement, issuers can bypass the registration
process and directly offer the bonds to a group of investors. For 144A bonds, qualified
institutional bond buyers are exempt from two-year holding period. What could be
the factors for these two sectors to exploit the faster turnaround of bond issuance? Do
some types of issuers mostly deal with an unexpected expenses or investment resulting
in quick turnaround of bond issuance? These are interesting questions that we could
address using eMAXX data. Table 1.47 shows the top 20 issuer by sector. We can see
that among top five issuers, three of them are from financial sector: banking, finance,
and unclassified finance. The banking-sector issuer is 13 percent of all the issuer. Top
20 issuers are counted as 73 percent out of 101 different sectors. First eight industries
are counted as 50 percent of all the issuers. In other words, only 8 percent of all the
industries issued more than 50 percent of the bonds overall. As mentioned in the be-
ginning of this chapter, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act plays an important role in the bond
market. It allows financial companies to participate more in the capital market. Fi-
nancial companies can issue or invest in bonds subject to a certain risk control such as
capital adequacy ratio for banks. Financial companies such as banks use high leverage
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which is a unique characteristics of financial companies. Most banks leverage roughly
80-90 percent of their capital and this is a usual level of leverage for them. This is
contrast to non-financial firms where usually less than half of their capital is leverage.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the top bond issuers are in the financial sectors.
This is the main reason that most financial economics papers separated financial firms
and non-financial firms in their analyses. Furthermore, I group the detailed issuer
industry into eight sectors shown in Table 1.48. Table 1.48 shows top three industry
issuer for all data is Financial, Industrial, and Service. For the US sample (bottom
panel), the pattern is the same. Supranational and education industries represented a
very small portion of the issuer in eMAXX data. Financial industry such as banks and
investment companies, usually, issue many bonds. Therefore, it is not unexpected that
financial industry is the largest portion of the issuer. The Table 1.49 is similar to the
Table 1.48 in terms of the industry proportion percentage, but Table 1.49 also groups
information for private placement issuers and 144A bonds. For industrial and service
industries, they have significantly higher proportion for the US private placement and
144A bonds. US private placement and 144A bond issuers have almost on average 50
percent from industrial and service issuers combined. We can see that some industries
of the bond issuers resort more to a certain type of bond, such as private placement
and 144A bonds in this case.
5.4 Bond Ownership Concentration
Another characteristic that we would want to know is the concentration of bondhold-
ing of each bond. Are bonds held by only a few large institutional investors? or are
they held by many bondholders? One of the ways to measure the concentration of
bondholding is utilizing Herfindhal index (HFI). Please find the equation and expla-
nations to calculate HFI in the GE case study section. We can see from Table 1.50 the
summary of Herfindhal index for different sets of data. Some bonds have HFI of 100
percent that means only one holder owns all the bond outstanding. The lower number
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of HFI indicates less concentration of holding. The highest HFI is the US non-financial
issuers with 15 percent HFI. The skewness and kurtosis exhibit positive values which
is expected because the outlier is on the right-side of the distribution. Most of the
issuers’ HFI is less than around 10 percent. However, as we can see that there are
some bonds with HFI equal to 1, which means there is only one holder for that issue.
It is of interesting to further explore this group of high holding-concentration bonds
specifically. In terms of agency cost, these bonds may have a lower agency cost, be-
cause the large holding incentivize bondholders to monitor the issuance firms closely.
Since there is no other bondholders helping with the monitoring in case of only one
bondholder, the bondholder has to take more effort to make sure that the issuers are
financially healthy.
5.5 Country of Issuer
As for the country of issuers, we may ask some interesting questions related to the
country of issuers and the bond characteristics, for instance, how bonds issued from
different countries are different from each other and why? From Table 1.51, majority of
the issuers is in the US with 64 percent of overall issuers. The second largest is the UK
with around 5 percent of overall issuers. Interestingly, Cayman Islands is the fourth
largest issuers appear in the data. This may relate to the different tax benefit because
Cayman Islands is famous for offshore financial tax haven. There are more than 100
countries represented in the eMAXX data as found in Table 1.52. For all data, on
average of each quarter, the number of countries issued bond is between 64 and 106. For
non-financial companies, on average, there are more countries issued bonds. However,
non-financial companies could be anything from retail, large manufacture, service,
etc. On the flip side, if we break down non-financial issuers into each industry and
compare with financial sector, the highest number of countries will be financial sector.
The skewness and kurtosis show that the distribution is quite normal. Insurance sector
may exhibit a bit of negative kurtosis which means the distribution contains not much
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of an outlier in the tails. This quite reasonable because it might take a certain level
of capital to start an insurance companies. Therefore, the number of country issued
bonds for insurance companies is stable over time. As for the region perspective, Table
1.53, 70 percent of the issuers are from North America. From the country summary,
most issuers are from the US, therefore the majority of issuers is in North America.
The second largest issuers are from Western Europe which is roughly 14 percent. From
Table 1.54, for all data, the average proportion of the US issuers are 66 percent and
non-US is 34 percent. However, for non-financial and insurance issuers, the proportion
of US issuers are higher at around 71 percent. For financial issuers, the proportion
of US and non-US are similar. All types of data have negative kurtosis. This means
the proportions of US and non-US bonds issued for different types of categorization
have not much of extreme values in the tails. For insurance issuers, there are some
years that 90 percent of the issuers are from the US. It is interesting to analyze the
US and non-US issuers whether they have different bond characteristics. For example,
given bonds with similar characteristics such as maturity and rating, they may have
different yields or coupon rates because of the exchange rate differences. Based on
the international interest rate of Fisher Effect, we could relate the exchange rate and
domestic rate of non-US issuers to the yields or coupon rates of bonds issued in the
US. If there is a difference in bonds between US and non-US bonds, the Fisher Effect
might be an explanation to the difference.
5.6 Issuer Countries and Risk of Bond Issuance
Since we find that Cayman Islands appear to be one of the largest bond issuers’
country, we should perform a further analysis on Cayman Islands in terms of riskiness
of bonds issued from this country. Bonds issued by a certain country may have higher
risk than others. We can use Cayman Islands as a case study here. Cayman Islands
has a very different economic fundamental from other large countries such as the US,
UK, or Japan. For instance, based on the United Nations data (UN) in 2017, Cayman
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Islands was ranked 167th in terms of GDP size whereas other top issuers are among the
countries in the top 10 largest GDP. In this context, I examine the riskiness of bonds
issued from the downgrade and upgrade of bonds and associate it with the country of
the issuers. As in price volatility, it could be upside volatility or downside volatility.
Hence, I include both upgrade and downgrade of bonds’ ratings. From Table 1.55, I
examined the bonds with downgrade and upgrade in many-step setting from 1, 2 to
5, 6 to 10, 11 to 15, 16 to 19, and 20 steps. For example, in the first panel “up/down
1 step in rating”, first I find bonds that were upgraded or downgraded one step in
each quarter. Then, I grouped them by countries. In this case, there are 35,966 one-
step upgrade or downgrade bonds issued by the US. The purpose of this table is that
I would like to see if the rating changes associate with any country in a consistent
manner. There are two sets of information in Table 1.55. The first set is the summary
of rating changes by the issuer country and the second set is the summary of rating
changes by the quarter. From the first column to the fourth column, the table gives
information about the top 5 countries with rating upgrade or downgrade. I count the
bonds with rating change (N) and calculate percentage (PCT). For the first panel,
the table shows top 5 countries of issuers with up or downgrade one step. 75 percent
of the bonds with one-step rating upgrade or downgrade is the US issuer. This is
expected because the US has the largest number of bonds issued. United Kingdom,
Canada, and Japan are also large countries in terms of GDP. The fifth country from
European country is Netherlands which might be a little unexpected. We would expect
Germany or France that are the two largest economies in Europe to show up on the
list but instead Netherlands shows up here. However, Netherlands economic size is
in the top-20 largest GDP country based on the UN data in 2017. Compared to
Cayman Islands, Netherlands is still much larger in terms of GDP. Some people may
ask why Germany and France are not on the list even though they are the two largest
economies in Europe. It could be many possibilities from a data report to capital
structure. Rajan and Zingales (1995) find that, out of all G7 countries, Germany has
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lower leverage ratio and they cited the reason from White (1996) and Kaiser (1993)
that, in Germany, the bankruptcy code does not favor firms to reorganize debt. In
other words, if we compare the Germany with the US which most distress firms filed
for Chapter 11 (reorganize debt), Germany has higher likelihood to liquidate distressed
firms instead of reorganizing debts. This could be a reason that German firms may use
less debt as part of their capital. Consequently, the number of bonds issued could be
too small to show up here. Another reason is that firms issued bonds in Germany and
France are financially stable; hence, the number of upgrade or downgrade in rating is
small. These are interesting questions that can be addressed using eMAXX.
However, in the second panel where the 2- to 5-step change in rating is analyzed,
we see Cayman Islands shows up as the third largest country. Usually, a country that
has larger economic size should issue bonds more and, intuitively, we should see large
countries more in this table. However, Cayman Islands is a much smaller country
compared to the US or UK. It is very interesting that Cayman Islands showed up here
as one of the top five. Then, for the more steps of the rating change, Cayman Islands
is in the top two with an exception for the last panel with 20-step rating change that
Cayman Islands is number one. This indicates that a lot of risky bonds are issued in
Cayman Islands. The other two countries that also show up in these tables and are
worth mentioning are Iceland and Ireland. These two countries also issued bonds with
a higher than average risk. Risk in my context here is in the sense of price or return
volatility which include both upside and downside volatility, not only the downside
risk. This table summarizes the change in rating for both upgraded and downgraded
rating. Both upgrade and downgrade should affect the bond returns both in the short-
term and long-term. Therefore, it is interesting to examine whether bonds issued from
Cayman Island generated higher return than bonds issued in other countries given risk
adjusted.
Another interesting information provided in Table 1.55 is a quarter that bonds
were downgraded or upgraded the most. The information is in the right side of the
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table starting from the fifth column to the last column. Qtr is the quarter that the
downgrade or upgrade occurred. For example, in the first panel “up/down 1 step in
rating”, six percent of the bonds that were downgraded or upgraded one step is in the
fourth quarter of 2008. In addition, a similar pattern can be observed from different
panels that most downgrades and upgrades were during the 2007-2008. Only the panel
of 16- to 19-step rating changes, the highest number is in the third quarter of 2010.
One of the largest financial crises started in 2007 and it took almost 10 years to recover
the economy back to the normal stage. Therefore, it is not surprising that most rating
upgrades or downgrades occurred during that time. Another time period that shows
up in the top five quarters with highest number of downgrade or upgrade is during 2000
– 2003. The time range of my analysis is from 1999Q1 to 2013Q2. This period covers
two large financial crises. The first one is the dot-com bubble in 2000 and the second
one is the subprime crisis in 2007. However, we can see the magnitude of upgrade
and downgrade for the 2007 financial crisis is much larger based on this table. For all
panels, most of the top five quarters of upgrade or downgrade in ratings were during
the 2007 financial crisis. However, can we tell if the financial crisis in 2007 is more
severe than the dot-com crisis in 2000 from this table? The answer is “no” because this
could be a joint testing between the riskiness of the firms and the accuracy of ratings
assigned by rating agencies. Alternative story could be that during financial crisis
in 2000, credit rating agencies may assign more timely and more accurately ratings
to firms while during the financial crisis in 2007, credit rating agencies did not do a
good job in assigning the ratings, because the securities were too complicated at that
time. After the crisis in 2007, regulators found that some assets had too high ratings,
especially securitized product. Consequently, after 2007, there were many rounds of
rating downgrades.
78
5.7 Quantity of Bonds Issued
Next, I examine the number of contracts sold by each issuer in each quarter. Do
number of bonds issued associate with the size of firms? or is it related to a certain
strategy to sell the bonds? These are interesting questions, because as Dass and
Massa (2014) find that bondholders prefer firms that issue various bond maturities.
Therefore, higher number of bonds may not be solely associated with the size of the
firms, but it could depend on the demand of the bondholders. From Table 1.56, on
average, for a given issuer, the number of contract sold is around 2 to 3 contracts
for all data (left panel). The number can go as high as 365 contracts for a given
issuer (in 1999). The right panel of Table 1.56 shows the same information but for
only the US issuers. The average number of bonds issued by an issuer is higher for
the US issuers. The data cover the time range of 1999Q1 to 2013Q2. For financial
issuers on the left panel of Table 1.57, they also issued bonds higher than overall data.
However, for insurance issuers (right panel), the number of contract issued has been
increasing. In 1999, the average of number of contract issued is 2.89. The number has
been increasing over time to 4.37 contracts in 2013. In summary, for all data, the mean
number of contract sold has decreased over time but financial and insurance companies
exhibit the opposite. This implies that the number of contract sold by other non-
financial and non-insurance sectors has decreased. From the summary, the decrease in
number of contracts contradicts the finding of Dass and Massa (2014). However, the
standard deviation is quite high at around 5-8 bonds. More careful analysis is needed.
Moreover, the number of contract sold for a given issuer is important in the aspect
of bankruptcy period. When an issuer fails, the higher the number of contract sold,
the more expensive the negotiation cost is. The story is in line with the debt contract
theory that incorporates the negotiation between equity holders and debt holders [e.g.
Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997)].
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5.8 Amount of Funds Raised
The amount of money raised should be related to the funding needs. However, there
could be a timing strategy to minimize the cost of borrowing. For instance, firms or
issuers may need some money right now and another portion six months from now.
They may have to crunch the number whether getting all the money now or getting
it once today and again in the next six months is better. In the upward interest rate
trend, firms may consider getting all the money now, because the cost of funding six
months from now might be much higher than getting all the money today. In other
words, issuers have to weigh between the cost of getting money earlier and cost of
higher interest rate in the future from waiting. Therefore, with eMAXX, we could
address interesting research questions, such as “Do firms strategically time the market
interest rate? Evidence from the size of bond issuance”. The wide range of amount
of bonds issued triggers a question “what are the determinants of bond-issuance size
other than the firm’s size?”
From Table 1.58, for all data, the amount of money raised from an issue on average
is $536 million and go as high as $9,992 million. The US financial firms on average
raised money more than non-financial firms. Financial firms raise on average $420
million compared to $324 million for non-financial US issuers. The amount of money
raised has positive skewness and kurtosis for all types of data. This shows that there
were some firms that issued a very large amount of bonds compared to other issuers.
The amount of bonds could relate to the timing of the issuance. As in the previous
section, I find that floating-rate bonds were mostly issued when the interest rates
were peak. This is an evidence of issuers timing the market interest rate to minimize
their borrowing costs. The same analysis could be applied here. We might find a
relationship of the bond-issuance size and the market interest rates. Issuers may want
to issue large amount of bonds during the economic expansion.
There could be other strategies related to different sizes of bond issued. For ex-
ample, what is a determinant of issuing large size bonds compared to a smaller size
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bonds but issue it several times? In other words, is it different between issuing $1
million bond and ten $100,000 bonds? On one hand, larger size bond may enjoy the
economies of scale such as lower underwriter and road-show fees. On the other hand,
many small-size bonds may serve the different needs of an issuer more. For instance,
out of the ten bonds, the first five might be non-callable bonds. The last five might be
callable bonds in case the project that the firm borrows the money for fails and the
firm has an option to reduce the debt obligation by calling the last five bonds back.
This is consistent with Chen et al (2010) which state that firms issue callable bonds to
hedge their investment risks. When firms face risky future investment opportunities,
they issue callable bonds in case the project results in Negative NPV so that they
can reduce their debt obligation by calling back their loans. This is opposite to Rob-
bins and Schatzberg (1986) that firms issue callable bonds because they have positive
investment project.
5.9 Recurrent Issuers
Then, I analyze the issuers who recurrently issue bonds. What are the characteristics of
firms that come back to issue bond many times? How often do these firms issue bonds?
What are the characteristics of the bondholder for these recurrent issuers? From Table
1.59, the total number of issues is as high as 1,140 by Barclays Bank. Total number of
quarter for this data is 58 quarters. If we divide total number of issues by 58, we will
have an average number of issuer per quarter. For Barclays Bank, the average number
of issue per quarter is around 20. This means Barclays Bank issued bonds once or twice
every week. It is also interesting that the top three highest number of issuances are not
from the US. Barclays Bank is from the UK. Rabobank is from Netherlands. The third
highest number of issuances is World Bank or supranational entity. The top-three US
recurrent issuers are Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, and Citigroup, respectively. As we
expected, all the recurrent issuers are financial companies (e.g., banks or investment
companies), because their main business is borrowing money and lending borrowed
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money out, such as personal loan or mortgage loan. Financial institutions, such as
bank, have to manage their assets (lending) and liabilities (deposit) which often time
they have a shortfall in their capital adequacy requirements. Consequently, they have
to borrow (sometimes overnight) from the debt market frequently, either privately or
publicly.
5.10 Conclusion
In sum, issuers need to decide on the specifications of the bonds issued, such as is-
suance amount, maturity, coupon rate, etc. Other than the basic characteristics of
bonds, issuers also need to consider some special features of bonds, such as callable
or convertible features. eMAXX covers more than 50,000 issuers from more than 100
sectors. The data range is from 1999Q1 to 2013Q2. Most of the issuers in eMAXX
are from the financial service sectors. The number of the issuers positively associates
with the economic cycle. In other words, more firms issue bonds during the economic
expansion. Most issuers are from the US and other large countries, such as UK and
Canada. Interestingly, a decent amount of bonds is from Cayman Islands, which is
a tax-favorable country. I find that bonds issued from Cayman Islands tend to have
higher risk and most bonds were upgraded or downgraded during the financial crises in
2000 and 2007. On average, firms issued three bonds or have three bonds outstanding
in a given quarter. However, the range of the number is wide from 1 to 365. As for the
amount of bonds issued, size of bonds issued on average is $536.4 million. Financial
firms tend to raise more money than non-financial firms on average. Moreover, finan-
cial firms, especially banks, tend to come back to issue bonds more than other types
of firms. Banks frequently need funding to fulfill their liquidity shortage. This might
explain why banks issued bonds very often.
Lastly, there could be a definition error for “state” code variable which identified as
municipal issuers. Out of 880,681 observations in the data, 16,037 are municipal bond
issuers based on Table 1.60. This counting is based on the definition in the eMAXX
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guide stated the description for the state code is “State Domicile of Issuer (applies to
North America Muni Issuers Only)”. This statement is actually not accurate because
among the bonds with State Code, a lot of them are not municipal bonds. For example,
they are mostly corporate bonds but has a domicile in Delaware because Delaware is a
friendly state for business set up. We can see that, if we still stick with the definition
of state code from eMAXX, the municipal bonds from Delaware alone account for 73
percent of overall municipal bond issuances. This is actually too high for a state to be
accounted for 73 percent of overall municipal bonds issued from all the US states. The
second largest is municipal bonds from New York with only much lower magnitude
at 3.8 percent. The rest have only around 1 percent or less in the share of municipal
bond market. To my knowledge, the “state” variable should be the domicile state of
the issuers with no association with the municipality status.
6. Analyses of Managing Firms
The role of managing firms is to invest in bonds on behalf of investors. For example,
firm A as an institutional investor may hire firm B to manage its bond portfolio.
In this case, firm A is a bondholder and firm B is a managing firm hired by firm
A. Sometimes, managing firms and investors are the same entity, because they can
manage funds by themselves without hiring anyone. A brief summary of managing
firm file is that there are 80,411 observations with the unique ID of 3,001 and Unique
name of 4,561. 1,012 IDs had name changes over time. Table 1.61 shows the example
of managing firms with name changes. For instance, for managing firm ID 06627
(observations 3 and 4), original name is RMB Asset Management but the name was
later changed to Momentum Asset Management because of the merging between RMB
Asset Management and Metropolitan Asset Managers. I cross check many other IDs
with names changed and find that the ID tracks the same identity over time though
the names changed. This is convenient for further analysis if we, for example, would
want to analyze an effect of a managing firm on a certain aspect, we need a unique ID
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that tracks the same managing firm over time.
6.1 Type of Managing Firms
In eMAXX, we can understand more about the type of managing firms whether they
are general investment manager or they associate with a certain type of firms, such as
mutual fund or life insurance. Whether managing firms can enhance investor returns is
a very controversial topic in finance research. Blake et al (1993) find that bond funds
on average performed worse than their index after taking into account the management
fees. Therefore, it is useful to explore more on this issue using eMAXX. In this section,
I provide an overview of different types of managing firms. From Table 1.62, it shows
how managing firms identify themselves as an entity. The number one managing firm
type is investment manager. The investment manager category which is counted as
the largest proportion of managing firms is worth investigating more. What are the
characteristics of the investment manager in this case? Are they small or large in size?
What are their expertise? Another question is that are they mostly just a facilitator for
bondholders or do they actively give advices to bondholders? If it is the latter case, the
trading activities of bondholders may be motivated by investment managers. Mutual
fund managers as well as equity managers also make it to the top-five list. This is
intuitive because, from the holder information, the mutual-fund category has a highest
growth in the number of bondholders. So, it is not surprising that the top-five type of
managing firms have investment manager, mutual fund manager, and equity manager.
In the top-five, there are also types of managing firms that are related to insurance
companies. The two types of insurance companies that play a very significant role in
a bond market are property and casualty insurance and life insurance companies.
Next, banks have the market share in managing fund business of around ten percent
overall. We can see from number 7 and 8 on the list. The top-eight type of managing
firms accounts for roughly 90 percent of the managing firms overall. Overall, we can see
that the managing firms concentrate on investment manager, mutual fund, insurance,
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and bank. Several types can be grouped under the managers for mutual funds. For
instance, mutual fund managers could be equity, bond, or balanced fund managers.
The previous example analyses about the bondholding effect on different aspects of
debt value (or firm value) may be first performed on these managing firms because
they maybe the real mastermind behind the decisions of the bondholders. What we
could do to check the effect of investment managers on the decision of bondholders
to buy or sell bonds is to analyze if there is a relationship between the number of
bondholders’ transactions and any given investment manager. If we observe that
there is an investment manager that always associated with high transaction activities
of bondholders, this could lead us to the conclusion that the investment manager has
strong effects on the bondholders’ decision.
6.2 Top Managing Firms by Assets under Management
“Who are the largest managing firms by size of fund under management?” is another
interesting question and whether the size of bondholding by large managing firms
affects bond’s return or bondholding behavior has never been explored. From Table
1.63, by individual firms, this table shows the top 30 largest managing firms by size
of funds under management. Pacific investment management or PIMCO is the largest
managing firm by size of fund managing. Financial market respects Bill Gross as a
legendary fund manager who managed PIMCO bond fund to become the largest bond
fund in the world. The second largest is Vanguard group which is famous for low cost
mutual funds. Then the third and fourth largest managing firms are Liberty mutual
insurance and Metropolitan life insurance investments (METLIFE). Even though I
categorize by the size of fund under management, we still have a similar pattern to
the type of holder. In other words, mutual funds and insurance companies are still
influential players in the bond market in terms of fund managing business. This may
come from the fact that these managing firms are also the largest holders and some
of them have their own research and trading departments. Therefore, similar pattern
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between the holding and managing firm types are not very surprising when we find
that mutual funds and insurance companies are the major types.
6.3 Decisions to Hire Managing Firms
Many interesting questions can be addressed at this point about the value of managing
firms to bondholders. Why do some bondholders hire managing firms but some don’t?
It is true that some bondholders are large enough to set up all the research and in-
vestment departments by themselves. These large firms also enjoy economies of scale
and complementary services that may come with hiring managing firms. For instance,
if bondholders trade a large portfolio, they would definitely receive a brokerage or
transaction fee discount or even free research. However, not all bondholders are large
enough to exploit the economies of scale. Then, what could be the factor that pushes
bondholders to hire or not hire managing firms? Do managing firms generate value for
bondholders? For example, managing firms may give an accurate view on the market
and legitimate advices for bondholders so that bondholders can make abnormal gains
from those advices. Can managing firms consistently give winning advices leading to
profitable portfolio for bondholders? Blake et al (1993) find that bond funds on aver-
age performed worse than their index post-management fees. Some other reasons that
might encourage bondholders to hire managing firms are transaction costs, diversifi-
cation ability, and customer services. (e.g., Sirri and Tufano (1992), Gruber (1996)).
Bergstresser and Tufano (2009) find that buying mutual funds through brokers did not
generate substantial tangible benefits. Even though there is a huge literature on the
value of investment intermediary, most of them dealt with equity markets. eMAXX
offers an opportunity to investigate more on this issue in bond markets.
The choice between hiring and not hiring managing firms by bondholders is worth
discussing more. Table 1.64 shows percentage of bondholders who hire managing firms
to manage their bond portfolios each year. On average, from 1999 to 2005, around
50 percent of bondholders hired managing firms. From 2006 to 2013, the percentage
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keeps increasing from 50 percent to almost 70 percent. This increasing trend of hiring
more managing firms could illustrate that managing firms can generate some benefits
to institutional bondholders. For example, managing firms may help generate a better
return or they help investors in other aspects not related to return, such as trade
facilitation.
Different types of bondholders may prefer a certain group of managing firms. Each
type of managing firms has different expertise. For example, brokers possess huge
connection with the capital markets. Banks can have multi-expertise from traditional
savings and lending to investment bank services. An interesting question could be
whether hiring different types of managing firms results in different outcomes (e.g.,
returns, turnover, etc.). Table 1.65 shows the breakdown of managing firms hired by
each type of holder. Most holders who hired managing firms used the service from in-
vestment managers (IM). Especially, mutual funds mostly hire investment managers.
For corporate pension funds, they mostly used bank management to manage their
bond investments. In this case, firms may already tie their payrolls with a bank and,
with tight relationship with the bank, firms may also adopt pension service with the
bank. This could be a reason why pension funds hire banks to manage bond in-
vestment. Mostly, large banks have their own investment department that can help
their client manage funds. Each bank calls this wealth management service differently,
such as private wealth or wealth management. However, they perform the same func-
tion which is helping their clients invest. For union pension funds, they used broker
management. Broker can perform many functions from selling financial products to
facilitating trades. We can see that there is a variety of managing firm type that
bondholders hire. Different types of managing firms may result in different values
generating for bondholders. It may not be only the return enhancing perspective, but
also the cost reduction.
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6.4 Country of Managing Firms
This section examines the country that managing firms locate. We would expect to
see most of the managing firms should be from the US, because bonds in my analysis
is the US corporate bonds. However, we should expect to see some large countries
such as Germany, France, and China as part of the top managing firms since they
are large countries in terms of the GDP. Table 1.66 shows managing firms by country.
Majority of the managing firms are the US firms as expected. More than 80 percent
of managing firms comes from the US. The second largest is Canada; however, the
number is much lower than the US managing firms. The second largest is only 6.9
percent of overall number of managing firms whereas the US controls the managing
firm market share by roughly 80 percent. An interesting result here is China ranked
number three in number of managing firms in the US bond market. If we go back to
other aspects in the eMAXX data such as issuer and holder information. We do not
see China as part of the top issuer or holder. Since China’s economy has been growing
rapidly for several decades, we would expect to see excess funds in China flowing out
to other countries to find a higher return as well as safe assets. Another interesting
point here is that among the managing firm countries that have similar percentage
around 1 percent, Hong Kong and Singapore are the financial hub in Asia after Japan;
therefore, their names showing up here is not very surprising. South Africa, Taiwan,
and India are quite interesting as they have market share as large as Japan.
6.5 Quantity of Managing Firms
Then, I would like to explore a number of managing firms each year in order to see
how much players in this market have evolved. It is interesting to explore more on the
issue of bondholder managers’ network, especially mutual funds. That is an investment
company may manage funds for hundreds of bondholders. For instance, BlackRock has
hundreds of its own mutual funds and it also manages funds for other private equity
companies. How BlackRock network impacts the performance of portfolio outside the
88
funds’ family of BlackRock is interesting. Their first priority is to manage their own
funds and the surplus resources will be used on funds outside BlackRock’s fund family.
This is another interesting question that can be addressed by eMAXX. Figure 1.12
shows average number of managing firms by year. It is interesting that the number
did not change much over time. The range of number of managing firms over time is
very narrow. The number of managing firms is between 1,256 and 1,499. However, we
can see a jump in 2003-2004, number of managing firms increased around 20 percent
in 2003. Then, the number of managing firms became stable again after the jump.
Based on the information from Investment Company Institute (ICI), the mutual funds
industry grew by more than $1 trillion to $7.4 trillion during the period. This is
because of excellent stock and bond fund returns. This asset or wealth rising had
attracted managing firms into the bond market6. The constant number of managing
firms is opposite to the high growth of bondholder number. This may indicate that
only a handful of managing firms manages very large funds for many bondholders,
besides some bondholders manage funds themselves.
6.6 Conclusion
To this point, we explore both bondholders and issuers in depth. Managing firm is
also a useful and interesting information to help us understand more about the US
corporate bond market. Some bondholders hire managing firms to invest or take care of
their bond portfolios. There are more than 3,000 managing firms in eMAXX database.
Over time, the number of managing firms have not varied much. This indicates that
the managing firm industry is quite stable and mature. Moreover, this could mean that
few managing firms control the market share in bond investment industry. The type of
managing firms is similar to the pattern of bondholders. The top five managing firms
by size of asset under management consist of fund managers in mutual funds and
6The information from ICI, https://www.ici.org/pdf/per10-01.pdf, also stated that mutual fund
assets rose 16 percent in 2003 to $7.4 trillion, just shy of the record $7.5 trillion reached in August
2000
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insurance companies. However, banks are also an important player in this market.
Many large banks do not only offer deposit and loan service. They also offer wealth
management for wealthy and institutional clients. More than half of the bondholders
hires managing firms and the trend is higher proportion of bondholders would hire
managing firms. Even though the ability to generate returns for investors from these
investment managers is not consistent based on a literature, still higher proportion of
bondholders hires managing firms. Majority of the managing firms are from the US,
Canada, and China.
7. Analyses of Fund Managers
From the first section to this section, some may ask a question who contributes to
the return of bondholders. Do bondholders generate returns by themselves? Or it
is managing firms that they hired help them gain more returns using superior skills
in picking and trading bonds. Another piece of information we can examine is “fund
managers” data or “personnel” in eMAXX term. For personnel data, there are 15,563
unique employee IDs, but only 14,742 IDs are unique. 1,845 IDs are used by several
employees from the same and different firms. For my analysis, I will ignore the latter
group since I cannot find a meaningful conclusion when the employee IDs are not
unique. The example of non-unique employee ID can be seen in Table 1.67. For
instance, from the first column Employee ID (EmpID), ID 10007 is used by several
employees, and this is in the same period. However, this non-unique ID accounts for
10 percent of overall data. Majority of IDs is still unique to each employee.
7.1 Turnover of Fund Managers
An interesting question is whether the fund manager turnover affects the return of
the portfolios under their management. We do not know whether the job movement
is associated with the positive or negative aspect of portfolio return. Some managers
may have an excellent record and many companies may buy them out. On the other
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hand, they may move because they have a bad track record. To understand more
about the eMAXX personnel data, first, I analyze how bond fund managers move to
other companies over time or what the turnover in this industry is. From Table 1.68,
87.48 percent of the bond managers did not move to other companies. This is based on
the data available in this analysis from 1999Q1 to 2013Q2. Roughly 5 percent of them
moved once. The maximum turnover is 13. It is interesting that most of bond fund
managers did not move to other companies. We would expect the opposite because the
financial market is volatile and the market environment changes very fast. Therefore,
there should be a large group of bond fund managers outperforms or underperforms
the market returns. Consequently, fund managers should move based on the track
records.
Similar to the turnover summary, length of time a bond fund manager has managed
a fund may associate with the returns. A reason could be the longer they manage a
fund, the more they gain experiences. For Table 1.69, given the data from 1999Q1 to
2013Q2, I measure how long managers worked in the industry. If their names or ID
showed up, this means they are still working in the industry given the unique ID of
employee. The mean average is around 5 years. The 99th percentile is 14 years which
is the same length as our data period. The mean average of working duration actually
makes sense, because a manager needs time to prove their performance and three- to
five-year ranges are appropriate durations. We can see that the median and mean is
quite close. Therefore, the distribution is not skewed.
7.2 Expertise of Fund Managers
Each fund manager should have different expertise. For example, fund manager A
may be very good at corporate bonds. Another fund manager is good at municipal
bonds. Expertise of fund managers could have an effect on the returns of the portfolios
they manage. An interesting question could be ”Do fund managers with more than one
area of expertise perform better than a fund manager with only one area of expertise?”
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We could address this issue using eMAXX. Table 1.70 shows information about the
expertise or focus area of each individual bond fund manager. The largest focus area
of bond fund managers is corporate bond following by government bond. There are
three areas that have similar share: asset backed, mortgage-backed, and domestic US
which have roughly 25 percent of overall. The percentage does not sum to 100 percent
because each individual bond manager can have more than one area of focus. For
example, if the code is “ACG”. This means the fund manager has three focus areas
which are asset-backed, corporate, and government bonds.
7.3 Fund Managers: Who Manages the Largest Funds
eMAXX fund manager database also provides us names of fund managers. It would be
interesting to see who manage the largest funds and whether they possess a superior
skill to gain higher return. Whether fund flow depends on the fund manager’s name is
another area that eMAXX can test using the buy and sell transactions of bondholders.
Will the big-name mutual fund managers affect investor’s investment decision? There
is a large literature on how advertising or credible name affects mutual fund flows.
Jan and Wu (2002) studied a sample of mutual funds pre- and post-advertisement in
Barron’s or Money magazine. They chose a sample that exhibited significantly higher
performance than the benchmark pre-advertisement, then measured the performance
post-advertisement. They found that these funds attracted more money but did not
exhibit superior performance post-advertisement. Based on Table 1.71 and Table
1.72, the fund managers who managed the largest fund from 1999 to 2010 worked
in life-insurance companies. In 2010, PIMCO Total Return Fund managed by Gross
surpassed all other life-insurance bond portfolios in terms of size. In the same manner
as Jan and Wu (2002), investors could just anchor their confident with the big-name
or celebrity such as Bill Gross of PIMCO.
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7.4 Quantity of Funds under Management
In the world that all firms try to minimize cost and maximize profit, hiring a few
fund managers to manage as many funds as possible could be a strategy for a firm to
maximize profit. However, the quality and efficiency is a concern in the case of mini-
mizing cost. Too much cost reduction, sometimes, results in the deteriorated quality
or in this case returns of the bonds may be decreased. Some interesting questions
are “Why some bond fund managers manage so many funds and why some manage
so few?” “Is there a cost to investors associated with the number of funds managed
by a bond fund managers?” For instance, will a bond fund manager who manages
200 bonds at the same time be too busy to monitor or review the performance of all
the bonds under management? Table 1.73 and Table 1.74 show how many funds a
bond manager manages at a given quarter. Based on the mean, from 1999 to 2007,
the average number of funds a bond manger managed is 3. From 2008 onward, the
number is around 4 funds. The maximum number of funds managed under the same
fund managers could be as high as 200 funds for a given quarter. The high number
of maximum number of funds under management could be explained by the fact that
the data contain only high-level employees such as bond manager, CFO, etc. They all
should have people work under his/her supervisions but their names do not show up
here as a fund manager.
Whether mutual fund managers can beat the market is still an unclear area where
two sides of the camp are still debating. We can investigate the fund managers’ hot
hands skill using eMAXX data. In addition, most of the papers in this area focused on
equity mutual funds without giving enough attention to bond funds. Whether bond
fund managers can outperform the market is a very interesting question that should be
further explored. Even though there is a large literature on mutual fund performance
that fund managers have not outperformed the market return (e.g., Treynor (1965),
Sharpe (1966), Jensen (1968), Grinblatt and Titman (1989), and Connor and Kora-
jczyk (1991)), there is another side of literature that found fund managers possess hot
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hands skill (e.g., Hendricks et al (1993) and Jagannathan et al (2010)).
7.5 Conclusion
Overall, the data about fund manager provided by eMAXX give us some insight about
who manage the funds. The data even provide the name associated with the firms
that fund managers work for. More than 10,000 fund managers covered by eMAXX
and these fund managers spread across different firm types such as mutual funds and
insurance companies. Surprisingly, most bond fund managers have not moved to other
companies. Only 12 percent of fund managers have moved at least once. However,
the data cover the period of 1999Q1 to 2013Q4. If some fund managers move before
1999Q1, they won’t be detected in this analysis. In addition, each bond fund manager
has different expertise. The top three expertise of bond fund managers are corporate,
government, and mortgage-backed bonds. On average, each fund manager manages
four funds; however, the range is as wide as 200 bonds.
8. Cross Information
Previous sections examine each data file in eMAXX separately (e.g., issuer, holder,
managing firms). In this section, I will examine cross information of eMAXX. Specif-
ically, I will analyze issuers and holders at the same time. It is interesting to examine
how each type of bondholders diversify their investment in each industry of issuer.
For example, which industry, for a given type of bondholder, do bondholders invest in
and by what proportion? Overall, the holding information is useful to answer some
questions related to why these holders focus on any specific type of industry at all.
Do they have any criteria related to specific type of issuer industry or they only care
about other characteristics such as return and duration? Moreover, for the diversifi-
cation aspect, it seems that most bondholders diversified their portfolio in terms of
the issuer industry well. To be more effective in analyzing the issuer industry, the
industries are reduced to 17 Fama-French industries. Table 1.75 shows holding av-
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erage in percentage of each type of holder. The first column shows 17 Fama-French
industries of issuers. The first row shows different types of bondholder. For example,
the top-three holding of life insurance (LIN) in the fourth column, on average, holds
bonds issued by financial companies (32%), utilities (15.3%), and consumption (8.4%).
I skip Other because it is a collection of many small industries. The largest industry
bonds held by bondholders in this dataset is bond issued by financial companies. More
than half of the holders hold almost all types of industry of issuers. Some of them are
active in a very few industries of issuer. For example, for annuity-type bondholders
(ANN), 100 percent of the holding is in bonds issued by financial companies. Another
example is hedge fund holding. Hedge fund holds 10 industries of bonds issued out of
17 industries. Specifically, Hedge fund is active in financial, machine and equipment,
and mines. Close-end mutual funds invest high proportion in Steel and Oil bonds.
Again, hedge fund in eMAXX is not a typical hedge funds we understand. They are
mutual funds with hedge-fund-like strategies.
Next, we may consider the question the other way around, instead from the lender
perspective to issuer perspective. One may ask “Do issuers in a given industry prefer
a certain type of bondholders?”. I examine the profile of issuer in the Table 1.76. The
first column and the first row will look the same as Table 1.75, but the interpretation
of the content inside is different. In the previous table, we read table vertically for
each type of bondholder in the first row. For this table, we read horizontally for
each industry in the first column. For example, for Cars industry, the three largest
bondholder is open-end mutual fund (56.3%), life insurance (53.2%), and property &
casualty insurance (16.9%), respectively. Again, I skip OTH because it is a sum of
many small bondholders. The two largest holders on average are mutual funds and
insurance companies, especially, open-end mutual fund and life insurance. Property &
Casualty insurance is also a very large holder of each bond industry. Interestingly, Unit
Investment Trust (UIT) is very active investor in fabricated products, transportation,
and machine and equipment bondholder types. In addition, Foundation/Endowment
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(FEN) are the major investors in bonds issued by food and transportation companies.
9. Analyses of Bondholdings during Bankruptcy
In this section, I analyzed the bondholding during the bankruptcy period of a firm.
The bankruptcy data is from UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database (BRD).
BRD contains more than thousand large public firms that have filed bankruptcy cases
since October 1, 1979 to October 31, 2018. To qualify as a “public” firm. The firm
has to file an annual report (form 10-K or form 10) with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) for a year ending not less than three years prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy case. The data also only consider large public firms with annual report
with assets of $100 million or more, evaluated using 1980 dollars (about $297 million in
current dollars). The data include both Chapter 7 (liquidation) and 11 (reorganization)
filings. The data are updated monthly.
From Table 1.77, 98 percent of the bankruptcy cases are chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Only 2 percent is Chapter 7. Chapter 11 bankruptcy allows debtors to reorganize their
debt and negotiate with creditors. Chapter 7 is a liquidation bankruptcy. If the case
was dismissed before the order for relief, the case is categorized as “no order for relief”.
Since majority of the bankruptcy case is chapter 11, the issue of strategic default is
important. Strategic default play a significant role when a firm is in distress or near
bankruptcy. Firms as debtors will seek a protection from a bankruptcy court which
shields them from creditors. Then, the negotiation process between the equity holders
and creditors starts. From Table 1.78, the data show how many firms negotiate with
creditors before filing for bankruptcy or we call it prepackaged bankruptcy. “Prepack-
aged” is when the debtor drafted the plan, submitted it to a vote of the creditors,
and claimed to have obtained the approval for the draft. “Prenegotiated” bankruptcy
is when there is a negotiation success with at least one major creditor but without
a formally voting for the debtor-drafted plan. If the case was dismissed before the
order for relief or as chapter 7 at filing, the case is identified “not applicable”. “Free
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fall” is when the bankruptcy has no pre-negotiation. It is very interesting that one-
third of the bankruptcy has some degree of negotiation with creditors. One benefit of
pre-negotiation is the smaller market impact.
Many interesting questions can be addressed when we apply eMAXX bondholding
data to other sources of data, such as BRD in this case. Who sell and buy bonds during
the bankruptcy, how much bondholders sell or buy bonds that are near bankruptcy,
etc. Hence, to perform the analysis of bondholding during bankruptcy, I merged the
eMAXX institutional bondholding data with the BRD data. The issuers of 606 firms
out of 1,124 bankruptcy cases are in eMAXX database. The result can be found in the
Table 1.79. One of the objectives for this section is to show how eMAXX bondholding
data can be useful and complement the analysis of bond research in different events,
such as bankruptcy in this case.
Figure 1.14 shows average number of sell transactions of bonds for firms filed for
bankruptcy. On the horizontal axis, zero means the quarter filed for bankruptcy.
Numbers to the left and right of zero are number of quarters before (negative) and after
(positive) the bankruptcy filing of firms in bankruptcy. We can see that the average
number of sell transactions were stable until five quarters before the bankruptcy filing
and peaked at the quarter when the bankruptcy was filed. After the bankruptcy filing,
it took around three quarters before the transactions became stable again.
For the buy transaction, the summary can be found in Figure 1.15. The buy trans-
action is opposite to the sell transactions in that when it was close to the bankruptcy
filing date, the number of buy transactions was decreasing. Similar to the sell transac-
tions, roughly five quarters before the bankruptcy filing, the buy transactions started
to decrease. An interesting observation is that 12 quarters or 1 year after the filing
for bankruptcy, we can see some buying transactions picking up. This indicates that
the bonds had higher demand after a year of bankruptcy. The higher demand could
come from the fact that the reorganization plans worked well and the companies that
filed for Chapter 11 came back to operate normally. Sears holdings filed for Chapter
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11 bankruptcy in October 2018. Its stock price jumped almost 50 percent on January
16, 2019, after positive news that a hedge fund would buy the company to secure the
firm from bankruptcy.
Moreover, it is interesting to explore a number of bondholders or portfolio holding
of bonds filed for bankruptcy how the number decreased or increased over time. From
Figure 1.16, it shows number of portfolio that held the bonds of the bankruptcy firms
before and after it filed for bankruptcy. The number of portfolio holdings was stable
until three quarters before it filed for bankruptcy. The number of portfolio holding
started to decrease and became stable very quickly around two quarters after the
bankruptcy filing. Similar to the buy transaction, the number of portfolio holding
picked up a year after bankruptcy filing.
Figure 1.14 and Figure 1.15 show number of transactions which might spur some
questions about who were selling and buying these bankruptcy bonds and by how
much. The answers are possible with eMAXX data. Figure 1.17 shows the types
of bondholder who sold the bankruptcy bonds by dollar value. The largest seller by
value is mutual funds following by insurance companies. This is interesting because
the largest holder is insurance companies. Insurance companies are on average holding
bonds five to six times more than mutual funds, but when the bonds they held came
to financial trouble, insurance holders were not the largest seller. The same pattern is
observed in the buying transactions in Figure 1.18 that the mutual fund is the largest
group of holder for the buying activity. Mutual funds bought a lot of bankruptcy-firm
bonds even within one or two quarters before firms filed for bankruptcy.
The fact that we see mutual funds traded bankruptcy bonds more than insurance
companies, which actually held much larger position than mutual funds, is interesting.
This could be an information asymmetry issue. Mutual funds may have more informa-
tion than insurance companies. We may use mutual funds as a signal if the accuracy
of the trade direction is high, which requires a formal test. Alternatively, insurance
companies may not be as mobile as mutual funds. Since insurance companies hold a
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very large bond position, their selling transactions may trigger the whole bond market
to sell the bonds excessively. In other words, if they move at the same time (sell large
amount of bonds at the same time), it could trigger the whole market to dump the
bonds and it could get worse than not selling the bonds.
Overall, it is more informative when we combine bond ownership data with another
database. In this case, the bond ownership data is combined with the bankruptcy data.
Most bond issuers that were in bankruptcy filed for chapter 11 to reorganize the firms.
Interestingly, one-third of the firms filed for bankruptcy are pre-negotiated. We can
see that, in terms of bond transaction activities, the selling activities increased while
the buying activities decreased before the bankruptcy quarter. After a year, there
were increase in buying activities. This could be from the well recovery after the
reorganization of bankruptcy firms. Though the largest bondholders are insurance
companies, mutual funds are more active in trading these bankruptcy bonds during
the bankruptcy quarter.
10. Analyses of Bondholdings during Rating Changes
For this section, I perform an analysis on bondholding during the rating changes. First,
I quantify Moody’s ratings into number. I assigned the numeric rating for Aaa as 21,
Aa1 as 20 and so on. The lowest rating is C which I assigned the numeric rating of
1. For unavailable, withdrawn, and not rated, I assigned the value of zero. Then, I
calculated the upgrade and downgrade from the numeric rating changes. If the change
in numeric rating is -1, this means there is one-step downgrade. If the change is 1,
there is one-step upgrade. The summary statistics of rating change from eMAXX is
provided in Table 1.80. This summary time range is from 1999Q1 to 2013Q2. The
summary shows the median rating change of -1. This means the middle value of all the
rating change is one-step downgrade. We can see that the maximum and minimum is
20 and -20, respectively. This is of interesting that which bonds were upgraded and
downgraded 20 steps.
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Table 1.81 shows some of the bonds that were downgraded 20 steps. We can
see that all of them were downgraded during the 2007 financial crisis. The first bond
DIOGENES CDO was downgraded from Aaa to C in 2007Q4. The second bond, IMAC
CDO, and the third bond, PASA FDG, were also downgraded in the same quarter.
The last two columns in Table 1.81 show number of buy and sell transactions. Since
we have the bondholding data eMAXX, we can understand more who buy or sell bonds
during this period of rating tumble. It would be more interesting to examine such a
bond with high activity as PASA FDG.
Examining bond ownership during the rating changes is important. Some bond-
holders may have to sell bonds because of the holding requirement. For instance,
insurance companies cannot hold too much of the non-investment grade bonds be-
cause of the capital adequacy requirements. Moreover, the window-dressing in mutual
fund industry is pervasive. Morey and O’Neal (2006) find that bond fund managers
loaded up more government bonds during the disclosure period than the nondisclosure
period. This implies window dressing to make the portfolio looked safer. Along the
same line, Agarwal et al (2014) observed the same pattern for stock mutual funds
in which they increased holdings on winning stock during the disclosure periods to
mislead investors about their true holdings. Many more studies have shown evidence
on window-dressing behaviors (e.g., Lakonishok et al. (1991), Sias and Starks (1997),
He et al. (2004), Ng and Wang (2004), Meier and Schaumburg (2004)). Therefore,
the story of window-dressing in mutual fund is not new and it could apply to the
bondholding as well.
We would think that the high activity of buy and sell should include many types of
buyer and seller but it turns out that it is only one mutual fund company that bought
and sold this bond. The information about the buy and sell transactions of PASA
FDG can be found from Table 1.82 to Table 1.85. The first column is the net change
in $’000. The fifth and sixth columns show the order of transaction. For instance,
for the first quarter in 2007, there are 11 buy transactions. This number matches the
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number of buy transaction column (No.Buy) in Table 1.81. It is Fidelity that bought
and sold PASA FDG during the 2007 crisis. Many types of funds, such as balanced
funds, from Fidelity bought and sold bonds. This is interesting that whether Fidelity
funds did not share information among each other that the bond should be purchased
or sold. This reminds us of the window dressing in mutual fund literature.
One possibility is that Fidelity tried to hedge its position by having half of the
funds purchased and another half sold. If the PASA FDG bond turns out to have a
profit, the funds that purchased the bond will have a good performance and opposite
is true for the funds that sold the bond. However, if the PASA FDG bond turns out
to be default or create huge losses, the funds that purchased the bond will write down
losses and funds shorted the bond will make huge profit. Overall, Fidelity can report
average profit of zero during the crisis which is actually much better than other mutual
fund companies that made losses during crisis.
From Table 1.86, we can see the top ten mutual funds with large number of funds
under management. Fidelity alone manages almost 500 funds which is the highest
number of funds in this sample. BlackRock is the second mutual fund company that
manages large number of mutual funds. Even though we have a lot of mutual funds,
many of them are managed by the same parent companies. There may be a network
effect on returns of mutual funds under the same parent company. These parent com-
panies may exploit the fact that they have many mutual funds under their management
and these mutual funds spread across asset types and geographic.
10.1 Ratings Downgrades
Similar to the bankruptcy analysis, rating upgrade and downgrade are analyzed in the
same manner. I calculate average number of sell, buy, portfolio holdings eight quarters
before and after the event, either downgrade or upgrade. We would expect to see the
sell transactions increase before the rating downgrade and buy transactions decrease
before the rating downgrade. Moreover, the downgrade of bonds could trigger a fire
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sale because of the holding requirement. After the downgrade, there should be many
bondholders that sold the bonds out owing to some investment policies. There is a
literature about “fire sale” that shows the received price of an asset from fire sale does
not reflect the long-term potential of the asset (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 2011)).
This fire sale will cause a huge loss to the seller. Then, why do bondholders sale for a
loss? The answer is some bondholder’s policy investments are constrained to a set of
asset. For instance, some bondholders are only allowed to invest in investment-grade
bonds. When investment-grade bonds that they hold are downgraded, they have to
sell them out to the market in the short period of time. This is another area where we
can study more on the fire sale in bond market after the rating change.
Figure 1.19 shows average number of sell transactions eight quarters before and
after rating downgrade. We can see that the average number of sell transactions
starts to increase three quarters before the downgrade. This may indicate that some
bondholders may possess some material information about the downgrade or there
could be an element of speculation that the issuers would be downgraded very soon.
Consequently, some bondholders managed to sell their bonds before the event occurred
to avoid a loss of bonds value from the downgrade. The sell numbers has high jump
one quarter after the downgrade, then it has decreased for a year. At the fifth quarter
after the downgrade the sell numbers increase again. This may indicate that the
downgraded firms did not perform better and could have another round of downgrade
if the performance is worse.
It is interesting that the number of buy transactions for the downgraded bonds were
increasing similar to the number of selling in the Figure 1.19. We would expect that
the number of buy activities should be lower after the downgrade, because some types
of bondholders did not want to incur losses when the value of the bonds drops. From
Figure 1.20, the numbers of buy transactions had smoothly increased over time. This
indicates that there were some institutional bondholders bought these downgraded
bonds. It could be that bondholders expected some future upgrade of the bonds
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and captured profit on the price differences. For number of portfolio holdings for
downgraded firms, interestingly, the numbers kept increasing over time. The number
of portfolio holdings for downgraded firms can be found in Figure 1.21. Even though
the firms were downgraded, new institutional bondholders still bought the bonds issued
by these downgraded firms.
However, the rating downgrade analysis in this section does not take into account
the degree of how many steps drop. For instance, the downgrade here could mean 1
step downgrade or 20 steps downgrade. The 1-step downgrade would not be as severe
as the 20-step downgrade. The analysis of the finer detail of the rating change is
provided in a later section.
10.2 Ratings Upgrades
Next, I examine the upgraded bonds. We would expect to see an increase in buying
activities before the upgrade or right after the upgrade depending on how informed
investors are. If the investors can predict that the bonds would be upgraded, they
would buy the bonds before the upgrading date. On the other hand, the selling
activities for upgraded bonds should be lower. For the selling activities during the
upgrade, there were drops in selling activities two quarters before the rating upgrade.
The summary of the selling activities is provided in Figure 1.22. However, overall the
selling activities did not change much. Only two periods of drop in selling activities.
The first period is five to seven quarters before the upgrade and the second period is
two quarters before the upgrade as mentioned. This indicates that there could be a
leak of inside information or speculation on the rating upgrade in those two periods.
Therefore, some bondholders start to keep the bonds even though initially they may
want to sell it. The upgrade of the bonds will increase a bond’s value.
Average number of buy transactions eight quarters before and after rating upgraded
is shown in Figure 1.23. We can see the activities of buy transactions were higher
before the rating upgrade. This again implies that the bondholders may possess some
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material information about issuers; consequently, they traded against the information.
Interestingly, the number of buying activities for upgraded bonds decreased after the
upgrade quarter as expected, but the number of buying activities for downgraded
bonds increased after the downgrade quarter.
For the number of portfolio holdings in case of the upgrade, we would expect new
bondholders participate more in bonds of the upgraded issuers. From Figure 1.24, we
can see slightly increase in number of portfolio holdings for the upgraded bonds, but
overall the number of portfolio holding for the upgraded bonds had been constant over
time. One of the explanations would be since these bonds should be financially healthy,
they have the potential to be upgraded. Hence, the likelihood that someone would
sell the good bond out maybe low unless the price offered is really high. Moreover,
most of the bondholders are long-term bondholders such as insurance companies and
pension funds. They have small incentives to actively trade bonds in their portfolio.
Consequently, the number of portfolio holdings is constant because no one sells the
bonds in the secondary market. Therefore, the number of the new bondholders for the
financially strong issuers could be low.
10.3 Ratings Upgraded from Non-Investment to Investment Grade
Previous sections analyze the bond issuers under general upgrade and downgrade con-
ditions. For this section, we will narrow the sample to the issuers that were upgraded
from non-investment grade to investment grade. It is important to analyze the transac-
tion activities this way because some types of bondholders have a restriction on holding
a certain bond rating, especially at the threshold between non-investment grade and
investment-grade. For instance, insurance companies, sometimes, are required to hold
only investment-grade bonds. Some bond mutual funds with a policy to hold only
investment grade bonds also in this category. The change in rating may impact the
returns of bonds. A literature related to how change in rating or credit watch impacts
bond’s return is extensive. For example, Hand et al. (1992) showed in their work that
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there was a -1.39% excess bond return when the credit watch indicated that a bond
issuer could be downgraded in the near future. On the other hand, when the credit
watch indicated a positive probability of rating upgrade, there was a significant posi-
tive average excess bond return of 2.25%. Their results are from the daily bond trades
which are considered to be more reliable than other longer frequency such as weekly or
monthly bond trades (e.g., Katz (1974), Grier and Katz (1976), Brooks and Copeland
(1983)). However, some literature did not find an evidence that the rating change af-
fects the bond return surrounding the rating change announcement period. Weinstein
(1977) found that there was a price effect 18 to 7 months before the announcement of
the rating change, but no evidence of price change 6 month before and after the rating
change announcement. Weinstein (1977) explained that there was no reason to expect
that the rating change would impact bonds’ returns, because the rating change is a
lagged performance indicator. Rating agencies, such as S&P and Moody’s, evaluate
firms’ rating based on the public information such as financial statement. Therefore,
there should not be any new information regarding the rating change. Kliger and
Sarig (2000) found that the rating changes did not affect bond’s returns; however, the
Moody’s announcement whether bond rating is better or worse than expected has an
impact on bond value. Hite and Warga (1997) found the effect of rating change on the
bond performance only appears on the downgrade side and much stronger for bonds
that were downgraded from investment grade to non-investment grade.
In the same manner as previous rating-change analyses, I will examine the selling
and buying activities as well as the number of portfolio holdings. First, for the number
of sell transactions in Figure 1.25, we can see a huge drop first quarter before and at
the quarter of upgrade from non-investment grade to investment grade. This is quite
intuitive. Fewer bondholders would want to sell a bond that will be upgraded from
non-investment grade to investment-grade, because the value would be much higher
for this type of bonds.
For the buying transactions in Figure 1.26, we can see a pattern of increase in
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buying activities before the upgrade; however, the volume is less one quarter before
the upgrade. This indicates that the information about future upgrade reflected in
the public view long before, more than two quarters, the upgrade took place. This
consistent with the Weinstein (1977) findings that show the price effect occurred 18 to
7 months before the upgrade, but the effect was less when it was close to the event date.
Similarly, new bondholders collected the bonds that have a prospect of upgrading from
non-investment grade to investment grade more than two quarters before the upgrade.
The average number of portfolio holdings in Figure 1.27 is consistent with the buying
activities in Figure 1.26. The pattern implies that institutional bondholders knew it
long before the upgrade occurred; therefore, they started to add the bonds into their
portfolios.
Previously, we only analyze buying and selling activities in terms of average number
of activities. With eMAXX bondholding data, we can see more into details who
are those buyers or sellers in terms of dollar value. From Figure 1.28, the highest
buying value was one quarter before the bonds were upgraded from non-investment to
investment grade. The largest buyer was insurance (in red) following by mutual fund
(in green). Pension fund (in purple) largest buying value was three quarters before
the event quarter. With eMAXX data, we can observe not only the pattern of the
transactions but we can also observe the participants in this market. For the selling
value for bonds upgraded from non-investment to investment grade, the smallest value
was at the event quarter. Then, we can see the selling value quickly dissipated over
time after the first quarter of the upgrade. The selling value decreased because, after
the bonds were upgraded, the value of these bonds increased because of the lower risk
of default. Institutional bondholders would want to buy rather than sell these bonds.
A reason that one wants to sell these upgrade bonds is the speculative purpose. That
is a bondholder may buy the bond right before the upgrade or sometime before the
upgrade in order to realize profit after the upgrade.
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10.4 Ratings Downgraded from Investment to Non-Investment Grade
Unlike the upgrade from non-investment grade to investment grade bonds, the down-
grade from investment grade to non-investment grade bonds shows no sign of specula-
tion before the event occurred. From Figure 1.30, we can see that the average number
of selling is highest one quarter after the downgrade took effect. This implies that
bondholders gave lower probability than they should have to the downside but gave
relatively accurate probability to the upside. If bondholders give probability to the
downside correctly, we would see the increase in average number of selling before the
event quarter similar to the event of upgrade from non-investment grade to investment
grade that there was a huge drop in selling activities before the upgraded quarter.
For the number of buy transactions before the downgrade, we would expect a de-
crease in number of buying activities before the downgrade occurred. From Figure
1.31, interestingly, the average number of buy transactions is higher before the down-
grade occurred. Downgrade from investment grade to non-investment grade would
hurt the performance of the bond portfolio. What could be a reason to explain this
phenomenon? Why institutional bondholders would want to buy a bond that has a
bad prospect and is prone to the rating downgrade? One reason could be the bonds
were really cheap because of the fire sale. As mentioned before, some types of bond-
holder can only hold investment grade bonds. When bonds that these bondholders
hold were prone to downgrade, they had to sell these bonds out. This could generate
opportunities for some bondholders who have less constraint in the types of asset they
can hold. For instance, some bond mutual funds have an explicit objective to earn
more return from non-investment grade bonds. Consistent with the buying activi-
ties, from Figure 1.32, the average number of portfolio holdings increases before the
upgrade quarter. This indicates that there were new bondholders entered the bond
market for this particular type of bonds. If the average number of portfolio holdings is
constant and we have high number of buying and selling activities, that would imply
bond exchange among the existing bondholders. In this case, the new bondholders
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participated in the market when the bonds were downgraded from investment grade
to non-investment grade. It indicates that these bondholders were interested in the
non-investment grade bonds rather than the investment grade bonds.
If we add more details about the value of buy or sell transactions, we will have
more information to understand about the dynamic of bondholding during the down-
grade of bonds from investment to non-investment grade. We can see from Figure
1.33 that the value of the buy transactions decreased quickly one quarter after the
downgraded quarter. Interestingly, we can see huge buying value came in a quarter
before the downgrade. I would like to emphasize the underestimation of downgrade
versus upgrade when the bonds cross the borderline of investment and non-investment
grade. We would expect that the buying value for downgraded bonds should be lower
earlier before the downgraded quarter, but, here, we see the opposite. As I mentioned,
another reason would be the fire sale of the bonds and some bondholders bid those
undervalue bonds. From Figure 1.34, the pattern is the same as buying value in the
Figure 1.33. The selling values for bonds downgraded from investment grade to non-
investment grade had dissipated over time. However, the number of selling activities
and value of selling activities are different in timing. For the number of selling ac-
tivities, we see the peak at a quarter after the downgrade, but the value of selling
activities peaked at a quarter before the downgrade. This indicates that there was
a sell transaction came out before the downgrade. The highest selling values were
four and six quarters before the bonds were downgraded. This implies some degree of
information asymmetry that some bondholders had material information and traded
on that information. If we don’t have eMAXX bondholding in dollar terms, it would
be impossible to see more in detail the dynamic of bondholding during the rating
change. Overall, with eMAXX bondholding data, we can understand more about the
bondholding during the rating upgrade or downgrade event.
108
11. Analyses of Bondholdings during Accounting Restatement
When there is a major difference or error in outcome or assumption in financial state-
ment of a firm, the firm is required to update or restatement its account. We would
like to see how bondholdings change during a firm restatement which is considered as a
major change of a firm financial statement. The sample is the firms that restatemented
during 2001 and 2002 with the total of 109 firms. Most accounting restatements are
perceived as negative news. However, there were some cases that the restatement was
positive, such as the upward revision of revenue related number. Since most account-
ing restatements are negative news, we would expect to see higher sell transactions
and lower buy transactions. Figure 1.35 shows average number of sell transactions
eight quarters before and after an accounting restatement. Average number of sell
transactions was increasing before a firm restatemented. Eight quarters before a firm
restatemented, the average number of sell transactions was around three. One quarter
before the restatement, the number of sell transactions went up to six and eight during
the restatement. After the restatement, the number of sell transactions was stable at
around 8. This is consistent with our expectation.
Figure 1.36 shows average number of buy transactions eight quarters before and af-
ter restatement. Similar to average number of sell transactions, eight quarters before
the restatement number of buy transactions was at around six transactions. Then,
the buy transactions kept increasing from six to ten transactions during the restate-
ment and were stable at that level. This is opposite to the average buy transactions
from bondholders during bankruptcy. Before bankruptcy, bondholders decreased their
holding until around two quarters after the quarter that bankruptcy was filed then the
buying activities became stable. A possible explanation could be that the accounting
restatement is not perceived as severe as bankruptcy; hence, the buy transactions did
not show a decreasing trend before the restatement period.
Average number of portfolio holdings eight quarters before and after restatement
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is provided in Figure 1.37. Number of portfolio holdings did not show a sign of bad
prospect for the firms during the restatement period, because the number of portfolio
holdings was steadily increasing over time. The number of portfolio holdings and aver-
age number of buy transaction are consistent in showing that the restatement, from the
bondholder point of view, may not relate to the firm’s future prospect. However, there
is a financial accounting literature showing negative consequences from restatement
(e.g., Hribar and Jenkins (2004), Gleason et al. (2008)).
Figure 1.38 shows composition of sell value from different types of bondholders.
Based on the sell value, the sell value was highest three quarters after the restatement.
This indicates that the restatement information was not priced in until the third
quarter after the restatement. This is different from the bankruptcy case where the
bankruptcy quarter had the highest selling value. The largest traders for the sell
transactions are insurance companies followed by mutual funds. However, unlike the
total selling value of all bondholders, the highest value of selling transactions from
insurance companies was right on the restatement quarter. The type of the highest
selling firm is also different from the bankruptcy case. For the bankruptcy case, mutual
fund is the largest seller of bonds during the bankruptcy whereas, in the case of
restatement, insurance companies are the largest seller.
Composition of buying value from different types of bondholders can be found in
Figure 1.39. For buying value, the highest-buy-value quarter during the restatement
was one quarter after the restatement. This indicates that on the positive restatement,
the information was priced in faster than the negative restatement. Similar to the
selling value, insurance companies dominated the transactions.
Overall, the bondholder’s activities give us more information about the issuers’
situation and bondholder’s reaction either they were overcoming bad times, such as
bankruptcy and downgrading, or facing higher demand from positive effect, such as
positive restatement. Even though the volume or liquidity of bond trading is much
less than the stock markets, additional information can be gained from a certain type
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of large bondholders such as insurance and mutual funds. Mutual funds have more
flexibility and speed to trade bonds since most of them are much smaller in size. On
the other hand, insurance companies are much larger in size on average; hence, when
they transact in the bond market, it could make the price of bonds change drastically.
Unless insurance companies can smoothly execute their transactions, they may need to
choose between getting their transactions out or not getting them out at all. We can
see from the bankruptcy analysis that during the bankruptcy insurance companies
traded less than mutual funds even though insurance companies held bonds much
larger in size than mutual fund holders on average.
12. Conclusion
In the past decades, researchers have explored the topic of firm capital structure and
we have come much farther from our starting point. We understand better why a firm
makes a decision when they need more capital. However, we still need more research
on a specific area of “public debt” which is a very important subject since 90% of
the new capital issuance is in the form of debt. In addition, firms use more debt
as part of their capital over time. However, debt is a more difficult area to conduct
research compared to equity. This is concerning with the availability of the data. For
private debt such as bank loan, most information or data are proprietary or, in other
words, they are not disclosed to the public. Our hope to understand more about
debt is on the public side in which SEC requires a disclosure. Nevertheless, some
institutional investors are exempt from the public disclosure such as hedge funds.
Therefore, the focus of my research is on the US corporate bonds where the data
are sufficiently available. New bondholding data, eMAXX, offer financial economics
research to understand more in detail about the public debt market, especially on the
demand-side effects. In conjunction with other bond databases (e.g., TRACE, FISD,
SDC), eMAXX complements the aspect of the corporate bond demand and activities
of bondholders. eMAXX data could address a number of question that have never
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been asked in financial discipline, I hope that a summary of eMAXX data in this first
chapter can give readers an idea how to apply eMAXX data to address interesting and
impactful financial research questions.
To quickly grasp what information contains in eMAXX bondholding data, I would
like to give a brief summary of the eMAXX data in different aspects. The first aspect
is about the characteristics of bonds issued in eMAXX data. Most of the corporate
bonds issued in the US (81%) are fixed-rate bonds with some special feature such as
144A rule bond that has higher portion of floating-rated bonds. There is a mix of
currency of bond issued: US, Euro, and Yen. US currency is the largest portion. One-
third of bonds offered in the US debt market is offered privately. This emphasizes the
fact that understanding more about the debt market is difficult since, even in corporate
bond market, there is a decent amount of bonds issued privately. In addition, out of
all the public bonds’ value, only less than one percent is traded. Two-thirds of bonds
in eMAXX is investment grade. However, more than half have no rating. Maturity
of bonds in eMAXX is, on average, relatively high at 10-13 years with the maximum
as high as 150 years. Half of the bonds used to be callable bonds, but the proportion
has changed to one-third since 2005. These are the summary of bond characteristics
in eMAXX.
The second aspect is the analysis on the issuers. Two-third of the issuers are US
firms and majority of them are from financial sector. This is the result of GLBM
that allows financial companies to participate more in the financial market. An issuer
issued number of contract ranged from 1 to 365 with an average amount issued of
$536M. On average, for each issue, there are 25 number of holders.
The information about bondholders is my third aspect. The two largest holders
for US corporate bonds are insurance and mutual funds in which I find that mutual
funds tend to trade more than insurance companies in several occasions. The largest
bondholders on average hold 14% of total dollar bonds issued. For a holder for a
given quarter, they hold roughly 65 bonds in their portfolios. Top three country of
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bondholders are US, Canada, and Japan, respectively. The average value-weighted
portfolio maturity of bondholders is 8.8 years and hold 30-50% of total dollar issued.
Even though insurance companies, especially life and property and casualty insurance,
are the largest bondholders from the beginning of the sample in 1999 to 2013, the
growth of bondholding by mutual fund is very high. The benefit of having more
mutual fund in the bond market is to promote liquidity because mutual funds tend
to trade bonds more than insurance companies in the secondary market where the
volume is very thin currently.
Half of the bondholders hires an investment company to manage their funds and
larger portion of bondholders hires managing firms over time. Our fourth aspect is,
then, managing firms. The three largest managing firms by size based on this sample
are PIMCO, Vanguard, and Metlife, respectively. Interestingly, managing firms can
manage funds under their brand name and manage for other companies outside their
brand name. For example, BlackRock manages funds for themselves and also manages
funds for other private equity firms. This is another challenge of eMAXX data to match
the parent company and its subsidiaries. For public firms, the subsidiary information
can be found in 10K exhibit 21.
Last aspect is about fund managers. There are more than 10,000 bond fund man-
agers in eMAXX database. I find that the turnover of bond fund manager is low and
on average each fund manager manages three portfolios, but the number can go up as
high as hundreds portfolio.
Information from eMAXX is valuable in terms of enabling us to understand more
about the public debt market of firms. Endless questions can be addressed by this
data. Thanks to SEC for the greater transparency in the bond markets, bondholders
are required to report their bondholdings; otherwise, our understanding about bond
market would be very limited.
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Figure 1.1: Percentage of Bond Issued by Country
This Figure shows a breakdown of percentage bond issued by each country in 2017.
The global bond market outstanding is $100.1 Trillion. The data is retrieved from
SIFMA report 2018.
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Figure 1.2: Types of Debt Issued in the US in 2017 (percentage)
This Figure shows a breakdown of percentage type of debt issued in the US in 2017.
The data is retrieved from SIFMA report 2018.
115
Figure 1.3: US Corporate Issuance from 2002 to 2016
The data used to create Figure 1.3 is from Securities Industry and Financial (SIFMA)
2017. SIFMA is the US industry trade group representing securities firms, banks, and
asset management companies. Figure 1.3 shows the US corporate issuance in $Billions.
Corporate debt includes public and private, investment grade and high yield bonds
issued in the US. Common stock includes initial public offerings and follow-ons issued
in the US.
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Figure 1.4: Holding by Type of Holder for Each Quarter
This figure is created from eMAXX data. The data range is from 1999Q1 to 2013Q2.
The subclass full name is the following: ANN=Annuity-variable, END=Close-End
mutual fund, FOF=Fund of Fund mutual fund, GPE=Pension Fund Government,
INS=Insurance Co-Diversified, LIN=Life insurance, MUT=Open-end mutual fund,
OTH=Others, PIN=Property and Casualty insurance, QUI=Mutual fund equity,
UIT=Unit investment trust, GVT=Government, BAL=Mutual fund-Balanced,
FEN=Foundation/Endowment, RIN=Reinsurance company, HFD=Hedge fund,
CPF=Pension fund corporate, UPE=Pension Fund-Union, HLC=Health care system,
HSP=Hospital, AMM=Annuity money market, MMM= Mutual fund money market
117
Figure 1.5: Daily Number of Bonds Transaction for GE bond, GE:AAD
Figure 1.5 shows daily number of transactions for GE:AAD bond
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Figure 1.6: Holding by Type of Holder for Each Quarter for GE:AAD
Figure 1.6 shows proportion of different types of bondholder from 1999Q1 to 2013Q2
for GE:AAD bonds. The subclass full name is the following: ANN=Annuity-variable,
END=Close-End mutual fund, FOF=Fund of Fund mutual fund, GPE=Pension Fund
Government, INS=Insurance Co-Diversified, LIN=Life insurance, MUT=Open-end
mutual fund, OTH=Others, PIN=Property and Casualty insurance, QUI=Mutual
fund equity, UIT=Unit investment trust, GVT=Government, BAL=Mutual fund-
Balanced, FEN=Foundation/Endowment, RIN=Reinsurance company, HFD=Hedge
fund, CPF=Pension fund corporate, UPE=Pension Fund-Union, HLC=Health care
system, HSP=Hospital, AMM=Annuity money market, MMM= Mutual fund money
market
119
Figure 1.7: Number of Firms Issued Bonds by Quarter
This figure shows number of firms issued bonds in each quarter from four databases
used: eMAXX, FISD, TRACE, and SDC Platinum
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Figure 1.8: Number of Issue by Quarter
This figure shows number of issue in each quarter from four databases used: eMAXX,
FISD, TRACE, and SDC Platinum
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Figure 1.9: Average Number of Holder
This figure is created from eMAXX data. The data range is from 1999Q1 to 2013Q2.
This figure shows average number of holder by year. Since eMAXX data provide
quarterly holding data, to output yearly data, the data is average for each quarter,
then multiply the number by four to get yearly average number of holder
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Figure 1.10: Number of Holder by Each Subclass Over Time
This figure is created from eMAXX data. The data range is from 1999Q1 to 2013Q2.
The subclass full name is the following: ANN=Annuity-variable, END=Close-End
mutual fund, FOF=Fund of Fund mutual fund, GPE=Pension Fund Government,
INS=Insurance Co-Diversified, LIN=Life insurance, MUT=Open-end mutual fund,
OTH=Others, PIN=Property and Casualty insurance, QUI=Mutual fund equity,
UIT=Unit investment trust, GVT=Government, BAL=Mutual fund-Balanced,
FEN=Foundation/Endowment, RIN=Reinsurance company, HFD=Hedge fund,
CPF=Pension fund corporate, UPE=Pension Fund-Union, HLC=Health care system,
HSP=Hospital, AMM=Annuity money market, MMM= Mutual fund money market
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Figure 1.11: Average Number of Issuer
This figure is created from eMAXX data. The data range is from 1999Q1 to 2013Q2.
This figure shows average number of issuer by year. Since eMAXX data provide
quarterly issuer data, to output yearly data, the data is average for each quarter, then
multiply the number by four to get yearly average number of issuer
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Figure 1.12: Average Number of Managing Firm
This figure is created from eMAXX data. The data range is from 1999Q1 to 2013Q2.
This figure shows average number of managing firms by year. Since eMAXX data
provide quarterly issuer data, to output yearly data, the data is average for each
quarter, then multiply the number by four to get yearly average number of managing
firms
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Figure 1.13: Proportion (%) Investment VS Junk Bonds Issuance Over
Time
Figure 1.13 shows proportion of investment and junk bonds from 1999 to 2013
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Figure 1.14: Average Number of Sell Transactions Twelve Quarters Before
and After Firms Filed for Bankruptcy
Figure 1.14 shows average number of sell transactions twelve quarters before and after
firms filed for bankruptcy. The vertical axis shows mean number of transactions and
horizontal axis shows number of quarter before and after the bankruptcy. Zero means
the quarter that a firm filed for bankruptcy.
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Figure 1.15: Average Number of Buy Transactions Twelve Quarters Before
and After Firms Filed for Bankruptcy.
Figure 1.15 shows average number of buy transactions twelve quarters before and after
firms filed for bankruptcy. The vertical axis shows mean number of transactions and
horizontal axis shows number of quarter before and after the bankruptcy. Zero means
the quarter that a firm filed for bankruptcy.
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Figure 1.16: Average Number of Portfolio Holdings Twelve Quarters Before
and After Firms Filed for Bankruptcy
Figure 1.16 shows average number of portfolio holdings twelve quarters before and
after firms filed for bankruptcy. The vertical axis shows mean number of transactions
and horizontal axis shows number of quarter before and after the bankruptcy. Zero
means the quarter that a firm filed for bankruptcy.
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Figure 1.17: Composition of Sell Value from Different Types of Bondholder
Twelve Quarters Before and After Bankruptcy Filed
Figure 1.17 shows composition of sell value from different types of bondholder
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Figure 1.18: Composition of Buy Value from Different Types of Bondholder
Twelve Quarters Before and After Bankruptcy Filed
Figure 1.18 shows composition of buy value from different types of bondholder
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Figure 1.19: Average Number of Sell Transactions Eight Quarters Before
and After Rating Downgraded
Figure 1.19 shows average number of sell transactions eight quarters before and after
rating downgraded. The vertical axis shows mean number of transactions and hor-
izontal axis shows number of quarter before and after the rating downgraded. Zero
means the quarter that firms were downgraded.
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Figure 1.20: Average Number of Buy Transactions Eight Quarters Before
and After Rating Downgraded
Figure 1.20 shows average number of buy transactions eight quarters before and after
rating downgraded. The vertical axis shows mean number of transactions and hor-
izontal axis shows number of quarter before and after the rating downgraded. Zero
means the quarter that firms were downgraded.
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Figure 1.21: Average Number of Portfolio Holdings Eight Quarters Before
and After Rating Downgraded
Figure 1.21 shows average number of portfolio holdings eight quarters before and after
rating downgraded. The vertical axis shows mean number of portfolios and horizontal
axis shows number of quarter before and after the rating downgraded. Zero means the
quarter that firms were downgraded.
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Figure 1.22: Average Number of Sell Transactions Eight Quarters Before
and After Rating Upgraded
Figure 1.22 shows average number of sell transactions eight quarters before and after
rating upgraded. The vertical axis shows mean number of transactions and horizontal
axis shows number of quarter before and after the rating upgraded. Zero means the
quarter that firms were upgraded.
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Figure 1.23: Average Number of Buy Transactions Eight Quarters Before
and After Rating Upgraded
Figure 1.23 shows average number of buy transactions eight quarters before and after
rating upgraded. The vertical axis shows mean number of transactions and horizontal
axis shows number of quarter before and after the rating upgraded. Zero means the
quarter that firms were upgraded.
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Figure 1.24: Average Number of Portfolio Holdings Eight Quarters Before
and After Rating Upgraded
Figure 1.21 shows average number of portfolio holdings eight quarters before and after
rating upgraded. The vertical axis shows mean number of portfolios and horizontal
axis shows number of quarter before and after the rating upgraded. Zero means the
quarter that firms were upgraded.
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Figure 1.25: Average Number of Sell Transactions Eight Quarters Before
and After Rating Upgraded from Non-Investment Grade to Investment
Grade
Figure 1.25 shows average number of sell transactions eight quarters before and after
rating upgraded from non-investment grade to investment grade. The vertical axis
shows mean number of transactions and horizontal axis shows number of quarter before
and after the rating upgraded from non-investment grade to investment grade. Zero
means the quarter that firms were upgraded to investment grade.
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Figure 1.26: Average Number of Buy Transactions Eight Quarters Before
and After Rating Upgraded from Non-Investment Grade to Investment
Grade
Figure 1.26 shows average number of buy transactions eight quarters before and after
rating upgraded from non-investment grade to investment grade. The vertical axis
shows mean number of transactions and horizontal axis shows number of quarter before
and after the rating upgraded from non-investment grade to investment grade. Zero
means the quarter that firms were upgraded to investment grade.
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Figure 1.27: Average Number of Portfolio Holdings Eight Quarters Before
and After Rating Upgraded from Non-Investment Grade to Investment
Grade
Figure 1.27 shows average number of portfolio holdings eight quarters before and after
rating upgraded from non-investment grade to investment grade. The vertical axis
shows mean number of portfolio holdings and horizontal axis shows number of quarter
before and after the rating upgraded from non-investment grade to investment grade.
Zero means the quarter that firms were upgraded to investment grade.
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Figure 1.28: Total Value of Buy Transactions Eight Quarters Before and
After Rating Upgraded from Non-Investment Grade to Investment Grade
Figure 1.28 shows total value of buy transactions eight quarters before and after rating
upgraded from non-investment grade to investment grade. The vertical axis shows
value in dollars and horizontal axis shows number of quarter before and after the
rating upgraded from non-investment grade to investment grade. Zero means the
quarter that firms were upgraded to investment grade.
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Figure 1.29: Total Value of Sell Transactions Eight Quarters Before and
After Rating Upgraded from Non-Investment Grade to Investment Grade
Figure 1.29 shows total value of sell transactions eight quarters before and after rating
upgraded from non-investment grade to investment grade. The vertical axis shows
value in dollars and horizontal axis shows number of quarter before and after the
rating upgraded from non-investment grade to investment grade. Zero means the
quarter that firms were upgraded to investment grade.
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Figure 1.30: Average Number of Sell Transactions Eight Quarters Before
and After Rating Downgraded from Investment Grade to Non-Investment
Grade
Figure 1.30 shows average number of sell transactions eight quarters before and after
rating downgraded from investment grade to non-investment grade. The vertical axis
shows mean number of transactions and horizontal axis shows number of quarter before
and after the rating downgraded to non-investment grade. Zero means the quarter that
firms were downgraded to non-investment grade.
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Figure 1.31: Average Number of Buy Transactions Eight Quarters Before
and After Rating Downgraded from Investment Grade to Non-Investment
Grade
Figure 1.31 shows average number of buy transactions eight quarters before and after
rating downgraded from investment grade to non-investment grade. The vertical axis
shows mean number of transactions and horizontal axis shows number of quarter before
and after the rating downgraded to non-investment grade. Zero means the quarter that
firms were downgraded to non-investment grade.
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Figure 1.32: Average Number of Portfolio Holdings Eight Quarters Before
and After Rating Downgraded from Investment Grade to Non-Investment
Grade
Figure 1.32 shows average number of portfolio holdings eight quarters before and after
rating downgraded from investment grade to non-investment grade. The vertical axis
shows mean number of portfolio holdings and horizontal axis shows number of quarter
before and after the rating downgraded to non-investment grade. Zero means the
quarter that firms were downgraded to non-investment grade.
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Figure 1.33: Total Value of Buy Transactions Eight Quarters Before and Af-
ter Rating Downgraded from Investment Grade to Non-Investment Grade
Figure 1.33 shows total value of buy transactions eight quarters before and after rating
downgraded from investment grade to non-investment grade. The vertical axis shows
value in dollars and horizontal axis shows number of quarter before and after the rating
downgraded from investment grade to non-investment grade. Zero means the quarter
that firms were downgraded to non-investment grade.
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Figure 1.34: Total Value of Sell Transactions Eight Quarters Before and Af-
ter Rating Downgraded from Investment Grade to Non-Investment Grade
Figure 1.34 shows total value of sell transactions eight quarters before and after rating
downgraded from investment grade to non-investment grade. The vertical axis shows
value in dollars and horizontal axis shows number of quarter before and after the rating
downgraded from investment grade to non-investment grade. Zero means the quarter
that firms were downgraded to non-investment grade.
147
Figure 1.35: Average Number of Sell Transactions Eight Quarters Before
and After Restatement
Figure 1.35 shows average number of sell transactions eight quarters before and after
restatement
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Figure 1.36: Average Number of Buy Transactions Eight Quarters Before
and After Restatement
Figure 1.36 shows average number of buy transactions eight quarters before and after
restatement
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Figure 1.37: Average Number of Portfolio Holdings Eight Quarters Before
and After Restatement
Figure 1.37 shows average number of portfolio holdings eight quarters before and after
restatement
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Figure 1.38: Composition of Sell Value from Different Types of Bondholder
Eight Quarters Before and After Restatement
Figure 1.38 shows composition of sell value from different types of bondholder
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Figure 1.39: Composition of Buy Value from Different Types of Bondholder
Eight Quarters Before and After Restatement
Figure 1.39 shows composition of buy value from different types of bondholder
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Figure 1.40: Monthly Federal Funds Rate from Jan 1, 2009 – Jan 1, 2019
Figure 1.40 shows monthly federal funds rate from Jan 1, 2009 to Jan 1, 2019. The
























































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.4: Availability of General Electric Bonds Issued in Each Database
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
FISDflag 943 1 0 1 1
TRACEflag 1624 1 0 1 1
SDCflag 615 1 0 1 1
emaxxflag 1350 1 0 1 1
Table 1.5: Summary Statistics of Number of Transaction of GE Bonds
(8-digit CUSIP)
N Min Max Mean Median Std Dev 25pct 75pct 95pct 99pct
1,637 1 150,411 2,849 530 10,691 169 1,376 10,786 48,010
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Table 1.6: Top 10 GE Bond with Highest Transactions
ID Ticker CUSIP Issuer No. Transactions
1 GE.AAD GE 36962GYY4 150,411
2 GE.ADF GE 369604AY9 GE CO 149,047
3 GE.HEE GE 369604BC6 140,087
4 GE.HFA GE 36962G3U6 GE MEDIUM TERM NTS BO 107,384
5 GE.WB GE 36962GXS8 103,281
6 GE.HDM GE 36962G3H5 GE MEDIUM TERM NTS BO 101,792
7 GE.HEH GE 36962G3P7 GE MEDIUM TERM NTS BO 93,904
8 GNW.IS GNW 37247DAK2 89,086
9 GNW.GD GNW 37247DAE6 81,776
10 GE.HDS GE 36962G3K8 GE Capital 79,589
Table 1.7: GE Transactions before the Offering Date
Transaction date CUSIP PRICE Purchaser Par ($)
20020214 36962GYY4 104.714 500,000
20020331 36962GYY4 104.815 NBC 500,000
20020530 36962GYY4 99.249 1,000,000
20020531 36962GYY4 99.249 69,500,000
20020531 36962GYY4 99.249 2,000,000
Table 1.8: GE Transactions after the Offering Date
Transaction date CUSIP PRICE Purchaser Par ($)
20120615 36962GYY4 100 MATURITY 4,000,000
20120615 36962GYY4 100 MATURITY 500,000
20120615 36962GYY4 100 MATURITY 200,000
20120626 36962GYY4 100 MATURITY 55,000
20120630 36962GYY4 100 MATURITY 150,000
Table 1.9: Summary Statistics of Daily Bonds Traded for GE:AAD
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 1st Pctl 5th Pctl 75th Pctl 95th Pctl
60 43 1 1237 11 20 59 145
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Table 1.10: Number of Bondholders for GE:AAD























































Table 1.12: Top Five Largest Bondholder for GE:AAD
Note: AXA = AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company, ING = ING USA Annuity & Life
Insurance Co, Hancock = John Hancock Life Insurance Co, Jackson = Jackson National
Life Insurance Co, TIAA = Teachers Insurance & Ann Assn of America, American Life
= American Life Insurance Co, iShare Barclays = iShares Barclays 1-3 Year Credit Bond
Fund, Woodmen = Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society, = Fidelity Intermediate
Bond Fund, T Rowe = T Rowe Price New Income Fund, Vanguard Total = Vanguard Total
Bond Market Index Fund, Thrivent = Thrivent Financial for Lutherans, Transamerica =
Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Co, Munich = Munich American Reassurance Co,
Vanguard ST = Vanguard Short-Term Investment-Grade Fund
YEAR QTR 1 2 3 4 5
2006 1 AXA Jackson Hancock Fidelity Thrivent
2006 2 AXA Jackson Hancock Fidelity Transamerica
2006 3 AXA Jackson Hancock Fidelity Transamerica
2006 4 AXA Jackson Hancock Fidelity TIAA
2007 1 ING AXA Jackson Hancock TIAA
2007 2 AXA Jackson ING Hancock T Rowe
2007 3 AXA ING Hancock Jackson TIAA
2007 4 AXA ING Hancock Jackson Munich
2008 1 AXA Hancock ING Jackson American Life
2008 2 AXA Hancock TIAA ING Jackson
2008 3 AXA Hancock TIAA Jackson American Life
2008 4 Hancock TIAA Jackson American Life Woodmen
2009 1 Hancock TIAA Jackson American Life Woodmen
2009 2 Hancock TIAA American Life Woodmen Vanguard ST
2009 3 Hancock American Life Woodmen TIAA Vanguard ST
2009 4 Hancock American Life iShares Barclays T Rowe Woodmen
2010 1 Hancock American Life iShares Barclays Woodmen TIAA
2010 2 Hancock iShares Barclays American Life Vanguard Total Woodmen
2010 3 Hancock iShares Barclays American Life Vanguard Total Woodmen
2010 4 Hancock iShares Barclays American Life Vanguard Total Woodmen
2011 1 Hancock iShares Barclays American Life Woodmen TIAA
2011 2 Hancock iShares Barclays American Life Woodmen TIAA
2011 3 Hancock American Life Woodmen TIAA AXA
2011 4 Hancock American Life Woodmen TIAA AXA
2012 1 Hancock American Life Woodmen TIAA AXA
160
Table 1.13: Percentage Amount of Bond Held for GE:AAD by Top Five
Largest Holders
YEAR QTR 1 2 3 4 5
2006 1 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04
2006 2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.03
2006 3 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.03
2006 4 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03
2007 1 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.03
2007 2 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.03
2007 3 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.03
2007 4 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.03
2008 1 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04
2008 2 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04
2008 3 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04
2008 4 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03
2009 1 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03
2009 2 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03
2009 3 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
2009 4 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03
2010 1 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
2010 2 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
2010 3 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
2010 4 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
2011 1 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
2011 2 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
2011 3 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05
2011 4 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
2012 1 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
Table 1.14: Coupon Structure
Obs Coupon Structure Count Percent Cumulative Percent
1 Fixed Rate 163540 81.8711 81.871
2 Floating Rate 31396 15.7174 97.589
3 Zero Coupon 4190 2.0976 99.686
4 Step-Up Rate 518 0.2593 99.945
5 Stripped Cpn (IO/PO) 108 0.0541 99.999
6 Inverse Floating 1 0.0005 100
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Table 1.15: Summary of Coupon Type (%)
FIXD FLTG ZERO STEP STRP N/A
All All data 79.1 15.5 3.1 0.3 0.1 1.9
US 82.7 12.6 1.8 0.3 0.1 2.5
Non-Fin US 87.0 8.0 1.4 0.3 0.0 3.3
Fin US 78.4 17.3 2.3 0.3 0.1 1.7
US insruance 85.0 11.3 0.9 0.1 0.3 2.4
Private All data 75.8 16.8 2.1 0.3 0.0 5.0
US 79.2 12.1 2.4 0.3 0.0 5.9
Non-Fin US 80.7 10.7 1.7 0.3 6.6
Fin US 76.9 14.3 3.6 0.3 0.0 4.8
US insruance 83.3 10.4 0.1 1.2 5.0
144A All data 68.3 28.7 1.8 0.5 0.0 0.7
US 76.3 20.2 2.1 0.5 0.0 0.9
Non-Fin US 89.3 6.7 2.4 0.7 0.9
Fin US 62.8 34.2 1.8 0.2 0.0 0.9
US insruance 80.0 19.1 0.3 0.3 0.3
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Table 1.16: 144A Bond Issuance Count and Percentage by Year
Year Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Cum. Percent
1930 1 0.0 1 0.0
1970 3 0.0 4 0.0
1971 1 0.0 5 0.0
1983 1 0.0 6 0.0
1985 1 0.0 7 0.0
1986 1 0.0 8 0.0
1990 70 0.3 78 0.4
1991 28 0.1 106 0.5
1992 21 0.1 127 0.6
1993 83 0.4 210 1.0
1994 73 0.3 283 1.3
1995 183 0.9 466 2.2
1996 333 1.6 799 3.7
1997 897 4.2 1696 7.9
1998 988 4.6 2684 12.5
1999 651 3.0 3335 15.6
2000 474 2.2 3809 17.8
2001 737 3.4 4546 21.2
2002 586 2.7 5132 24.0
2003 1102 5.1 6234 29.1
2004 1236 5.8 7470 34.9
2005 1167 5.5 8637 40.3
2006 2035 9.5 10672 49.8
2007 1939 9.1 12611 58.9
2008 591 2.8 13202 61.6
2009 982 4.6 14184 66.2
2010 1874 8.8 16058 75.0
2011 1536 7.2 17594 82.1
2012 2249 10.5 19843 92.6
2013 1581 7.4 21424 100.0
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Table 1.17: Currency of Bond Issued
Obs Currency COUNT PERCENT CUM. PERCENT
1 USD 153707 76.9146 76.915
2 EUR 9974 4.991 81.906
3 JPY 8063 4.0347 85.94
4 CAD 3939 1.9711 87.911
5 GBP 3482 1.7424 89.654
6 INR 3285 1.6438 91.298
7 KRW 3019 1.5107 92.808
8 CNY 1980 0.9908 93.799
9 AUD 1796 0.8987 94.698
10 TWD 1606 0.8036 95.501
11 ZAR 1200 0.6005 96.102
12 MXN 1071 0.5359 96.638
13 HKD 781 0.3908 97.029
14 SGD 736 0.3683 97.397
15 BRL 669 0.3348 97.732
16 MYR 616 0.3082 98.04
17 CLP 512 0.2562 98.296
18 THB 399 0.1997 98.496
19 CHF 389 0.1947 98.69
20 SEK 304 0.1521 98.843
Table 1.18: Collateral
Obs Collateral code description COUNT PCT CUM SUM PCT
1 General Corporate Obligation 199869 99.997 99.997
2 Single Family Mortgage Loans 2 0.001 99.998
3 Education (Primary/Secondary) 1 0.0005 99.998
4 FHLMC Gold (Cooperative Share Mortgages) 1 0.0005 99.999
5 Non-U.S. Local Tax/User Fee 1 0.0005 99.999
6 Undefined 1 0.0005 100
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Table 1.19: Pledge
Obs Pledge code description COUNT PERCENT CUM SUM PERCENT
1 Note/Bond 127184 63.6318 63.632
2 Medium Term Notes 40095 20.06 83.692
3 Certificate of Deposit 6822 3.4131 87.105
4 Convertible Bonds/Notes 6125 3.0644 90.169
5 Debenture (Senior Lien) 6114 3.0589 93.228
6 Lease/Loan 4892 2.4475 95.676
7 Mortgage (First) 2723 1.3624 97.038
8 Equipment Trust Certificates 2083 1.0422 98.08
9 Equity Linked Note 894 0.4473 98.528
10 Debenture (Sub/Junior Lien) 858 0.4293 98.957
11 Warrants 798 0.3992 99.356
12 Trust Preferred 620 0.3102 99.666
13 Derivative 387 0.1936 99.86
14 Pay-In-Kind 116 0.058 99.918
15 Commercial Paper 72 0.036 99.954
16 Dividend Rights Certificates 48 0.024 99.978
17 Mortgage (Second) 20 0.01 99.988
18 Bankers Acceptances 15 0.0075 99.995
19 Participation/Pass-Thru Certificate 3 0.0015 99.997
20 Preferred (Par Based) 2 0.001 99.998
21 Collateralized Loan Obligation 1 0.0005 99.998
22 Note - Grant Anticipation 1 0.0005 99.999
23 Note - Promissory 1 0.0005 99.999
24 Rev Bond (Subordinated/Junior Lien) 1 0.0005 100


















Table 1.21: Mean and Median Amount Issued ($’000) for Private Placement
Firms
Private Placement
Yes No Yes No
YEAR Median Median Mean Mean
1999 150,000 35,000 195,855 91,888
2000 154,100 54,842 233,269 131,628
2001 150,000 71,960 216,274 126,852
2002 100,000 55,167 129,424 112,542
2003 100,000 120,000 370,200 164,579
2004 . 11,384 . 97,433
2005 74,280 133,130 98,646 142,939
2006 150,000 149,732 249,981 298,168
2007 220,000 181,247 321,953 401,965
2008 280,558 36,648 425,869 321,280
2009 275,000 35,000 367,775 290,378
2010 300,000 78,006 390,169 288,527
2011 300,000 250,000 435,409 369,608
2012 400,000 250,000 492,654 403,219
2013 350,000 250,000 464,734 360,641
Table 1.22: Bond Rating Status
Rate type Freq. Percent Cum Freq. Cum Pct.
N/A 44848 22.44 44848 22.44
NR 66722 33.38 111570 55.82
Rated 88305 44.18 199875 100
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Table 1.23: Bond Rating
RATING COUNT PERCENT CUM˙SUM˙PERCENT
Aaa 11532 13.0605 13.06
Aa 1 0.0011 13.062
Aa1 2844 3.2209 16.283
Aa2 4287 4.8552 21.138
Aa3 7261 8.2234 29.361
A 272 0.3081 29.669
A1 7239 8.1985 37.868
A2 9144 10.356 48.224
A3 7508 8.5031 56.727
Baa 4 0.0045 56.731
Baa1 6067 6.8711 63.602
Baa2 6538 7.4046 71.007
Baa3 4539 5.1406 76.148
Ba 1 0.0011 76.149
Ba1 2278 2.5799 78.729
Ba2 2349 2.6603 81.389
Ba3 2548 2.8857 84.275
B 1 0.0011 84.276
B1 3162 3.5811 87.857
B2 3479 3.9401 91.797
B3 4731 5.3581 97.155
Caa 88 0.0997 97.255
Caa1 378 0.4281 97.683
Caa2 173 0.1959 97.879
Caa3 112 0.1268 98.006
Ca 937 1.0612 99.067
C 824 0.9332 100
Table 1.24: Summary Statistics of Ratings of Bond Issued
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 25th Pctl 75th Pctl
All data Baa1 A3 C Aaa Ba1 A1
US Baa1 Baa1 C Aaa Ba1 A1
Non-Fin US Baa3 Baa2 C Aaa Ba3 A3
Fin US A2 A2 C Aaa Baa1 Aa3
US Insurance A3 A2 C Aaa Baa1 A1
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Table 1.25: Junk VS Investment Grade Bond by Year
















Table 1.26: Maturity of Bonds Issued (years)
N Mean Median Std Dev 25th Pctl 75th Pctl 99th Pctl Minimum Maximum
148074 10 7 9 5 10 40 1 150
Table 1.27: Summary Statistics of Maturity in Years
Mean Median Min Max 25pct 75pct Std Skewness Kurtosis
All data 13.54 10.01 0.01 100.10 7.01 16.97 10.22 1.66 3.99
US 13.86 10.01 0.01 100.10 7.01 20.03 10.20 1.43 3.03
Non-Fin US 10.65 9.96 0.50 100.06 7.01 10.04 6.84 2.40 9.23
Fin US 18.05 15.93 0.01 100.10 7.04 28.69 12.15 0.67 1.05
US Insurance 18.28 10.03 1.02 100.10 7.00 30.02 15.63 1.98 6.65
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Table 1.28: Proportion of Callable and Non-Callable Bonds Each Year
YEAR Callable Noncall No data
1999 0.46 0.45 0.09
2000 0.51 0.41 0.08
2001 0.56 0.37 0.07
2002 0.60 0.34 0.06
2003 0.61 0.32 0.06
2004 0.61 0.32 0.06
2005 0.59 0.34 0.07
2006 0.33 0.67 0.00
2007 0.36 0.64 0.00
2008 0.32 0.68 0.00
2009 0.29 0.71 0.00
2010 0.28 0.72 0.00
2011 0.30 0.70 0.00
2012 0.31 0.69 0.00

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.30: Top Ten Holder Subclass Information by Unique subID
Obs HOLDER TYPE COUNT PERCENT CUM˙SUM˙PERCENT
1 Open-End Mutual Fund 14507 61.23 61.23
2 Insurance Co-Prop & Cas 3035 12.81 74.04
3 Insurance Co-Life/Health 1913 8.07 82.12
4 Annuity/Variable Annuity 1851 7.81 89.93
5 Closed-End Mutual Fund 1005 4.24 94.17
6 Pension Fund-Government 902 3.81 97.98
7 Health Care Systems 130 0.55 98.53
8 Mutual Fund-Fund of Funds 89 0.38 98.90
9 Insurance Co-Diversified 76 0.32 99.22
10 Government 68 0.29 99.51
Table 1.31: Top 30 Largest Bondholders by Size
Obs Name Type
1 PIMCO TOTAL RETURN FUND Open-End Mutual Fund
2 TEACHERS INSURANCE ANNUITY AMERICA Insurance Co-Life/Health
3 METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE NEW YORK CIT Insurance Co-Life/Health
4 NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE Insurance Co-Life/Health
5 PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY AMERIC Insurance Co-Life/Health
6 AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE ASSURANCE COLUM Insurance Co-Life/Health
7 VANGUARD TOTAL BOND MARKET INDEX FUND Open-End Mutual Fund
8 CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES CALPERS INTE Pension Fund-Government
9 AMERICAN GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE Insurance Co-Life/Health
10 PEERLESS INSURANCE Insurance Co-Prop & Cas
11 NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE Insurance Co-Life/Health
12 AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE DELAWARE Insurance Co-Life/Health
13 NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE ANNUITY Insurance Co-Life/Health
14 MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE Insurance Co-Life/Health
15 VANGUARD TOTAL BOND MARKET II INDEX FUND Open-End Mutual Fund
16 LINCOLN NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE Insurance Co-Life/Health
17 HARTFORD LIFE INSURANCE Insurance Co-Life/Health
18 TEXAS MUNICIPAL RETIREMENT SYSTEM Pension Fund-Government
19 ALLIANZ LIFE INSURANCE NORTH AMERICA Insurance Co-Life/Health
20 LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE Insurance Co-Prop & Cas
21 TRAVELERS INSURANCE LIFE DEPARTMENT Insurance Co-Life/Health
22 JOHN HANCOCK LIFE INSURANCE USA Insurance Co-Life/Health
23 ALLSTATE LIFE INSURANCE Insurance Co-Life/Health
24 TRANSAMERICA LIFE INSURANCE Insurance Co-Life/Health
25 METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE SA Insurance Co-Life/Health
26 AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE Insurance Co-Prop & Cas
27 GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL ASSURANCE Insurance Co-Life/Health
28 DOUBLELINE TOTAL RETURN BOND FUND Open-End Mutual Fund
29 AIG ANNUITY INSURANCE Insurance Co-Life/Health
30 GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY AMERICA Insurance Co-Prop & Cas
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Table 1.32: Total Par Holding to Total Amount Issued
Mean Median Min Max 25pct 75pct Std Skewness Kurtosis
All data 0.34 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.59 0.33 0.70 -0.84
US 0.41 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.69 0.34 0.35 -1.24
Non-Fin US 0.49 0.51 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.78 0.34 0.01 -1.29
Fin US 0.29 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.49 0.31 0.97 -0.28
US Insurance 0.38 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.60 0.30 0.42 -0.92
Table 1.33: Percentage Holding of Top 10/5/3/1 Holders Over Time
Mean Median Min Max 25pct 75pct Std Skewness Kurtosis
All data top10 0.26 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.41 0.30 1.21 0.37
top5 0.23 0.11 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.31 0.28 1.57 1.54
top3 0.20 0.09 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.25 0.27 1.89 2.69
top1 0.14 0.05 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.13 0.23 2.68 6.59
US top10 0.34 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.53 0.32 0.80 -0.55
top5 0.30 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.42 0.31 1.15 0.20
top3 0.26 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.34 0.30 1.44 0.94
top1 0.18 0.08 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.19 0.26 2.14 3.58
FIN us top10 0.23 0.11 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.35 0.27 1.44 1.22
top5 0.20 0.09 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.28 0.26 1.80 2.61
top3 0.18 0.08 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.22 0.24 2.12 3.98
top1 0.12 0.05 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.12 0.21 2.94 8.54
Insurance top10 0.32 0.27 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.46 0.27 0.90 0.19
top5 0.27 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.37 0.25 1.40 1.65
top3 0.23 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.30 0.24 1.83 3.18
top1 0.15 0.09 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.17 0.21 2.77 7.73
Nonfin US top10 0.43 0.36 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.66 0.33 0.49 -0.97
top5 0.37 0.27 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.54 0.32 0.85 -0.51
top3 0.33 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.44 0.32 1.13 -0.03
top1 0.22 0.10 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.25 0.29 1.78 1.94
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Table 1.34: Average Number of Bonds Invested for Each Type of Holder
This figure is created from eMAXX data. The data range is from 1999Q1 to 2013Q2.
The subclass full name is the following: ANN=Annuity-variable, END=Close-End
mutual fund, FOF=Fund of Fund mutual fund, GPE=Pension Fund Government,
INS=Insurance Co-Diversified, LIN=Life insurance, MUT=Open-end mutual fund,
OTH=Others, PIN=Property and Casualty insurance, QUI=Mutual fund equity,
UIT=Unit investment trust, GVT=Government, BAL=Mutual fund-Balanced,
FEN=Foundation/Endowment, RIN=Reinsurance company, HFD=Hedge fund,
CPF=Pension fund corporate, UPE=Pension Fund-Union, HLC=Health care sys-
tem, HSP=Hospital, AMM=Annuity money market, MMM= Mutual fund money
market
Type All data US US Fin Insurance US Non-Fin
AMM 2 2 2 0 0
ANN 94 80 29 6 61
BAL 51 34 13 4 30
CPF 28 25 6 2 21
END 63 59 15 4 50
FEN 21 19 7 2 14
FOF 163 161 49 11 126
GPE 66 57 21 5 41
GVT 19 17 8 3 12
HFD 32 28 9 3 21
HLC 59 52 23 4 34
HSP 12 11 9 3 6
INS 48 44 18 5 33
LIN 119 103 33 8 76
MMM 26 29 10 4 53
MUT 73 72 24 6 59
OTH 249 185 75 20 171
PIN 33 29 12 3 21
QUI 15 15 9 3 12
RIN 74 61 22 5 43
UIT 187 31 35 3 8
UPE 1 1 0 0 1
Table 1.35: Number of Bonds Invested for a Given Holder on Average
1999Q1-2013Q2
Mean Median Min Max 25pct 75pct Std Skewness Kurtosis
All data 65.7 17.0 1.0 4151.0 4.0 61.0 157.9 8.4 113.0
US 59.5 16.0 1.0 3303.0 4.0 58.0 138.2 8.1 104.1
US fin 20.8 8.0 1.0 966.0 3.0 22.0 42.2 7.4 88.8
Insurance 5.4 2.0 1.0 181.0 1.0 5.0 10.0 6.7 67.7
US non fin 46.2 12.0 1.0 2408.0 3.0 44.0 106.4 7.7 94.2
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Table 1.36: Holder Country
Obs Name COUNT PERCENT CUM˙SUM˙PERCENT
1 United States 14485 61.1388 61.139
2 Canada 1960 8.2728 69.412
3 Japan 1245 5.2549 74.667
4 India 1132 4.778 79.445
5 South Korea 810 3.4189 82.863
6 Luxembourg 775 3.2711 86.135
7 China 692 2.9208 89.055
8 Brazil 457 1.9289 90.984
9 Mexico 394 1.663 92.647
10 Ireland 294 1.2409 93.888
11 Taiwan 255 1.0763 94.965
12 South Africa 208 0.8779 95.842
13 Israel 151 0.6373 96.48
14 Malaysia 141 0.5951 97.075
15 Singapore 99 0.4179 97.493
16 Chile 88 0.3714 97.864
17 Thailand 88 0.3714 98.236
18 Argentina 85 0.3588 98.594
19 Hong Kong 70 0.2955 98.89
20 United Kingdom 61 0.2575 99.147
21 Cayman Islands 52 0.2195 99.367
22 Channel Islands 21 0.0886 99.456
23 Australia 18 0.076 99.531
24 Bermuda 17 0.0718 99.603
25 Austria 15 0.0633 99.667
26 Germany 12 0.0507 99.717
27 Greece 12 0.0507 99.768
28 Belgium 10 0.0422 99.81
29 Malta 6 0.0253 99.835
30 Switzerland 6 0.0253 99.861
31 Hungary 4 0.0169 99.878
32 British Virgin Isl. 3 0.0127 99.89
33 Estonia 3 0.0127 99.903
34 Indonesia 3 0.0127 99.916
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Table 1.37: Summary of Number of Portfolio Holding, Buying, and Selling
for a Given Issue
Mean Median Min Max 25pct 75pct Std Skewness Kurtosis
Number of portfolio holding
All data 24.7 4 1 1062 1 22 52.5 4.5 29.3
US 25.1 4 1 1002 1 21 55.6 4.4 27.7
Non-Fin US 29.3 5 1 1002 1 29 58.2 3.9 21.5
Fin US 19.1 2 1 928 1 11 51.0 5.6 42.8
US Insurance 27.6 4 1 660 1 33 51.8 3.6 18.5
Number of portfolio buying
All data 6.2 1 0 709 0 5 16.8 6.9 83.2
US 5.6 0 0 709 0 3 16.7 7.3 87.4
Non-Fin US 6.7 1 0 709 0 5 17.9 6.4 69.8
Fin US 4.0 0 0 611 0 1 14.7 9.2 135.0
US Insurance 5.1 0 0 412 0 4 14.3 7.6 101.4
Number of portfolio selling
All data 4.5 0 0 758 0 4 11.7 7.5 130.1
US 4.2 0 0 478 0 3 11.6 6.9 87.2
Non-Fin US 5.1 1 0 478 0 4 12.6 6.2 72.0
Fin US 3.0 0 0 458 0 1 9.7 8.4 129.0
US Insurance 3.2 0 0 168 0 2 8.1 5.6 49.6
Table 1.38: Summary of the Average Value-Weighted Portfolio Maturity
in Years
Mean Median Max Min 25pct 75pct Std Skewness Kurtosis
All data 8.8 8.3 99.1 0.1 6.3 10.8 4.0 1.1 4.9
US 9.6 8.8 59.4 0.1 7.1 11.7 4.1 1.1 4.2
Non-Fin US 10.2 9.2 58.9 0.4 7.6 12.4 3.9 1.3 3.2
Fin US 8.4 7.8 69.7 0.1 5.4 10.6 4.6 1.4 6.1
US Insurance 13.1 12.2 94.7 0.5 7.8 17.2 7.7 1.8 8.6
Table 1.39: Average Proportion (%) of Each Type of Holder for Each Data
and Industry (Long-Term(LT),Medium-Term(MT),Short-Term(ST))
Long-Term Medium-Term Short-Term
All data 0.75 0.18 0.07
US 0.80 0.13 0.07
US FIN 0.69 0.26 0.05
Non FIN US 0.85 0.07 0.08
Insurance 0.79 0.17 0.04
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Table 1.40: Sector of the Holders Who Are Also Issuers, Proportion (%)
Quarterly Average
This figure is created from eMAXX data. The data range is from 1999Q1
to 2013Q2. The subclass full name is the following: ANN=Annuity-variable,
END=Close-End mutual fund, FOF=Fund of Fund mutual fund, GPE=Pension Fund
Government, INS=Insurance Co-Diversified, LIN=Life insurance, MUT=Open-end
mutual fund, OTH=Others, PIN=Property and Casualty insurance, QUI=Mutual
fund equity, UIT=Unit investment trust, GVT=Government, BAL=Mutual fund-
Balanced, FEN=Foundation/Endowment, RIN=Reinsurance company, HFD=Hedge
fund, CPF=Pension fund corporate, UPE=Pension Fund-Union, HLC=Health care sys-
tem, HSP=Hospital, AMM=Annuity money market, MMM= Mutual fund money mar-
ket
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
LIN 0.47 0.05 0.40 0.55
PIN 0.23 0.02 0.19 0.26
MUT 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.15
ANN 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.10
END 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.06
HLC 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.04
BAL 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05
QUI 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04
RIN 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03
INS 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
FOF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 1.41: Proportion of Investing in the Same Companies but Different
Bonds
Mean Median Min Max 25pct 75pct Std Skewness Kurtosis
All data 0.40 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.14 0.50 0.33 0.86 -0.69
Removed one issue 0.27 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.33 0.20 1.24 1.93
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Table 1.42: Subclass Code from eMAXX
Description Code
Annuity/VA - Money Market AMM
Annuity/Variable Annuity ANN




















Mutual Fund - Money Mkt MMM
MutFd-OE/UnitTr/SICAV/FCP MUT
Nuclear De-Comm Trust NDT
Other OTH
Insurance Co-Prop & Cas PIN
Mutual Fund-Equity QUI
Reinsurance Company RIN




Unit Investment Trust UIT
Pension Fund-Union UPE
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Table 1.43: Credit Sector Description Example
Credit sector description Credit sector code Market sector Credit sector description
Correctional Facilities/Jails COR R Jails/Corr Facs
Economic Development ECD R Eco/Ind Dev
Education EDU R Education
Environment/Pollution Control EPC R Env/Poll Ctrl
Federal/Sovereign Government SOV G Fed/Sov Govt
Financial - All FXX C Financial/All
Financial/Banking F01 C Finl/Banking
Financial/Combined F02 C Finl/Combined
Financial/Finance F03 C Finl/Finance
Financial/Insurance F05 C Finl/Insurance
Financial/Investment F04 C Finl/Investment
Financial/Mutual Funds F06 C Finl/Mutual Fds
Financial/Real Estate F07 C Finl/Real Est
Financial/Securities F08 C Finl/Securities
Financial/Unclassified F99 C Finl/Uncl
Health Care (Hospitals/Nursing Homes) HEC R Health Care
Housing HSG R Housing
Industrial - All IXX C Industrial/All
Industrial/Aerospace I02 C Ind/Aerospace
Industrial/Aircraft Mfg & Components I03 C Ind/Aircraft
Industrial/Aluminum I04 C Ind/Aluminum
Industrial/Apparel Products I01 C Ind/Apparel
Industrial/Arms & Ammunition I05 C Ind/Arms/Ammo
Industrial/Beverage I06 C Ind/Beverage
Industrial/Boat I07 C Ind/Boat
Industrial/Building I09 C Ind/Building
Industrial/Car & Truck Manufacturing I12 C Ind/Car/Trk Mfg
Industrial/Car Parts & Equipment I10 C Ind/Car Parts
Industrial/Chemical I13 C Ind/Chemical
Industrial/Coatings & Paint I14 C Ind/Coatings
Industrial/Conglomerates & Diversified I16 C Ind/Diversified
Industrial/Containers I15 C Ind/Containers
Industrial/Cosmetics & Toiletries I17 C Ind/Cosmetics
Industrial/Drugs I20 C Ind/Drugs
Industrial/Electronics I22 C Ind/Electronics
Industrial/Food I24 C Ind/Food
Industrial/Glass Products I27 C Ind/Glass Prods
Industrial/Home Furnishings I30 C Ind/Home Furn
Industrial/Household Appliances I31 C Ind/HH Applnces
Industrial/Household Products I33 C Ind/HH Products
Industrial/Housewares I34 C Ind/Housewares
Industrial/Jewelry I35 C Ind/Jewelry
Table 1.44: Issuer Types
Entity Freq. Percent Cum Freq. Cum Percent
Federal Corporation/Agency 1 0 1 0
Public/Private Corporation 829419 94.18 829420 94.18
Supranational 3574 0.41 832994 94.59
Trust/Master Trust/Grantor Trust 47687 5.41 880681 100
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Table 1.45: Number of Firms Issued Bond Quarterly Summary 1999Q1-
2013Q2
Mean Median Min Max 25pct 75pct Std. Skew. Kurt.
All data 15,184 14,561 11,800 21,725 12,652 16,825 2,843.23 0.58 (0.73)
US 9,856 9,977 8,956 10,815 9,278 10,379 583.43 (0.20) (1.35)
Non-Fin US 5,850 5,861 5,041 6,834 5,533 6,036 428.82 0.35 (0.19)
Fin US 3,289 3,365 2,703 3,973 2,888 3,570 353.08 (0.25) (1.19)
US Insurance 253 253 218 288 239 268 18.19 (0.12) (1.02)


















Table 1.47: Top 20 Issuers by Sector
Obs Sector COUNT PERCENT CUM˙SUM˙PERCENT
1 Financial/Banking 118962 13.508 13.508
2 Structured Finance 78783 8.9457 22.454
3 Industrial/Unclassified 58359 6.6266 29.08
4 Financial/Finance 55655 6.3195 35.4
5 Financial/Unclassified 49682 5.6413 41.041
6 Service/Unclassified 33720 3.8289 44.87
7 Financial/Real Estate 30650 3.4803 48.35
8 Industrial/Oil & Gas 29167 3.3119 51.662
9 Telephone/Telecommunications 27309 3.1009 54.763
10 Utility/Electric 26769 3.0396 57.803
11 Financial/Insurance 21933 2.4905 60.293
12 Industrial/Electronics 16238 1.8438 62.137
13 Financial/Investment 14810 1.6817 63.819
14 Service/Retail Stores 13993 1.5889 65.407
15 Utility/Combined 13750 1.5613 66.969
16 Industrial/Food 13481 1.5307 68.499
17 Industrial/Chemical 13162 1.4945 69.994
18 Service/Health Care 12269 1.3931 71.387
19 Utility/Natural Gas 11153 1.2664 72.654
20 Service/Business 9980 1.1332 73.787
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Table 1.48: Proportion(%) of Issuer’s Industry Summary 1999Q1-2013Q2
Mean Median Min Max 25pct 75pct Std Skewness Kurtosis
All data
Education 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.53 .
Financial 0.41 0.41 0.34 0.51 0.35 0.47 0.06 0.08 -1.70
Industrial 0.30 0.30 0.23 0.35 0.26 0.33 0.04 -0.12 -1.64
Service 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.02 0.06 -1.76
Telecom 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03 -1.41
Transportation 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.12 -0.91
Utility 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.00 -0.27 -0.66
Supranational 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 -1.89
US
Mean Median Min Max 25pct 75pct Std Skewness Kurtosis
Financial 0.36 0.37 0.31 0.42 0.32 0.39 0.03 -0.12 -1.49
Industrial 0.31 0.31 0.26 0.35 0.28 0.33 0.03 -0.15 -1.47
Service 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.01 -0.41 -1.20
Telecom 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00 -1.44
Transportation 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.39 -1.40
Utility 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.01 -1.90 4.22
Supranational 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.54 -2.04
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Table 1.49: Summary of Issuance by Industry (%)
industry Alldata US USPrivate US144A
Education 0.00 . . .
Financial 52.97 48.25 37.58 36.14
Industrial 21.92 23.31 30.68 30.67
Service 12.02 15.27 20.40 20.40
Supranational 0.01 0.01 . .
Telecom 2.82 2.56 2.53 4.47
Transportation 2.92 2.84 1.79 2.20
Unassigned 0.51 0.30 0.51 0.37
Utility 6.82 7.47 6.51 5.75
Table 1.50: Herfindahl Index (HFI) for Each Issuer
Mean Median Min Max 25pct 75pct Std Skewness Kurtosis
All 0.08 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.03 0.22 3.40 10.60
US 0.12 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.06 0.26 2.69 6.00
US fin 0.07 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.03 0.20 3.92 14.78
insurance 0.08 0.02 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.05 0.20 3.81 14.09
US non fin 0.15 0.02 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.10 0.29 2.21 3.47
Table 1.51: Issuer by Country
Obs Country COUNT PERCENT CUM˙SUM˙PERCENT
1 United States 571667 64.9119 64.912
2 United Kingdom 44186 5.0173 69.929
3 Canada 38413 4.3617 74.291
4 Cayman Islands 32863 3.7315 78.022
5 Japan 20639 2.3435 80.366
6 Netherlands 19317 2.1934 82.559
7 Australia 13186 1.4973 84.057
8 France 12110 1.3751 85.432
9 Germany 10798 1.2261 86.658
10 Luxembourg 8018 0.9104 87.568
11 Mexico 7330 0.8323 88.401
12 South Korea 6976 0.7921 89.193
13 Taiwan 6234 0.7079 89.901
14 Ireland 5760 0.654 90.555
15 China 5712 0.6486 91.203
16 Brazil 5137 0.5833 91.786
17 Sweden 4776 0.5423 92.329
18 Singapore 4220 0.4792 92.808
19 India 4091 0.4645 93.272
20 Bermuda 3779 0.4291 93.702
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Table 1.52: Number of Countries Issued Bond Quarterly Summary 1999Q1-
2013Q2
Mean Median Min Max 25pct 75pct Std Skewness Kurtosis
All data 83 81 64 106 75 89 10.9 0.5 -0.5
Non-Fin 72 72 56 90 67 76 8.5 0.5 0.0
Fin 70 68 56 94 61 75 10.6 0.6 -0.7
Insurance 20 19 12 28 17 25 4.4 0.0 -1.0
Table 1.53: Issuer by Region
Obs Region˙name COUNT PERCENT CUM˙SUM˙PERCENT
1 North America 613929 70.0744 70.074
2 Western Europe 124291 14.1867 84.261
3 Asia/Pacific 73803 8.4239 92.685
4 Caribbean 35611 4.0647 96.75
5 Latin America 20623 2.3539 99.104
6 Africa -Central & S. 3465 0.3955 99.499
7 Middle East 1789 0.2042 99.703
8 Eastern Europe 1768 0.2018 99.905
9 North Atlantic 701 0.08 99.985
10 Africa -North 130 0.0148 100
Table 1.54: Proportion(%) of US and Non-US Issued Bond Quarterly Sum-
mary 1999Q1-2013Q2
Variable Mean Median Min Max 25pct 75pct Std Skewness Kurtosis
All data US 0.66 0.68 0.47 0.82 0.56 0.75 0.11 -0.19 -1.37
All data Non-US 0.34 0.32 0.18 0.53 0.25 0.44 0.11 0.19 -1.37
Non-fin US 0.71 0.72 0.55 0.83 0.64 0.78 0.08 -0.32 -1.14
Non-fin Non-US 0.29 0.28 0.17 0.45 0.22 0.36 0.08 0.32 -1.14
Fin US 0.59 0.62 0.39 0.81 0.47 0.69 0.13 -0.04 -1.42
Fin Non-US 0.41 0.38 0.19 0.61 0.31 0.53 0.13 0.04 -1.42
Insurance US 0.71 0.73 0.57 0.90 0.67 0.75 0.09 0.27 -0.32
Insurance Non-US 0.29 0.27 0.10 0.43 0.25 0.33 0.09 -0.27 -0.32
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Table 1.55: Top 5 Issuer Country for Step (s) in Rating Upgraded or Down-
graded (left), Top 5 Quarter (Right)
up/down 1 step in rating
No. CTRY N PCT No. Qtr N PCT
1 United States 35966 75 1 2008Q4 2741 6
2 United Kingdom 2020 4 2 2003Q3 2132 4
3 Canada 1550 3 3 2007Q1 1762 4
4 Japan 1225 3 4 2012Q2 1648 3
5 Netherlands 1145 2 5 2006Q2 1575 3
up/down between 2 to 5 steps in rating
No. CTRY N PCT No. Qtr N PCT
1 United States 21588 73 1 2008Q4 2995 10
2 United Kingdom 1231 4 2 2012Q2 1858 6
3 Cayman Islands 1138 4 3 2001Q2 1452 5
4 Japan 1012 3 4 2007Q1 1172 4
5 Canada 820 3 5 2005Q3 1151 4
up/down between 6 to 10 steps in rating
No. CTRY N PCT No. Qtr N PCT
1 United States 1866 73 1 2008Q4 284 11
2 Cayman Islands 230 9 2 2009Q2 217 9
3 United Kingdom 162 6 3 2000Q4 192 8
4 Ireland 56 2 4 2007Q4 176 7
5 Canada 42 2 5 2003Q2 169 7
up/down between 11 to 15 steps in rating
No. CTRY N PCT No. Qtr N PCT
1 United States 415 67 1 2008Q3 287 47
2 Cayman Islands 88 14 2 2008Q4 62 10
3 Iceland 35 6 3 2007Q4 45 7
4 United Kingdom 32 5 4 2002Q1 29 5
5 Ireland 30 5 5 2010Q3 21 3
up/down between 16 to 19 steps in rating
No. CTRY N PCT No. Qtr N PCT
1 United States 22 48 1 2010Q3 7 15
2 Cayman Islands 18 39 2 2008Q4 6 13
3 Iceland 3 7 3 2007Q4 5 11
4 United Kingdom 2 4 4 2009Q1 4 9
5 Ireland 1 2 5 2010Q1 4 9
up/down 20 steps in rating
No. CTRY N PCT No. Qtr N PCT
1 Cayman Islands 9 90 1 2007Q4 5 50
2 Iceland 1 10 2 2010Q2 3 30
3 2009Q1 1 10
4 2009Q4 1 10
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Table 1.56: Number of Contract Sold for a Given Seller for All Data (Left
Panel) and the US Data (Right Panel)
YEAR MIN MAX MEAN STD YEAR MIN MAX MEAN STD
All data US data
1999 1 365 3.10 8.70 1999 1 365 3.35 9.61
2000 1 327 3.10 8.19 2000 1 327 3.40 9.28
2001 1 304 3.04 7.54 2001 1 304 3.33 8.57
2002 1 272 2.94 7.02 2002 1 272 3.22 8.00
2003 1 231 2.78 6.38 2003 1 231 3.05 7.32
2004 1 255 2.70 6.03 2004 1 255 2.95 6.97
2005 1 254 2.75 6.36 2005 1 254 2.99 7.29
2006 1 226 2.73 6.10 2006 1 226 3.00 7.13
2007 1 206 2.72 5.83 2007 1 206 3.02 7.06
2008 1 236 2.72 5.91 2008 1 236 3.06 7.16
2009 1 258 2.76 5.84 2009 1 258 3.19 7.23
2010 1 306 2.71 5.81 2010 1 306 3.11 7.36
2011 1 298 2.70 5.51 2011 1 298 3.08 6.98
2012 1 326 2.73 5.55 2012 1 326 3.13 7.04
2013 1 269 2.77 5.28 2013 1 269 3.21 6.68
Table 1.57: Number of Contract Sold for a Given Seller for Financial (Left
Panel) and Insurance (Right panel)
YEAR MIN MAX MEAN STD YEAR MIN MAX MEAN STD
Financial Insurance
1999 1 365 3.69 11.98 1999 1 60 2.89 5.13
2000 1 269 3.88 11.79 2000 1 59 2.95 5.04
2001 1 255 3.71 10.89 2001 1 58 2.81 4.61
2002 1 237 3.49 10.32 2002 1 52 2.80 4.09
2003 1 221 3.34 9.94 2003 1 50 2.98 4.37
2004 1 255 3.27 9.90 2004 1 138 3.29 6.77
2005 1 254 3.43 10.71 2005 1 146 3.54 9.43
2006 1 226 3.45 10.25 2006 1 136 3.51 8.76
2007 1 206 3.54 10.14 2007 1 117 3.40 8.07
2008 1 236 3.62 10.41 2008 1 95 3.44 7.76
2009 1 258 3.67 10.25 2009 1 77 3.52 7.62
2010 1 306 3.55 10.54 2010 1 66 3.41 6.94
2011 1 298 3.44 9.83 2011 1 69 3.31 6.16
2012 1 326 3.47 9.87 2012 1 66 3.23 5.66
2013 1 269 3.55 8.97 2013 1 67 4.37 8.82
185
Table 1.58: Summary Statistics of Amount of Money Raised by Firms
(Unit: $’000)
Mean Median Min Max 25pct 75pct Std Skew. Kur.
All data 536,411 296,103 1 9,992,000 116,071 665,533 740,598 4 26
US 372,554 187,820 1 9,975,000 30,000 470,041 558,226 3 19
Non-Fin US 324,833 200,000 1 9,000,000 65,000 400,000 443,821 4 28
Fin US 420,051 153,978 1 9,975,000 20,000 514,000 649,165 3 13
US Insurance 367,676 250,000 9 4,408,200 55,365 500,000 422,514 3 16
Table 1.59: Recurrent Issuers
Obs ISSUER Total issues Avg. issue: quarter
1 BARCLAYS BANK PLC 1140 19.6552
2 RABOBANK NEDERLAND NV, UTRECHT 596 10.2759
3 IBRD (INTL BANK FOR RECON & DEV) (WORLDBANK) 589 10.1552
4 MORGAN STANLEY 550 9.4828
5 MERRILL LYNCH & CO INC 506 8.7241
6 HSBC BANK PLC 471 8.1207
7 CITIGROUP INC 468 8.069
8 ABN AMRO BANK NV 457 7.8793
9 BANK OF AMERICA CORP 440 7.5862
10 HSBC BANK PLC, LONDON 434 7.4828
11 GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL CORP (GECC) 382 6.5862
12 ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND PLC 371 6.3966
13 WESTPAC BANKING CORP 371 6.3966
14 SOCIETE GENERALE, PARIS 352 6.069
15 EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK (EIB) (BEI) 345 5.9483
16 BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC 342 5.8966
17 BNP PARIBAS 335 5.7759
18 JP MORGAN CHASE & CO 334 5.7586
19 UBS AG JERSEY BRANCH 333 5.7414
20 WESTPAC BANKING CORP, SYDNEY NSW 333 5.7414
21 DRESDNER BANK AG (FRANKFURT) 307 5.2931
22 AT&T CORP (AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO) 299 5.1552
23 LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC 297 5.1207
24 ING BANK (INTERNATIONALE NEDERLANDEN BANK) 286 4.931
25 ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND PLC, EDINBURGH 283 4.8793
26 ING BANK NV 281 4.8448
27 DEUTSCHE BANK AG (LONDON) 262 4.5172
28 LLOYDS TSB BANK PLC 252 4.3448
29 GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC 250 4.3103
30 LEHMAN BROTHERS TREASURY BV 249 4.2931
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Table 1.60: Issuer by State
Obs State COUNT PERCENT CUM˙SUM˙PERCENT
1 Delaware 11832 73.7794 73.779
2 New York 617 3.8474 77.627
3 California 317 1.9767 79.603
4 Texas 293 1.827 81.43
5 Florida 226 1.4092 82.84
6 Nevada 199 1.2409 84.081
7 Ohio 177 1.1037 85.184
8 Pennsylvania 164 1.0226 86.207
9 Tennessee 145 0.9042 87.111
10 Indiana 139 0.8667 87.978
11 Maryland 127 0.7919 88.77
12 North Carolina 125 0.7794 89.549
13 Wisconsin 112 0.6984 90.248
14 Illinois 109 0.6797 90.927
15 Georgia 108 0.6734 91.601
16 Michigan 105 0.6547 92.255
17 New Jersey 86 0.5363 92.792
18 Virginia 85 0.53 93.322
19 Utah 84 0.5238 93.845
20 Massachusetts 83 0.5176 94.363
21 Kentucky 67 0.4178 94.781
22 Minnesota 64 0.3991 95.18
23 Louisiana 58 0.3617 95.542
24 Connecticut 55 0.343 95.885
25 Missouri 54 0.3367 96.221
26 Quebec 50 0.3118 96.533
27 Colorado 47 0.2931 96.826
28 Puerto Rico 45 0.2806 97.107
29 Arizona 42 0.2619 97.369
30 South Carolina 35 0.2182 97.587
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Table 1.61: Example of Name Changed for Managing Firms
Obs mfID MF˙name
1 4931 Escorts Asset Management Limited
2 4931 Escorts Asset Management Ltd
3 6627 RMB Asset Management (Pty) Ltd
4 6627 Momentum Asset Management
5 10013 Aetna Services, Inc. (Portfolio Management Group)
6 10013 Aetna Inc (Portfolio Management Group)
7 10017 Aid Association for Lutherans (AAL)
8 10017 Aid Association for Lutherans/Lutheran Brotherhood (Appleton)
9 10017 Thrivent Financial for Lutherans (Appleton)
10 10019 AIM Advisors, Inc.
11 10019 AIM Advisors, Inc./AIM Capital Management, Inc.
12 10019 AIM Investments
13 10019 Invesco AIM
14 10019 Invesco Advisers Inc (Houston)
15 10022 Alfa Group
16 10022 Alfa Insurance
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Table 1.62: Type of Managing Firms
Obs Type COUNT PERCENT CUM˙SUM˙PERCENT
1 Investment Manager 978 32.6109 32.611
2 Insurance Co-Prop & Cas 539 17.9727 50.584
3 Mutual Fund Manager 379 12.6375 63.221
4 Insurance Co-Life 309 10.3034 73.525
5 Equity Manager 183 6.102 79.627
6 Insurance Co-Mgmt Div 138 4.6015 84.228
7 Bank-Management Division 122 4.068 88.296
8 Bank-Trust 97 3.2344 91.531
9 Broker/Management Sub 52 1.7339 93.264
10 Insurance Co-Diversified 44 1.4672 94.732
11 Pension Fund-Government 41 1.3671 96.099
12 Bank-Portfolio 28 0.9336 97.032
13 Government 21 0.7002 97.733
14 Hedge Fund 20 0.6669 98.399
15 Health Care Systems 7 0.2334 98.633
16 Corporation 6 0.2001 98.833
17 Pension Fund-Corporate 6 0.2001 99.033
18 Reinsurance Company 6 0.2001 99.233
19 Trust Company 6 0.2001 99.433
20 Foundation/Endowment 4 0.1334 99.567
21 Bank-Savings/Bldg Society 3 0.1 99.667
22 Credit Union 2 0.0667 99.733
23 Finance/Credit Company 2 0.0667 99.8
24 Other-General 2 0.0667 99.867
25 Pension Fund-Union 2 0.0667 99.933
26 Bank-Government 1 0.0333 99.967
27 Broker/Dealer-Fund Mgr 1 0.0333 100
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Table 1.63: Thirty Largest Managing Firms by Size of Holding
Obs Name Type
1 PACIFIC INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT PIMCO Investment Manager
2 VANGUARD GROUP Mutual Fund Manager
3 LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE Insurance Co-Diversified
4 METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE INVESTMENTS METLIFE Insurance Co-Mgmt Div
5 PRUDENTIAL INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT FIXED INCOME Investment Manager
6 FRANKLIN TEMPLETON INVESTMENTS Investment Manager
7 TEACHERS ADVISORS TIAA CREF Investment Manager
8 AIG GLOBAL INVESTMENT GROUP Insurance Co-Mgmt Div
9 BLACKROCK FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FIXED INCOME Investment Manager
10 HARTFORD INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT HIMCO Insurance Co-Mgmt Div
11 CAPITAL RESEARCH MANAGEMENT LOS ANGELES WEST Investment Manager
12 BLACKROCK FUND ADVISORS Bank-Management Division
13 FIDELITY MANAGEMENT RESEARCH FIXED INCOME DIVISION Investment Manager
14 ALLIANCEBERNSTEIN Investment Manager
15 WELLINGTON MANAGEMENT Investment Manager
16 ZZZO Other-General
17 NEW YORK LIFE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT Investment Manager
18 MASON STREET ADVISORS Investment Manager
19 STATE FARM INSURANCE Insurance Co-Mgmt Div
20 STANCORP INVESTMENT ADVISERS Insurance Co-Mgmt Div
21 WESTERN ASSET MANAGEMENT WAMCO Investment Manager
22 AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE AFLAC Insurance Co-Life
23 AEGON UNITED STATES AMERICA INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT Insurance Co-Mgmt Div
24 DELAWARE INVESTMENTS Bank-Management Division
25 GE ASSET MANAGEMENT Investment Manager
26 NORTHWESTERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT Insurance Co-Mgmt Div
27 PINEBRIDGE INVESTMENTS Insurance Co-Mgmt Div
28 TRAVELERS ASSET MANAGEMENT INTERNATIONAL TAMIC Insurance Co-Mgmt Div
29 ALLSTATE INVESTMENTS LLC Insurance Co-Prop & Cas
30 OPPENHEIMERFUNDS ROCHESTER Mutual Fund Manager
Table 1.64: Proportion of Holders Hired Manager to Manage Their Funds
(%)


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.66: Country Identification of Managing Firm
Obs Country name COUNT PERCENT CUM˙SUM˙PERCENT
1 United States 2438 81.2396 81.24
2 Canada 209 6.9643 88.204
3 China 65 2.1659 90.37
4 Japan 56 1.866 92.236
5 Hong Kong 47 1.5661 93.802
6 Taiwan 45 1.4995 95.302
7 India 42 1.3995 96.701
8 South Africa 39 1.2996 98.001
9 Singapore 36 1.1996 99.2
10 Australia 13 0.4332 99.633
11 Bermuda 9 0.2999 99.933
12 Bahamas 1 0.0333 99.967
13 Cayman Islands 1 0.0333 100
Table 1.67: Example of Non-Unique Employee ID
EmpID MfID Prefix First Last Title year Quarter
10007 16825 Mr. Brendan Bradley Senior Vice President 2005 2
10007 13234 Mr. Eric Holmes Portfolio Manager 2005 2
10007 26444 Ms. Stacey Navin Director & Portfolio Manager 2005 2
10007 13234 Mr. Daniel O’Neill Portfolio Manager 2005 2
10007 26444 Mr. Manraj Sekhorn Director & Portfolio Manager 2005 2
10007 11073 Mr. Matthew Willey Portfolio Manager 2005 2
10008 18058 Mr. Brian Dawson 1999 1
10008 31952 Mr. Vladimir de Vassal Director of Quantitive Researc 2007 1
10008 11113 Mr. Valadimir deVassal Portfolio Manager 2005 2
10008 10735 Mr. Sean Fitzgibbon Vice President & Portfolio Man 2005 2
10008 11073 Ms. Jeanna Wong Portfolio Manager 2005 2
10008 11113 Mr. Peter Zuleba III Portfolio Manager 2005 2
10009 10782 Mr. Drew Demakis Senior Portfolio Manager 2006 3
10009 11686 Ms. Eleanor Innes Second Vice President 2005 2
10009 10735 Ms. Elizabeth Slover Co-Director & Portfolio Manage 2005 2
10009 11686 Ms. Marguerite Wagner Executive Vice President 2005 2
10009 11813 Dr. Edward Yardeni Chief Investment Strategist 2006 3
10010 11205 Mr. Philippe Brugere-Trelat Portfolio Manager 2005 2
10010 11205 Ms. Anne Gudefin Portfolio Manager 2005 2
10010 12962 Mr. Mark Koenig Portfolio Manager 2005 2
10010 11205 Mr. Charles Lahr Portfolio Manager 2005 2
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Table 1.68: Bond Managers Turnover
No. of time moved Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Cum. Percent
0 12897 87.48 12897 87.48
1 724 4.91 13621 92.4
2 213 1.44 13834 93.84
3 175 1.19 14009 95.03
4 178 1.21 14187 96.24
5 153 1.04 14340 97.27
6 139 0.94 14479 98.22
7 99 0.67 14578 98.89
8 85 0.58 14663 99.46
9 59 0.4 14722 99.86
10 12 0.08 14734 99.95
11 5 0.03 14739 99.98
12 2 0.01 14741 99.99
13 1 0.01 14742 100
Table 1.69: Summary of Duration a Manager has Worked in the Industry
(Years)
Mean Minimum Maximum Median 25th Pctl 75th Pctl 99th Pctl
5.7 0.1 14.2 4.7 2.0 8.7 14.2
Table 1.70: Summary of Market Sector Identifying the Employee’s Area of
Focus
Obs STRING CODE TYPE OF STRING PERCENTAGE
1 A Asset backed 24.1018
2 C Corporate 40.2327
3 G Government 30.9623
4 M Mortgage-Backed 25.8693
5 R Local/Regional 19.4828
6 N Domestic US 27.0609
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Table 1.71: List of Fund Managers Managed the Largest Funds in Each
Quarter
YEAR QTR Prefix First Last Title TYPE Company Amount Managed ($ 000’s)
1999 1 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 91,777,338
1999 2 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 90,111,507
1999 3 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 85,551,700
1999 4 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 84,406,020
2000 1 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 83,900,011
2000 2 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 83,419,642
2000 3 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 84,618,831
2000 4 Ms. Patricia Cook MD LIN Prudential 87,454,331
2001 1 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 83,454,332
2001 2 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 86,091,764
2001 3 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 86,123,160
2001 4 Ms. Patricia Cook MD LIN Prudential 87,860,646
2002 1 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 88,964,237
2002 2 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 89,082,966
2002 3 Mr. Michael O’Kane Senior MD LIN TIAA-CREF 91,034,448
2002 4 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 102,704,220
2003 1 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 101,269,481
2003 2 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 104,478,305
2003 3 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 102,451,867
2003 4 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 106,575,188
2004 1 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 108,478,857
2004 2 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 112,169,041
2004 3 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 130,771,263
2004 4 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 121,495,471
2005 1 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 127,643,077
2005 2 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 125,856,914
2005 3 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 133,547,032
2005 4 Mr. Scott Evans CIO and EVP LIN TIAA-CREF 120,659,689
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Table 1.72: List of Fund Managers Managed the Largest Funds in Each
Quarter (Continued)
YEAR QTR Prefix First Last Title TYPE Company Amount Managed ($ 000’s)
2006 1 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 133,197,472
2006 2 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 130,967,388
2006 3 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 127,608,485
2006 4 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 126,330,925
2007 1 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 130,810,145
2007 2 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 125,738,696
2007 3 Mr. Scott Evans CIO and EVP LIN TIAA-CREF 131,766,458
2007 4 Mr. Thomas Lenihan MD LIN Met Life 138,161,954
2008 1 Mr. Scott Evans CIO and EVP LIN TIAA-CREF 131,690,587
2008 2 Ms. Elizabeth Black MD LIN TIAA-CREF 134,106,825
2008 3 Ms. Elizabeth Black MD LIN TIAA-CREF 130,084,226
2008 4 Ms. Elizabeth Black MD LIN TIAA-CREF 136,249,278
2009 1 Ms. Elizabeth Black MD LIN TIAA-CREF 135,921,977
2009 2 Ms. Elizabeth Black MD LIN TIAA-CREF 138,966,666
2009 3 Ms. Elizabeth Black MD LIN TIAA-CREF 136,871,014
2009 4 Ms. Elizabeth Black MD LIN TIAA-CREF 147,071,614
2010 1 Ms. Elizabeth Black MD LIN TIAA-CREF 150,559,429
2010 2 Mr. William Gross MD MUT PIMCO 186,650,383
2010 3 Mr. William Gross MD MUT PIMCO 199,994,471
2010 4 Mr. William Gross MD MUT PIMCO 199,531,249
2011 1 Mr. William Gross MD MUT PIMCO 198,062,555
2011 2 Ms. Elizabeth Black MD LIN TIAA-CREF 165,852,866
2011 3 Mr. William Gross MD MUT PIMCO 192,110,943
2011 4 Mr. William Gross Port Mgr MUT PIMCO 227,089,766
2012 1 Mr. William Gross Port Mgr MUT PIMCO 225,425,700
2012 2 Mr. William Gross Port Mgr MUT PIMCO 250,932,239
2012 3 Mr. William Gross Port Mgr MUT PIMCO 254,071,056
2012 4 Mr. William Gross Port Mgr MUT PIMCO 259,707,077
2013 1 Mr. William Gross Port Mgr MUT PIMCO 278,503,447
2013 2 Mr. William Gross Port Mgr MUT PIMCO 278,529,928
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Table 1.73: Number of Funds Under Management by Quarter
Obs year Qtr Freq Mean Median Min P25 P75 P99 Max
1 1999 1 2169 2.79023 1 1 1 3 24 58
2 1999 2 2087 2.72544 1 1 1 3 25 58
3 1999 3 2055 2.75912 1 1 1 3 27 62
4 1999 4 2039 2.78568 1 1 1 3 28 62
5 2000 1 2041 2.78001 1 1 1 3 27 65
6 2000 2 1927 2.5698 1 1 1 2 24 76
7 2000 3 1995 2.59499 1 1 1 2 24 72
8 2000 4 2011 2.70612 1 1 1 2 24 83
9 2001 1 1981 2.74609 1 1 1 2 25 83
10 2001 2 2102 2.86013 1 1 1 3 26 88
11 2001 3 2143 2.85954 1 1 1 3 26 93
12 2001 4 2150 2.90651 1 1 1 3 26 94
13 2002 1 2173 2.97561 1 1 1 3 27 103
14 2002 2 2218 2.97701 1 1 1 3 27 106
15 2002 3 2220 2.95631 1 1 1 3 26 111
16 2002 4 2145 2.87506 1 1 1 3 26 109
17 2003 1 2135 2.86183 1 1 1 3 25 117
18 2003 2 2188 2.88803 1 1 1 3 26 115
19 2003 3 2125 2.83576 1 1 1 3 25 108
20 2003 4 2255 2.80798 1 1 1 3 25 114
21 2004 1 2317 2.7691 1 1 1 3 25 121
22 2004 2 2139 2.91959 1 1 1 3 25 130
23 2004 3 2154 2.90808 1 1 1 3 25 131
24 2004 4 2267 2.86061 1 1 1 3 25 134
25 2005 1 1981 3.07824 1 1 1 3 31 127
26 2005 2 2140 3.02944 1 1 1 3 32 127
27 2005 3 2331 2.9541 1 1 1 3 28 126
28 2005 4 2320 2.92629 1 1 1 3 27 127
29 2006 1 2335 2.93704 1 1 1 3 26 133
30 2006 2 2293 2.9638 1 1 1 3 29 122
31 2006 3 2329 2.97853 2 1 1 3 23 125
32 2006 4 2328 2.9768 2 1 1 3 23 121
33 2007 1 2219 3.22172 2 1 1 3 25 126
34 2007 2 2226 3.24933 2 1 1 3 26 126
35 2007 3 2157 3.35651 2 1 1 3 28 129
36 2007 4 1965 3.58728 2 1 1 4 30 126
37 2008 1 1873 3.748 2 1 1 4 33 133
38 2008 2 1866 3.78081 2 1 1 4 31 143
39 2008 3 1778 3.96625 2 1 1 4 32 152
40 2008 4 1712 4.07126 2 1 1 4 32 153
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Table 1.74: Number of Funds Under Management by Quarter (Continued)
Obs year Qtr Freq Mean Median Min P25 P75 P99 Max
41 2009 1 1678 4.15495 2 1 1 4 32 157
42 2009 2 1662 4.12034 2 1 1 4 29 152
43 2009 3 1646 4.13062 2 1 1 4 30 146
44 2009 4 1592 4.13882 2 1 1 4 28 104
45 2010 1 1539 4.81741 2 1 1 5 37 227
46 2010 2 1547 4.7117 2 1 1 5 36 202
47 2010 3 1525 4.79738 2 1 1 5 40 202
48 2010 4 1483 4.93257 2 1 1 5 42 202
49 2011 1 1471 4.95377 2 1 1 5 42 199
50 2011 2 1456 4.92514 2 1 1 5 38 197
51 2011 3 1421 4.80647 2 1 1 5 38 197
52 2011 4 1429 4.81666 2 1 1 5 38 195
53 2012 1 1423 4.83064 2 1 1 5 39 202
54 2012 2 1446 4.78838 2 1 1 5 38 199
55 2012 3 1442 4.77739 2 1 1 5 39 200
56 2012 4 1468 4.72548 2 1 1 5 38 199
57 2013 1 1416 4.76059 2 1 1 5 32 198



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.77: Summary Statistics of Type of Bankruptcy Chapter
Chapter no. of cases Percent
11 1097 98
7 24 2
Table 1.78: Summary Statistics of Bankruptcy Prepackaging
Prepackaged Frequency Percent Cum Freq Cum Percent
free fall 755 67.17 755 67.17
not applicable 27 2.4 782 69.57
prenegotiated 217 19.31 999 88.88
prepackaged 125 11.12 1124 100
Table 1.79: Summary Statistics of Firms in Both eMAXX and BRD
Database
In Both Database Frequency Percent Cum Freq. Cum. Percent.
YES 606 53.91 606 0.54
No 518 46.09 1124 1.00
Table 1.80: Rating Upgrade and Downgrade Summary
Mean Median Min Max 25pct 75pct Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis








































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.82: Buy and Sell Transaction of PASA FDG
Net Chg ($’000) YR QTR NAME Buy Sell Rating
9 2007 1 Fidelity Asset Manager: Growth Portfolio 1 Aaa
12 2007 1 Fidelity Asset Manager 85% 2 Aaa
18 2007 1 Fidelity Real Estate Income Fund 3 Aaa
26 2007 1 Fidelity Balanced Portfolio 4 Aaa
145 2007 1 Fidelity Asset Manager Portfolio 5 Aaa
146 2007 1 Fidelity Asset Manager 70% 6 Aaa
216 2007 1 Fidelity Asset Manager 20% 7 Aaa
267 2007 1 Fidelity Advisor Inflation-Protected Bond Fund 8 Aaa
352 2007 1 Fidelity Investment Grade Bond Portfolio 9 Aaa
720 2007 1 Fidelity Asset Manager 50% 10 Aaa
827 2007 1 Fidelity Strategic Real Return Fund 11 Aaa
Net Chg ($’000) YR QTR NAME Buy Sell Rating
9 2007 2 Fidelity Asset Manager: Growth Portfolio 1 Aaa
12 2007 2 Fidelity Asset Manager 85% 2 Aaa
18 2007 2 Fidelity Real Estate Income Fund 3 Aaa
26 2007 2 Fidelity Balanced Portfolio 4 Aaa
30 2007 2 Fidelity Advisor Balanced Fund 5 Aaa
59 2007 2 Fidelity Advisor Balanced Fund 6 Aaa
105 2007 2 Fidelity Advisor Short Fixed-Income Fund 7 Aaa
145 2007 2 Fidelity Asset Manager Portfolio 8 Aaa
146 2007 2 Fidelity Asset Manager 70% 9 Aaa
216 2007 2 Fidelity Asset Manager 20% 10 Aaa
245 2007 2 Fidelity Advisor Intermediate Bond Fund 11 Aaa
257 2007 2 Fidelity Advisor Ultra-Short Bond Fund 12 Aaa
267 2007 2 Fidelity Advisor Inflation-Protected Bond Fund 13 Aaa
340 2007 2 Fidelity Puritan Fund 14 Aaa
352 2007 2 Fidelity Investment Grade Bond Portfolio 15 Aaa
364 2007 2 Fidelity Advisor Mortgage Securities Fund 16 Aaa
395 2007 2 Fidelity Balanced Fund 17 Aaa
569 2007 2 Fidelity Short-Term Bond Fund 18 Aaa
679 2007 2 Fidelity Puritan Fund 19 Aaa
720 2007 2 Fidelity Asset Manager 50% 20 Aaa
789 2007 2 Fidelity Balanced Fund 21 Aaa
820 2007 2 Fidelity US Bond Index Fund 22 Aaa
827 2007 2 Fidelity Strategic Real Return Fund 23 Aaa
1206 2007 2 Fidelity Intermediate Bond Fund 24 Aaa
2620 2007 2 Fidelity Investment Grade Bond Fund 25 Aaa
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Table 1.83: Buy and Sell Transaction of PASA FDG (Continued)
Net Chg ($’000) YR QTR NAME Buy Sell Rating
-180 2007 3 Fidelity Investment Grade Bond Fund 1 Aaa
-108 2007 3 Fidelity Strategic Real Return Fund 2 Aaa
-29 2007 3 Fidelity Advisor Ultra-Short Bond Fund 3 Aaa
-24 2007 3 Fidelity Investment Grade Bond Portfolio 4 Aaa
-21 2007 3 Fidelity Asset Manager Portfolio 5 Aaa
-18 2007 3 Fidelity Real Estate Income Fund 6 Aaa
-5 2007 3 Fidelity Balanced Portfolio 7 Aaa
-1 2007 3 Fidelity Advisor Mortgage Securities Fund 8 Aaa
-1 2007 3 Fidelity Asset Manager: Growth Portfolio 9 Aaa
1 2007 3 Fidelity Asset Manager 85% 1 Aaa
6 2007 3 Fidelity Asset Manager 70% 2 Aaa
10 2007 3 Fidelity Advisor Intermediate Bond Fund 3 Aaa
11 2007 3 Fidelity Asset Manager 20% 4 Aaa
22 2007 3 Fidelity Balanced Fund 5 Aaa
28 2007 3 Fidelity Advisor Short Fixed-Income Fund 6 Aaa
30 2007 3 Fidelity Advisor Balanced Fund 7 Aaa
31 2007 3 Fidelity Asset Manager 50% 8 Aaa
43 2007 3 Fidelity Balanced Fund 9 Aaa
51 2007 3 Fidelity Advisor Inflation-Protected Bond Fund 10 Aaa
59 2007 3 Fidelity Advisor Balanced Fund 11 Aaa
146 2007 3 Fidelity Short-Term Bond Fund 12 Aaa
149 2007 3 Fidelity Intermediate Bond Fund 13 Aaa
304 2007 3 Fidelity US Bond Index Fund 14 Aaa
340 2007 3 Fidelity Puritan Fund 15 Aaa
615 2007 3 Fidelity Advisor Total Bond Fund 16 Aaa
679 2007 3 Fidelity Puritan Fund (Aggrgtd) 17 Aaa
1229 2007 3 Fidelity Advisor Total Bond Fund 18 Aaa
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Table 1.84: Buy and Sell Transaction of PASA FDG (Continued)
Net Chg ($’000) YR QTR NAME Buy Sell Rating
-513 2007 4 Fidelity Investment Grade Bond Fund 1 C
-137 2007 4 Fidelity Intermediate Bond Fund 2 C
-107 2007 4 Fidelity US Bond Index Fund 3 C
-74 2007 4 Fidelity Asset Manager 50% 4 C
-30 2007 4 Fidelity Advisor Mortgage Securities Fund 5 C
-29 2007 4 Fidelity Asset Manager 20% 6 C
-27 2007 4 Fidelity Advisor Inflation-Protected Bond Fund 7 C
-22 2007 4 Fidelity Advisor Intermediate Bond Fund 8 C
-17 2007 4 Fidelity Asset Manager 70% 9 C
-8 2007 4 Fidelity Advisor Balanced Fund 10 C
-7 2007 4 Fidelity Advisor Ultra-Short Bond Fund 11 C
-4 2007 4 Fidelity Advisor Balanced Fund 12 C
-2 2007 4 Fidelity Asset Manager 85% 13 C
-1 2007 4 Fidelity Asset Manager: Growth Portfolio 14 C
0 2007 4 Fidelity Asset Manager 60% C
0 2007 4 Fidelity Asset Manager 40% C
0 2007 4 Fidelity Asset Manager 30% C
1 2007 4 Fidelity Investment Grade Bond Portfolio 1 C
2 2007 4 Fidelity Balanced Portfolio 2 C
2 2007 4 Fidelity Asset Manager Portfolio 3 C
15 2007 4 Fidelity Advisor Short Fixed-Income Fund 4 C
20 2007 4 Fidelity Advisor Total Bond Fund 5 C
39 2007 4 Fidelity Advisor Total Bond Fund 6 C
74 2007 4 Fidelity Puritan Fund 7 C
106 2007 4 Fidelity Balanced Fund 8 C
130 2007 4 Fidelity Short-Term Bond Fund 9 C
135 2007 4 Fidelity Advisor Asset Manager 70% Fund 10 C
147 2007 4 Fidelity Puritan Fund 11 C
212 2007 4 Fidelity Balanced Fund 12 C
719 2007 4 Fidelity Strategic Real Return Fund 13 C
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Table 1.85: Buy and Sell Transaction of PASA FDG (Continued)
Net Chg ($’000) YR QTR NAME Buy Sell Rating
-816 2008 1 Fidelity US Bond Index Fund 1 C
-719 2008 1 Fidelity Strategic Real Return Fund 2 C
-230 2008 1 Fidelity Advisor Mortgage Securities Fund 3 C
-132 2008 1 Fidelity Advisor Inflation-Protected Bond Fund 4 C
-4 2008 1 Fidelity Investment Grade Bond Portfolio 5 C
0 2008 1 Fidelity Asset Manager 60% C
0 2008 1 Fidelity Advisor Short Fixed-Income Fund C
0 2008 1 Fidelity Asset Manager 30% C
0 2008 1 Fidelity Intermediate Bond Fund C
1 2008 1 Fidelity Asset Manager 40% 1 C
2 2008 1 Fidelity Asset Manager: Growth Portfolio 2 C
3 2008 1 Fidelity Asset Manager 85% 3 C
3 2008 1 Fidelity Advisor Asset Manager 70% 4 C
18 2008 1 Fidelity Asset Manager Portfolio 5 C
31 2008 1 Fidelity Asset Manager 70% 6 C
45 2008 1 Fidelity Advisor Intermediate Bond Fund 7 C
63 2008 1 Fidelity Asset Manager 20% 8 C
155 2008 1 Fidelity Asset Manager 50% 9 C
264 2008 1 Fidelity Short-Term Bond Fund 10 C
526 2008 1 Fidelity Investment Grade Bond Fund 11 C
Net Chg ($’000) YR QTR NAME Buy Sell Rating
-2486 2008 2 Fidelity Investment Grade Bond Fund 1 C
-1323 2008 2 Fidelity Intermediate Bond Fund 2 C
-1246 2008 2 Fidelity Short-Term Bond Fund 3 C
-728 2008 2 Fidelity Asset Manager 50% 4 C
-719 2008 2 Fidelity Strategic Real Return Fund 5 C
-468 2008 2 Fidelity Investment Grade Bond Portfolio 6 C
-296 2008 2 Fidelity Asset Manager 20% 7 C
-235 2008 2 Fidelity Advisor Short Fixed-Income Fund 8 C
-211 2008 2 Fidelity Advisor Intermediate Bond Fund 9 C
-152 2008 2 Fidelity Asset Manager 70% 10 C
-125 2008 2 Fidelity Asset Manager Portfolio 11 C
-15 2008 2 Fidelity Advisor Asset Manager 70% 12 C
-14 2008 2 Fidelity Asset Manager 85% 13 C
-9 2008 2 Fidelity Asset Manager: Growth Portfolio 14 C
-3 2008 2 Fidelity Asset Manager 30% 15 C
-2 2008 2 Fidelity Asset Manager 40% 16 C
-1 2008 2 Fidelity Asset Manager 60% 17 C
Net Chg ($’000) YR QTR NAME Buy Sell Rating
-719 2008 3 Fidelity Strategic Real Return Fund 1 C
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Table 1.86: Mutual Fund Networks
Obs COUNT PERCENT Name
1 488 2.47 Fidelity Management & Research Company
2 236 1.19 BlackRock Financial Management Inc
3 216 1.09 Mitsubishi UFJ Asset Management Co Ltd
4 214 1.08 Pacific Investment Management Co LLC (PIMCO)
5 212 1.07 Legg Mason Partners Fund Advisor LLC (New York)
6 205 1.04 J.P. Morgan Investment Management, Inc. (U.S.A.)
7 202 1.02 Templeton Global Bond Managers, Inc.
8 189 0.96 Invesco Canada Ltd
9 166 0.84 Nomura Asset Management Co Ltd
10 163 0.82 HSBC Investments (USA), Inc.
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CHAPTER II
Strategic Default Premium and Credit Spreads
1. Introduction
To examine a determinant of bond value, there are two approaches to perform the
analysis. We can either analyze the bond price or yield. However, the common practice
in bond literature is to perform the analysis using bond yield. Usually, we subtract
the risk-free rate from the bond yield and the output is called “credit spreads”. The
risk-free rate used should have the characteristics similar to the bond analyzed. These
credit spreads are the focus of the research in finding the determinant of bond value.
So far, academic researchers have found that the credit spreads reflect risk premiums,
such as liquidity risk and default risk. However, the issue of the bond credit spreads
still has a lot of room to explore. A regular credit risk and liquidity factor cannot
explain all of the variations in the credit spreads of bonds. Strategic default is another
potential area that may help explain the variation in credit spreads of firms. Hart and
Moore (1994, 1998) define the difference between liquidity and strategic default as that
liquidity default is when borrowers cannot pay their loan back as promised because
they do not have enough resources to do so. Strategic default is when borrowers do
not pay back the loan even though they have enough resources. They just default
strategically.
Such regular risk factors as leverage and volatility are common in literatures when
analyzing bond pricing. Large unexplained portion of credit spreads could be under-
stood more if we add strategic risk factors. Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) identify
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strategic factors based on three categories: liquidation cost, bargaining power of eq-
uity, and renegotiation friction. However, Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) as well as
most literature on bond pricing have not ventured deep enough into bondholder’s bar-
gaining power effect on credit spreads. Most studies focus on equity holders bargaining
power. I fill in the gap of corporate bond pricing and strategic default literature by
examining the relationship between credit spreads of firms and bondholders’ bargain-
ing power through the strategic default mechanism. Another reason that bondholder’s
bargaining power has not been considered much might be concerning data availability.
Just until recently, eMAXX data from Thomson Reuters provides detailed holding of
institutional investors. For instance, for each bond CUSIP, eMAXX provides data
regarding the dollar value of bond held by different institutional investors. Follow-
ing the model of Fan and Sundaresan (2000), my main hypothesis is the higher the
percentage bondholding by a bondholder the lower the credit spreads or vice versa
(please see Appendix for theoretical motivation). This negative relationship is be-
cause the lower chance of strategic default by equity holders. Equity holders have less
incentive to default strategically if they know that they will not be able to steer the
company toward their desired direction in case of bankruptcy. With high bargaining
power of bondholders, equity holders will have a hard time to control the game and
may result in small surplus for them at the end of renegotiation process. Therefore,
ex ante, bondholders demand less premium on lower strategic default likelihood when
they have high bargaining power.
Theoretical credit risk models incorporating strategic default and bargaining power
of bondholders are becoming more common (e.g. Anderson and Sundaresan (1996),
Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), Fan and Sundaresan (2000)), but, again, we still
lack empirical side of it.
To test whether bondholder’s bargaining power is an important explanatory vari-
able for a firm credit spreads, I perform pooled regression with year and industry fixed
effect. The regression also takes care of heteroscedasticity with robust standard errors.
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Important independent variables both strategic and non-strategic variables in credit
risk literature are included as control variables.
Regarding my results, first, the main result shows consistency with my main
hypothesis that the higher the bondholders’ bargaining power the lower the credit
spreads. The reason could be due to the lower strategic default likelihood. Second,
when I break down the issuer into different industries, I find that the insurance com-
pany is the top holder of all types of issuer by the margin of 40 – 50 percent of overall
bond issuance amount. We would expect that the holding by insurance companies
should have significant explanatory power on the credit spreads of all the industries.
I find the results consistent with the conjecture; however, the only one industry that
its credit spreads cannot be explained by the holding of insurance companies is con-
struction companies. The result may be prone to small sample since construction
represents only 0.73 percent of overall sample. Third, when bondholders’ bargaining
power and equity holder bargaining power interact, bondholders require higher credit
spreads to hold a bond. This result could be explained by the fact that the decision to
default strategically is solely based on equity holders and, based on strategic default
model, equity holders always receive higher benefit from strategic default than bond-
holders. Therefore, with one to one increase in each bargaining power, bondholders
require higher premium to compensate for strategic default prospect. Fourth, I con-
sider the event that could affect the likelihood of strategic default: Dodd-Frank Act,
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), and financial crisis 2007. I find that after Dodd-Frank Act
and SOX took effect, the strategic default likelihood is lower based on the premium
required by bondholders. This implies that the two acts help reduce the overall risk
including strategic default risk. For financial crisis, I find that strategic default plays
much more important role during the crisis. This makes sense since overall systematic
risk is higher during the crisis and firms have higher likelihood to go out of business.
Lastly, some characteristics of issuers result in different degree of strategic default. I
find that strategic default plays more important role in firms with low rating and low
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fixed-assets.
Since the data is bond transaction data, the problem of large-firm transaction’s
domination may arise. I address this issue by allowing only one transaction per firm per
period and perform the same regression analysis as in the main test. In other words,
I randomly pick one transaction per firm per month. Then perform the regression
analysis. I repeat this procedure 100 times and the results are consistent with the
main finding. As for the endogeneity issue, lower credit spreads may result in higher
bondholding. I take care of this issue by using two-stage GMM. The results still show
consistency to my main hypothesis after using GMM even though the significant level
is reduced by half but the overall significance is still high at one percent significant
level.
However, some people might argue that the significant negative association between
bondholder’s bargaining power and credit spreads may capture something else other
than the implicit strategic default factor, because strategic default is likely to occur
when a firm is in distress. But, the main test is during the normal stage of firms.
To ensure that the results can be generalized, I also test the relationship on different
likelihoods of bankruptcy using two models from Campbell et al (2008) and Acharya
et al (2007). And I find that the results still hold.
One of the main contributions is to show that bondholder’s bargaining power is
important when we study determinants of credit spreads or corporate bond pricing,
specifically through strategic default. The second contribution is to propose to a regu-
lator a way that could help reduce the strategic default risk by making the bondholding
information of each issuer more transparent and more publicly available. Currently,
regulators and financial industry have done a good job of publicizing the shareholder
information of firms. For instance, information about institutional shareholders and
free float of public companies are more publicly available. However, we have less in-
formation regarding a bondholder structure of a public company. Based on the result
of this paper, bondholder’s bargaining power is a good proxy for strategic default like-
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lihood. That is a bond with major bondholder may have lower chance of strategic
default from equity holders. Therefore, to gauge the strategic default incentive, we
need this information so that individual investors who cannot handle high risk could
avoid investing in firms with high likelihood of strategic default. This is also to make
the bond investment has higher symmetric information. Note that I do not mean
bonds with no major bondholders are wrong or should not exist, but retail investors
should be informed whether the bonds they invest in have a major bondholder (low
strategic default risk) or dispersed bondholders (high strategic default risk). If retail
investors know that a company they tend to invest in its bond has high likelihood of
strategic default (i.e. dispersed bondholder structure) and they still invest because
they expect higher compensation or can handle high risk without compensation, this
will create no problem. However, the real world leans more toward asymmetric in-
formation and is full of risk-averse investors. Therefore, it might be better for retail
investors to have a major bondholder in order to help reduce strategic default risk in
a bond that they invest in. At the same time, regulators and the government should
offer some incentives for institutional bondholders to hold bonds with yet no major
bondholders.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 is literature review which
discusses about related bond pricing models and models that allow for renegotiations.
For Section 3, hypotheses are developed. Section 4 discusses data source and data
preparation. Section 5 describes in detail the variable construction. The methodology
is provided in section 6. Section 7 provides results. Section 8 and 9 address robustness
concerns. Lastly, section 10 concludes.
2. Literature Review
Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) perform an empirical analysis on the relationship
between corporate debt prices and firm characteristics that impact strategic decisions
concerning default and distressed renegotiations. Though ex post there may be effi-
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ciency gains from renegotiation, they find that the possibility of strategic default in-
creases corporate debt credit spreads. The effect of strategic actions on credit spreads
is even larger for corporations whose creditors are more vulnerable to the threat of
strategic default, such as firms with low tangible assets. While the topic of pricing of
corporate bonds has been done for a long time, the credit spreads still remain largely
unexplained.
One possibility that there is still a large portion of unexplained credit spreads is
that studies have been focusing only on the risk factors such as leverage and volatil-
ity. Other characteristics that are not related to risk factors should be given more
attention. For instance, US bankruptcy code’s Chapter 11 results in making renego-
tiation an important factor in distressed reorganizations both formal bankruptcy and
in out-of-court renegotiations. Empirical works show that factors affecting bargaining
positions of different parties in negotiations, including debt recovery rates, deviations
from absolute priority, formal and informal reorganizations, asset tangibility, man-
agerial share ownership, complexity of debt structure. Most models show that credit
spreads vary based on the expected default probability. However, some models allow
for recovery rate factor which gives room to negotiation (e.g., Longstaff and Schwartz
(1995)).
The extent of whether and when equity holders will decide to default is another
important aspect of bankruptcy process. Hart and Moore (1994, 1998) give a definition
of the difference between the liquidity default and strategic default. Liquidity default
is when the firm’s cash flows are not enough to pay the promised debt whereas strategic
default is when firms have enough cash to pay off their debts but they choose to default
strategically. When a firm goes to default, the value of the firm decreases relative to
going concern. So, some of the creditors are willing to forgive some debt for the firm
to survive. This is an incentive for the equity holders to default strategically because
they can enjoy the debt concession. Therefore, considering only liquidity default may
understate the true probability of default and results in large unexplained portion of
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bond credit spreads.
Bond pricing models that allow for the renegotiation such as Anderson and Sun-
daresan (1996) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) suggest that when lenders have
small bargaining power, a large portion of the credit spreads may be due to the risk
of strategic default. Many recent models on corporate bond pricing incorporate the
possibility of strategic renegotiation. I extend this part of the literature in that large
and small bargaining powers of creditors should have an effect on the credit spreads
through the strategic default channel differently. Small bargaining power of credi-
tors or bondholders may demand higher credit spreads because of strategic default
prospect. On the other hand, large bargaining power of creditors may require lower
credit spreads because of lower chance to face the strategic default. Equity holders
have higher chance to default strategically if most of the bargaining power belong to
them because they know that there is a high chance that bondholders will temporarily
give up debt to survive the firms. However, if the bondholders are not dispersed or
some of the bondholders are big enough. Equity holders will have less incentive to
fight with this influential group of bondholders.
Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) use aggregate measure for renegotiation frictions.
Those aggregate measures are number of bond issues and Herfindhal index. High
number of bond issues reflects high renegotiation friction. High Herfindhal index
shows concentration of the bondholder based on the face value of bonds issued, thus
high Herfindhal index represents low renegotiation friction. I use eMAXX data that
provides bondholders’ details both institutional and individual holders to delve down
into more details about bondholders’ bargaining power. Fan and Sundaresan (2000)
show in their models that the strategic action effect on credit spreads depends on
bargaining power in renegotiations.
Overall, most of the empirical papers on strategic default still do not test on bond-
holders’ bargaining power directly. Favara et al. (2012) examined whether strategic
default by shareholders can explain differences in firm’s equity risk across countries. On
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the debt holder side, they look at the characteristics of the bankruptcy code (Djankov
et al. (2008)). They find that equity risk is lower in countries where insolvency pro-
cedure favors debt renegotiation, not liquidation.
Djankov et al. (2008) quantify the level of debt enforcement of each country from
the survey completed by attorney and judges who are registered in section J of the
International Bar Association (IBA). Section J’s members are practitioners in the
areas of insolvency, restructuring and creditors’ rights. Djankov et al. (2008) touch
on the creditor bargaining power, but their proxy is still very limited. First, the proxy
used is a survey which, usually, is prone to the design of the survey and judgement
of a person who completes the survey. Second, the proxy used is institutional level
which is used in different context, such as country-level analysis. For the firm-level
effect, we would need a firm specific variable. Aslan and Kumar (2012) examined
the bargaining power of equity on cost of debt and they found positive relationship
between the two. To conclude on the empirical aspect of previous literature, most of
them focus on the equity holders’ bargaining power. Some literature that considered
bondholders bargaining power used indirect proxy such as characteristics of bonds and
country level debt enforcement.
3. Hypotheses
Table 2.1 shows types of issuers based on the first two SIC industry code. The largest
issuer in this sample is manufacturing with 50.16 percent of the sample, following by
transportation which is the second largest issuer with 19.49 percent of overall issues.
Table 2.2 shows different portion of bondholding by each type of bondholder. This
difference in portion of bonds held can be translated to different bargaining power
of bondholders. In this paper, bondholders’ bargaining power is proxied by the por-
tion of the bonds held by institutional investors. If they hold large part of the bond
amount outstanding, this implies they have high bargaining power because they have
a say in renegotiation process. A type of bondholders should also be related to the
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bondholder’s bargaining power. As in activist investors in equity literature, in many
cases, shareholders do not need to hold large share of firm’s equity to pressure the
management of the firm. They can use some other resources to pressure the firm,
such as proxy fight. Based on Fan and Sundaresan (2000) model, different bargaining
power of bondholders should result in different effect on credit spreads. Specifically,
we should expect negative relationship between size of bondholding and credit spreads
conditional on the type of bondholders. In other words, the larger the bonds held by
a bondholder (higher bargaining power), the lower the strategic default premium they
require (please see Appendix for the numerical example of the negative relationship
between credit spreads and bondholders’ bargaining power). Therefore, the first and
most important hypothesis that we have to test is whether there is a significant rela-
tionship between credit spreads and bondholder’s bargaining power.
H1: Proxied by portion of bonds held, higher bargaining power of bond-
holders should result in lower credit spreads
Table 2.11 shows the breakdown of quarterly average percentage holding of each
bondholder for different types of issuers. For example, on average, largest bondholders
of construction companies are insurance and mutual funds with the holding size of
46 and 7 percent respectively. Insurance are the top holders of all industries in Table
2.11. Mutual fund is the second largest holder next to insurance, except for mining and
transportation that pension holding is higher. Moreover, we can see from the range
of top three bondholders, which are insurance, mutual fund, and pension, is from 1 to
52 percent whereas the range of the rest is much lower at around less than one per-
cent. Overall, insurance holding is the largest and quite larger than the second largest
holding of any issuer types. Therefore, we should expect to see insurance holdings as
significant explanatory variables for credit spreads for all types of issuer.
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H2: Insurance, as the largest bondholders of all issuers, should have
significant explanatory power on credit spreads of all types of issuers
Since the decision to default strategically depends solely on the equity holder, we
should expect positive relationship between the interaction term of equity and bond-
holder’s bargaining power and credit spreads of a bond. In other words, in terms
of strategic default, equity holders have positive relationship with credit spreads and
bondholders have negative relationship with credit spreads. With one to one increase
in bargaining power of both sides, equity holders should have stronger bargaining
power because of the right to go bankrupt strategically. Fan and Sundaresan (2000)
also shows that in renegotiation equity holders always receive higher compensation
than bondholders. This implies that, in terms of benefit and cost, it is costlier for
bondholders in renegotiation game. If there are equity holders in the mix or in this
case interaction term, bondholders should require higher premium from holding the
bond. Shareholders will choose the timing that they will benefit the most from strate-
gic default.
H3: Interaction between equity holders and bondholders should be pos-
itively related to the credit spreads
Moreover, I would like to test whether bondholders will demand higher strategic
default premium on credit spreads from firms that are more vulnerable to strategic
default. One proxy for high and low strategic default prospect could be through low
and high fixed assets, respectively. Following Alderson and Betker (1996) and Davy-
denko and Strebulaev (2007), companies with high fixed assets have lower probability
to face strategic default from equity holders because they have lower liquidation costs
for bondholders and lower benefit for equity holders. In other words, fixed assets are
easy to sell, so bondholders will know quite certain what would be the impact when
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it comes to default. Moreover, based on priority rule, equity holders will only receive
residuals after creditors take all their claims. In this case, bondholders will not give
up debt easily to survive a firm when equity holders threat to default strategically. On
the other hand, if firms have large amount of non-fixed assets which are difficult to sell
and also difficult to know the value of the final liquidation value, bondholders will feel
uncertain and have a higher chance to give up debt to survive the firms when equity
holders threat to default strategically. Therefore, I expect that strategic default risk
should be lower for firms with high fixed assets and higher for firms with low fixed
assets.
H4: For lower prospect of strategic default as proxied by high fixed
assets, strategic default should play less important role in bond pricing
The rating of a firm should play a role in strategic default likelihood. High rating
firms, such as AAA, should have better corporate governance control; hence, lower
risk of strategic default. On the other hand, low-rated firms should have less efficiency
in management system and we would expect higher strategic default likelihood. In
addition, Huang and Huang (2012) found low-rated firms have higher default risk.
Therefore, we should expect higher premium from bondholders for low-rated firms to
compensate for higher strategic default likelihood.
H5: Strategic default should play more important role in low-rated
firms
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 or SOX is the act that increases the corporate gover-
nance of a firm. After Enron and Worldcom scandals, the US congress passed this law
in 2002 to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate dis-
closure. The act issued new standard requirement for all U.S. public company boards,
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management and public accounting firms. To see how SOX relates to the reduction of
strategic default likelihood, first, the link between corporate governance and perfor-
mance should be clearly explained. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (GIM, 2003) examine
the effect of corporate governance on firm performance during the 1990s. GIM (2003)
find a positive relation between corporate governance and firm performance. Conse-
quently, when the performance of a firm is better, the likelihood of filing for bankruptcy
strategically is lower. Therefore, the act should reduce the strategic default risk after
its implementation. If strategic default risk is lower, bondholders should require lower
premium to hold the bond after SOX.
H6: After Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was implemented, strategic de-
fault likelihood should be lower
In 1999, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) repealed part of the Glass-Steagall Act
of 1933 by allowing financial companies to participate in investment banking and in-
surance businesses. Many people said that this permission by GLBA led the world
economy to financial crisis in 2007. After the crisis, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) was passed by Obama administration
in 2010. One of the Dodd-Frank proposals or some people call it “Volcker Rule” (Title
VI of the Act) is to restrain financial companies from speculative business. Volcker
Rule is, essentially, the same rule as the Glass-Steagall Act that tries to prevent finan-
cial crisis in the first place. This should reduce the overall risk in the financial market
including strategic default likelihood. Moreover, in Dodd-Frank Act, there are new
rules that apply to specific types of financial institutions in my sample. For example,
Title V Subtitle A of Dodd-Frank Act increases the transparency of insurance industry
by giving more power to authority to monitor the industry. Overall, we should see
lower risk of strategic default because of Dodd-Frank Act. Since Dodd-Frank Act took
place in 2010, I separate sample into before and after 2010 to test the effect of Dodd-
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Frank Act on strategic default likelihood. To be more specific in stating hypothesis,
we expect to see bondholders require lower premium from strategic default after the
Dodd-Frank Act was implemented.
H7: After the Dodd-Frank Act, strategic default likelihood should be
lower or larger negative relationship between bondholder’s bargaining power
and credit spreads after the act
Since the bankruptcy likelihood is higher during a financial crisis, strategic default
likelihood by equity holders should also be higher during a crisis. Equity holders have
less to lose when the financial economy is bad because the value of the assets will be
lower overall when economy is in crisis. This is also related to hypothesis four that
companies with high fixed assets have lower chance of strategic default. For instance,
overall real estate price tumbled during the financial crisis in 2007. This lowers the
value of fixed assets of a company; consequently, the firm face higher likelihood of
strategic default. Hence, bondholders should require higher strategic default premium
during a crisis. On the other hand, bondholders should require lower premium during
non-crisis because of the lower risk of strategic default. Therefore, we should expect
to see larger negative coefficient during the non-crisis period implying bondholders re-
quire lower premium to hold the bond. My sample is from 1999 to 2013 which covers
financial crisis in 2007. I separate sample into during crisis (2007-2009) and non-crisis
(1999-2006 and 2010-2013).
H8: During crisis periods, strategic default should play more impor-
tant role than non-crisis periods.
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4. Data
4.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection
I use corporate bond price data for the years 1999 to 2013. The bond transaction
data is from Mergent FISD provided details of all fixed income transactions. The
transaction data provides details about bond transactions such as accrued interest,
either the transaction type is buy or sell, flat price, and date of transactions. These
transactions are actual transactions and not dealer quotes or matrix prices. The detail
of the issuer also comes from the FISD. Bond ratings from FISD using data from
Moody’s. I use daily yield of constant maturity US Treasury from FRED to estimate
the corporate credit spreads over the equivalent risk-free US Treasury yield. Then,
I merge the bond data with both financial statement information (Compustat) and
equity prices (CRSP). I use ExecuComp data on executive stock and option holdings,
also some CEO characteristics, and institutional equity ownership data from Thomson
Financial Ownership data.
For the period 1999 to 2013, the total transactions are 3,864,361 transactions. Fol-
lowing Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007), I include only U.S. corporate bonds. I then
exclude all non-fixed coupon bonds, asset backed issues, and bonds with embedded
options, such as, puttable, callable, exchangeable, convertible bonds, and bonds with
sinking fund provisions because these embedded options are factors that affect the
credit spreads, but in a different context of what I will analyze. I look at the effect of
bondholder’s bargaining power on the credit spreads after strategic and non-strategic
default factors are taken into account. Moreover, if there are several trades occurred
in one bond on the same day with the same prices and volumes, I retain only one
transaction to avoid double counting.
I consider only bonds with remaining time to maturity at the trade date between 1
and 30 years, because risk-free rates from FRED that I use to estimate credit spreads
have maturities lower than 30 years and, for maturity less than one year, small mea-
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surement error results in large yield differences. This will make the credit spreads
estimation noisy. As with other papers on bond pricing, I exclude bonds issued by
financial companies (SIC codes 6000-6999) since they have different characteristics and
regulation than other types of company. Then, I exclude observations with missing
total debt in the fiscal year immediately preceding the trading date, and I require
that data on equity returns be available for at least 120 business days preceding the
trading date. For the bondholding characteristics, I use a new dataset from Thomson
Reuters eMAXX; known as the market intelligence for fixed income. eMAXX provides
comprehensive information on institutional investors of all sizes and types including
such as mutual fund, pension fund, and insurance companies. eMAXX also provides
information on bond characteristics such as CUSIP/ISIN, coupon type, maturity, and
ratings. On the aggregate level of holders, I combine sub holders in the same category
in the following. Insurance includes life, property and casualty, reinsurance, and diver-
sified insurances. Mutual fund includes both closed- and open-end, balanced, money
market, fund of fund, and equity. Both corporate and government pensions are in
Pension. Other consists of annuity, foundation/endowment, and other categorized by
eMAXX. Health are hospital and health care system.
The period of the data is from 1999Q1 to 2013Q2, so we have 14 years and two
quarters of data. Lastly, I merge the samples with eMAXX data for bondholding
variable. Final sample consists of 31,296 trades for 944 unique bond issues from 311
unique issuers.
5. Variable Construction
5.1 Bargaining Power of Bondholder
eMAXX data provides information regarding how much dollar value a bondholder
holds a bond out of the total dollar bond issued in each quarter. Then, I sum up the
firms with the same category. For instance, Insurance A holds $100 and Insurance B
holds $200 of bond C. Then, I sum up insurance companies and set up new variable
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called “Insurance (INS)” with the total holding of the bond of firm C $300 for each
quarter. I do the same for each bondholder category such as mutual fund (MUT).
Suppose firm C issues a bond with the total face value of $900. I calculate percentage
holding of insurance for this particular bond (9 digit CUSIP) in this particular quarter
by 300/900 which is 33 percent of this bond issued by firm C. Then, I create a variable
called “Top holder”. Top holder is a categorical variable based on the highest percent-
age holding of a bond. If the highest bondholder category is 10 percent to 19 percent,
top holder is assigned the value of one. If the highest bondholder is 20 percent to 29
percent, top holder is assigned the value of two. The maximum value of Top holder
is nine which means the highest percentage holding is 90 to 100 percent. We can see
that the higher the number of Top holder, the more concentrated the bondholder on
any category is. To be more illustrative, if insurance holds 93 percent of a bond, this
bond is assigned the Top holder value of 9. In this case, other bondholder categories
holding adds up to 7 percent. So, the total holding of this bond adds up to 100 percent
(93+7).
Based on the methodology to construct the variable described above, Top holder
captures two important aspects of bondholder’s bargaining power. The first aspect is
the percentage holding of the bond and the second aspect is the type of the holder.
The percentage holding measures the bargaining power of bondholders similar to the
percentage stock ownership proxied for the equity holder’s bargaining power1. The
type of the bondholder is also an important aspect of bondholder’s bargaining power
similar to the equity holder’s bargaining power. An extensive literature on the type of
equity ownership shows that the type of ownership plays an important role in decision
making process of a firm. The importance of type of equity ownership implies that it
does not take large percentage of ownership stake to pressure a firm’s management. For
instance, an influential hedge fund, such as Icahn and Pershing Square Capital, could
1Percentage equity holding has become very common as a proxy for equity holder’s bargaining
power. For example, Betker (1995) examines the relationship between CEO shareholdings and ab-
solute priority deviation. In addition, other papers that measure equity holder’s bargaining power
along the same line are Davydenko and Strabulaev (2007) and Valta (2016)
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convince other stockholders to join their side and becomes very influential without
initial large holding of equity ownership2. Therefore, it is important to create an
aggregate variable for bondholder’s bargaining power that can capture both aspects
of percentage holding and type of bondholders.
The purpose of this essay is to test the importance of bondholder’s bargaining
power. Therefore, in order to have a clean test of bondholder’s bargaining power on
the credit spreads, the Top holder or the aggregate variable for bondholder’s bargaining
power that can capture both important aspects of bargaining power is vital. For future
research, how different types of bondholders, such as mutual fund and insurance, affect
the credit spreads is a very interesting question and it could be done separately for
each type of holder because each type of holder has different holding characteristics
and objectives.
5.2 Investor Horizons
To identify the horizon of investors, I first calculate the value-weighted maturity of
bondholder’s portfolio in a given quarter from eMAXX institutional bondholding data.
The short-term investors have average maturity less than one year. The medium-term
investors have maturity between one to five years and, lastly, the long-term investors
have maturity more than five years. Then, we calculate a portion of each type of
holder for each bond based on 8-digit CUSIP.
5.3 Dependent Variable: Bond Credit Spreads
Credit spreads are the difference between yield to maturity of a bond and the replicated
portfolio of risk free bonds. In this case, I use constant maturity Treasury bond rates
from FRED. To calculate credit spreads, first, I calculate yield to maturity for each
bond trade in the sample using promised future coupon payments and the invoice
price recorded from the transaction data. The invoice price is flat price plus accrued
2Some examples of hedge fund activism paper showing the importance of the “type” of investor
are Brav et al. (2008), Greenwood and Schor (2009) and Brav et al. (2015)
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interest. Second, I obtain the yield to maturity of a risk-free portfolio bonds that
replicate the promised stream of cash flows from the corporate bonds using constant
maturity rate from FRED. For each cash flow, I calculate the constant maturity yield
using linear approximation and use the resulting yield to discount the promised cash
flows to the present and find invoice price. Then, find the yield to maturity in the
same way as the first stage. Finally, I subtract the matched risk-free yield from the
corporate bond yield to have the corporate bond credit spreads.
5.4 Control Variables
Strategic Factor Variables
Choices of strategic factor variables are motivated by existing papers in corporate
reorganizations and capital structure. The main factor for the costs of liquidation is
nonfixed assets. Additional proxies are market-to-book asset ratio, R&D investment,
and the utility industry dummy. Variables used to proxy for the bargaining power of
equity in potential renegotiations are proportion of equity owned by the firm’s CEO,
institutional investors, and the CEO’s tenure with the firm. Lastly, to capture the
renegotiation frictions, I use the number of outstanding public bond issues, Herfindahl
index of the bonds, the number of shareholders, and the ratio of short-term debt to
total debt. Panel A of Table 2.4 presents a summary of these variables. The detail
discussion is provided below.
Cost of Liquidation
A renegotiation between borrowers and lenders takes place to avoid possible costs
that would be incurred if the original contract were to be maintained, such as decreas-
ing value in asset in case of liquidation. The liquidation costs are proxied by the ratio of
non-fixed assets, defined as one minus the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment
to total assets, by the market-to-book asset ratio, which is the sum of book debt and
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market equity divided by the sum of book debt and equity, and by the ratio of R&D
expenditures to total investments. These liquidation cost proxies are motivated by
large body of literature in capital structure and distressed reorganizations. Alderson
and Betker (1996) show how to estimate the liquidation costs for a sample of bankrupt
firms and conclude that fixed assets, market-to-book ratio, and R&D expenses are the
best variables to use to proxy for liquidation costs. Following Davydenko and Strebu-
laev (2007), I also use the nonutility industry dummy, which equals to one if a firm
is non-utility and zero otherwise. In bankruptcy, utility firms have tangible assets
that could be sold easily. Acharya, Bharatch, and Srinivasan (2007) find that credi-
tors of utility firms enjoy higher recovery rate because of these valuable tangible assets.
Relative Equity Bargaining Power
Shareholders’ bargaining power plays an important role in renegotiation surplus
which reflected the deviations from the absolute priority rule (APR). The primary
independent variable for bargaining power is CEO shareholding, which is the percent-
age holding of CEO share to total share outstanding. Betker (1995) found that 10%
increase in CEO shareholdings increases deviation in equity from Chapter 11 APR by
around 1.2 % of the firm value. In addition, following LoPucki and Whitford (1990),
they find that the APR deviation of equity occurs only when shareholders are ag-
gressively represented. Another appropriate proxy for relative bargaining power is
institutional shareholding, which is the proportion of equity held by institutional in-
vestors. Based on Baird and Jackson (1988), how long the CEO stays in the company
is also part of the relative bargaining power. I use CEO’s tenure which defines as the




Renegotiation frictions measure how difficult to negotiate company’s debt. It could
be a costly bankruptcy if the renegotiation friction is high. Gertner and Scharfstein
(1991) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) show that renegotiations are difficult when
there are many parties involved with diverse interest. With different interests of bond-
holders, successful debt renegotiation may not be reached.
Most literature on strategic default use such aggregate proxy as number of out-
standing bond issues. Moreover, Herfindahl index of outstanding bond issues is also









Bij is the face value at offering of the j
th bond of firm i. The index will equal
one if there is only one bond in the capital structure, and become very small if there
are many bonds with similar face values. Betker (1995) finds that the higher the HFI
index, the larger the equity deviations from absolute priority. Following Davydenko
and Strebulaev (2007), I use 1- HFI, which is positively related to the renegotiation
frictions.
Moreover, secondary proxies for renegotiation frictions are also used: normalized
number of shareholders and short-term debt. Similar to the dispersion of bondholders,
the dispersion of equity holders could also create a problem of coordination when it
comes to bankruptcy. So, the number of institutional shareholders is used to proxy
the equity holder dispersion. The number of institutional shareholders is defined as
the logarithm of the number of different institutional shareholders divided by the
logarithm of the market value of the firm’s equity. Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) and
Berglof and von Thadden (1994) show that firms do not want to negotiate debt with
short term creditors because those creditors will not give up their debt easily due to
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subordinate property of short term debt to long term one.
Since data on bondholding for firms are difficult to obtain, most empirical studies
tend to use the number of outstanding bond issues as a proxy as described. I extend this
part of the strategic default on credit spreads literature in that I use the bondholding
data from eMAXX to find the relationship between each type of bondholders on credit
spreads and also the concentration of bondholders on credit spreads. Table 2.3 shows
that life insurance, government pension fund, and open-end mutual fund are the top
three holders of bonds on average with the percentage holding on average for each
bond of 34.1, 6.7, and 6.5 percent, respectively. The three lowest holders are other,
hospital, and hedge fund with less than 0.1 percent on average for all three. In the
same manner as previous literature, if we look at the number of bonds held by each
type of bondholders. The top three are life insurance, property & casualty insurance,
and open-end mutual fund with the number of bonds held 31226, 29816, and 28145
respectively. And the three lowest holders by number of bonds are hedge fund, hospital,
and pension fund-corporate with the number of bonds held 72, 127, and 485.
Risk Factors Unrelated to Renegotiation
The risk factors that are not related to strategic functions are presented in Panel
B of Table 2.4. Contingent claim models predict that leverage and asset volatility
affect the probability of financial distress. The leverage is estimated as the ratio of
the book value of total debt at the end of the previous fiscal year to the sum of the
book value of debt and the closing market value of equity on the trade date. Following
Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008), asset volatility is estimated as a leverage-weighted
average of the firm’s one-year historic equity volatility and average bond volatility for
the same rating. To calculate equity volatility, I use monthly return from CRSP and
calculate one-year volatility for each month rolling. Then, I calculate bond’s return
by using invoice price. At this point, I winsorize bond returns below one percentile
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and above 99 percentile, because there are some outliers for some bond returns. For
example, normal invoice price is close to $1000 which is the face value, but there are
some abnormally low invoice prices which produce very huge returns. Asset volatility
is calculated as follows.





Dj,t + 2Lj,t(1− Lj,t)σEDj,t (2.2)
The equity volatility, σE, is computed as mentioned, where L is the leverage. The
last term shows relationship between equity and debt for firm j at time t. σDj,t is the
time t volatility of firm j’s debt and σEDj,t is the time t covariance between returns on
firm j’s debt and equity. To calculate the volatility of returns on firm j’s debt, first,
I calculate the firm j mean volatility of debt returns by credit rating. For instance,
for rating AAA and firm j, I take the returns on firm j’s debt for all transactions that
the debt was rated AAA. Then, I calculate volatility return of firm j from all those
transactions. Averaging these volatilities over all corporates with the same rating and
same date, I obtain the average volatility for AAA debt. The volatility of firm j’s
debt is then set equal to the average volatility of the rating category of firm j. The
covariance between equity and debt returns, σEDj,t , is calculated as ρEDj,tσDj,tσEj,t
where ρEDj,t is a correlation between the equity and debt returns on each bond in the
same rating category.
In addition, I also control for the size of the firm by using logarithm of total assets.
To control for the term premium, I also use time to maturity as of the day of trade to
control for the term premium. Variation in the risk-free rate may affect credit spreads
so I control it by using the 5-year constant maturity Treasury rate to control for this
variation following Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007).
5.5 Sample Statistics
Table 2.5 shows statistics on corporate bond credit spreads for the whole sample and
for different rating groups and maturity. The mean of credit spreads is 383 basis
228
points, and the median is 272 basis points. The mean of credit spreads is quite high
because, from Table 2.13, during the financial crisis in 2001 and 2007, on average the
invoice price is low. In 2002, the invoice price is as low as $160 for $1000 face value.
Maximum yield to maturity is as high as 99%. In addition, FED reduced the FED
fund rate to a low level in a very short time during those periods. As a result, some
of the credit spreads are very high. Generally, in Table 2.5, the lower the rating of
the bonds the higher the credit spreads. An interesting observation is that there is a
jump in credit spreads between B and CCC spreads (e.g., for all maturities, 687 VS
1170 basis points).This large difference may not only reflect higher default probability
but also the lower liquidity of low-graded bonds.
Table 2.6 shows summary statistics for non-strategic proxies. For the leverage, the
average leverage for AAA rated firms is 35.87 percent. The lower the rating, the higher
the leverage. Firms with CC rating have the mean leverage almost 100 percent. The
asset volatility of high-rated bonds, in general, has lower volatility. On average, AAA-
rated bonds have 25 percent asset volatility whereas B-rated bonds have 40 percent
asset volatility. Most of the issuers issue bonds with maturity around 8 to 10 years.
For the size of the asset, we can see that high-rated companies have much larger in
asset size. AAA-rated companies are around 342 billion dollars in asset size while
B-rated companies are around 19 billion dollars.
Table 2.7 presents the summary statistics for all control variables. On average,
65 percent of their assets are non-fixed assets. Average asset size of companies is 67
billion dollars. Because of the large firm size, CEO shareholding is small, around 0.46
percent on average. However, institutional shareholding is quite large with the mean
around 64 percent of total share outstanding. The range of institutional shareholding
is from 0 percent to 94 percent. Recently, the issue of institutional investors on firms’
value is becoming more and more important. We have experienced and seen a lot
of news about institutional investors trying to intervene or being part of the firms’
decision process. Therefore, including institutional shareholding as one of the control
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variables is crucial in analyzing credit spreads.
6. Methodology
I run pooled regression for all bond transactions 3. Important control variables are
included in the regressions both strategic and non-strategic proxies to make sure that
all aspects of credit spreads factors are controlled for. The year and industry fixed
effects are included to control for the year specific and industry specific that could
potentially affect the credit spreads of firms. To handle the fact that large firms may
over represent the sample, I also control the results using firm specific ID. Following
Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) there are nine specifications for the regressions.
Each specification selects one of the proxies from three categories: liquidation cost,
bargaining power, and renegotiation frictions. All of the nine specifications for strategic
default variables are also controlled for non-strategic default variables.
For the first hypothesis, to test the bondholder’s bargaining power, I use Top holder
as my focus variable with other control variables both strategic and non-strategic
variables denoted here as “X”. There are n control variables and each control variable
j is associated with credit spreads through βj.
Spreadit = β1 + β2Topholderit +
n∑
j=3
βjXitj + εit (2.3)
The dependent variable is the credit spreads of firm i at time t. The top holder
is the categorical variable showed the highest percentage of bonds held by any bond-
holders.
For second hypothesis, I break down the bondholders into six groups of bondhold-
ers: mutual fund, insurance, pension fund, government, health care, and other. I state
3Previous literature use Fama-Macbeth to incorporate the fact that large firms’ transactions are
overrepresented both in terms of issuer id and liquidity. However, in this sample, the large firms and
number of transactions are scattered. The maximum transaction by firm ID and transaction are not
over 2-3 percent.
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it in the equation below as “Holder”.






βjXitj + εit (2.4)
The third hypothesis, to test the interaction between bargaining power of equity
holders and bondholders, I interact the proxy for equity holder bargaining power and
bondholder’s bargaining power. The two proxies for equity holder bargaining power
is percentage of equity owned by CEO and institutional investors. I interact the two
with the variable Top holder and renamed them Top*CEO and Top*Institutional.
Spreadit = β1 + β2Top ∗ CEOit + β3Top ∗ Institutionalit +
n∑
j=4
βjXitj + εit (2.5)
For the rest of the hypothesis, I use equation 2.3 to test the degree of strategic
default from different characteristics of an issuer and different important events. For
hypothesis 4, I divided firms into high and low non-fixed assets based on the median
value. High non-fixed assets is the same thing as low-fixed assets which in this case
is vulnerable to strategic default. For hypothesis 5, similar to non-fixed asset case, I
divided firms into high and low rated group based on the median value of rating which
is “A” in this case.
As mentioned in hypothesis development, different regulations or periods may
result in different degree of strategic default. For hypothesis six, before and after
Sarbanes-Oxley act (SOX), I divided firms into before and after SOX implemented in
2002. In other words, the first group is before 2002 and the second group is after 2002.
Then, I perform equation 2.3 to see the different effects between the two periods. The
same manners are performed for Dodd-Frank Act and crisis period. For Dodd-Frank
Act, as seventh hypothesis, I divided firms into before and after 2010 which was the
year the Dodd-Frank Act was implemented. For the last hypothesis, during the finan-
cial crisis is the sample falling between 2007 and 2010. The rest of the sample in other
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years are non-financial crisis sample.
7. Empirical Results
7.1 Non-Strategic Default Factor Results
Table 2.8 shows the results of regressing non-strategic variables on credit spreads. As
we expected, the higher the leverage the higher the credit spreads. Investors require
more premium to hold risky debts. High leverage makes a firm to have higher default
probability. Based on specification (3), a one-standard deviation increase in market
leverage increases credit spreads by 233 basis points. The longer the time to maturity
the higher the credit spreads because of the term premium. All else equal, the longer
time to maturity bonds should have higher yield for investors; otherwise, investors
would want to hold shorter term bonds. Again, based on specification (3), one standard
deviation increase of time to maturity results in credit spreads 23 basis points higher.
Credit spreads also have a negative correlation with size. This could be because of
the information and liquidity of the large company. In other words, large companies
are well known and produce better information for the public. With higher quality
information, investors demand less premium for holding bonds of large companies.
Therefore, the larger the firms, the lower the credit spreads. Besides the information
quality, this also reflects lower risk of large firms, because larger firms have more certain
stream of cash flows.
7.2 Credit Spreads and Bondholders’ Bargaining Power
As in hypothesis one, proxied by portion of bond held, higher bargaining power of
bondholders should result in lower credit spreads. Table 2.9 shows the relationship
between Top holder along with all control variables both strategic and non-strategic
variables and credit spreads. As expected, the results show highly significant negative
relationship between Top holder and credit spreads. The results imply that, roughly,
every ten percent increase in bondholders’ bargaining power results in 20 basis points
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lower credit spreads on average. The lower credit spreads mean bondholders are willing
to accept less premium because of lower strategic default likelihood when they have
higher bargaining power over equity holders. Table 2.10 shows the breakdown of each
bondholder category result. We can see that mutual fund and insurance are the two
holders that have consistent significant power to explain credit spreads.
7.3 Credit Spreads and Insurance Bondholdings
Insurance, as the largest bondholders of all issuers, should have significant explanatory
power on credit credit spreads of all types of issuers following the second hypothesis.
From Table 2.11, insurance holds highest portion of all types of issuers. For instance,
insurance holds more than 50 percent of overall bonds issued by mining and wholesale
trade. Therefore, we expect to see insurance bondholdings to have explanatory power
on credit spreads through strategic default for all types of issuers. Based on the
result in Table 2.12, almost all types of issuers’ credit spreads can be explained by the
insurance-type holder, except construction. However, bonds issued by construction
companies is the lowest number in our sample. It is only 0.73 percent of bonds issued
in this sample. The results may be prone to small sample bias. For overall results,
insurance-type bondholder can explain most of the issuers’ credit spreads. However,
for mining and services, the sign of the coefficients is positive. Positive relationship
between the bargaining power and credit spreads implies higher premium required
to hold more bonds in a particular bond. The reason may be that in these two
industries, though bondholders are becoming a dominant holder of the bonds, the
bargaining power through strategic default framework is not higher. In other words,
the bargaining power mostly is still with the equity holders.
7.4 Shareholder and Bondholder Bargaining Power
As stated, for hypothesis three, interaction between equity holders and bondholders
should be positively related to the credit spreads. Table 2.14 shows the result of
hypothesis three. The bargaining power interactions between bondholders and equity
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holders are shown as Top holder*CEO and Top holder*Institutional. Top holder*CEO
is the interaction term between top holder and CEO percentage shareholding in firm’s
equity whereas Top holder*Institutional is the interaction term between top holder and
institutional percentage shareholding of equity. The results show significant positive
relationship between the interaction and the credit spreads as expected for both CEO
and institutional shareholding. Since the decision to default strategically is solely
based on equity holders, the friction between the two bargaining power should render
in higher premium required by the bondholders. Another interesting point here is
that, the effect from the CEO interaction is stronger than the effect of institutional
interaction. For example, for specification (1) the effect of CEO interaction is 1.97
whereas the effect of institutional interaction is 0.26. The stronger effect of the CEO
interaction may imply that the real power to do the strategic default might be based
on the CEO. CEO works at the company every day and knows the company inside
out. CEO should be the most influential person when it comes to decide whether the
firm should default strategically.
7.5 Strategic Default by Issuers with High Level of Fixed Assets
For lower prospect of strategic default as proxied by high fixed assets, strategic default
should play less important role in bond pricing as stated in hypothesis four. For lower
prospect of strategic default as proxied by high fixed assets, strategic default should
play less important role in bond pricing. To test this hypothesis, I separate sample into
high and low fixed asset by using the median of non-fixed asset as a cutoff. If a company
has non-fixed asset less than the median of non-fixed asset’s value, the company is in
the high fixed asset group and vice versa. Companies with high fixed asset have low
chance of strategic default from equity holders, because, unlike non-fixed assets, fixed
assets are easy to sell. If creditors know clearly what they will earn if the firm has
to be liquidated, they will not give up debt for equity holders easily. Moreover, by
priority rule, equity holder will receive their part in case of bankruptcy after creditors
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receive all of their claims. Sometimes, equity holders may not earn anything at the
end. Therefore, the likelihood of equity holders to default strategically is lower for
firms with high fixed assets. On the other hand, if most of the firm’s assets are non-
fixed assets. Equity holders have an incentive to default strategically if they have a
chance, because non-fixed assets are difficult to sell and there is no clear liquidation
value for creditors. In this case, creditors may give up debt temporarily for equity
holders to survive the firms. Hence, I expect that strategic default should play less
important role for firms with high fixed assets than firms with low fixed assets. In
Table 2.15 of specification (9) and (10), high non-fixed asset (or low fixed-assets) firms
have highly significant relationship between bondholder’s bargaining power and credit
spreads whereas low non-fixed assets (or high fixed-assets) firms has no significant
relationship. This implies that strategic default risk plays less important role in firms
with high-fixed assets.
7.6 The Effects of Credit Ratings on Strategic Default Decisions
The testable hypothesis five is that strategic default should play more important role in
low-rated firms. From Table 2.15 of specification (7) and (8), for high-rated firms, the
relationship between bondholders’ bargaining power and credit spreads is not signifi-
cant, but for low-rated firms, it is highly significant. This implies that strategic default
risk is high in low-rated firms. As I mentioned in the hypothesis section, high-rated
firms have better corporate governance system and more stable cash flow streams.
Therefore, strategic default should not play an important role for high-rated firms.
The insignificant effect between bondholders’ bargaining power and credit spreads for
high-rated firms is consistent with the hypothesis.
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Strategic default for Different Regulations and Periods
7.7 The Effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Strategic Default Decisions
The sixth hypothesis is the larger negative relationship between bondholders’ bar-
gaining power and credit spreads after SOX. From Table 2.15, we can see that after
SOX implemented, strategic default risk is lower based on the lower credit spreads
required from the bondholders. Pre-SOX, every ten percent increase in bargaining
power of bondholder associates with 18.44 basis points less credit spreads required
whereas, post-SOX, the credit spreads are lower when bondholders have higher bar-
gaining power at 21.53 basis points. The more negative value post-SOX implies less
strategic default likelihood and results in lower premium required by bondholders.
7.8 The Effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on Strategic Default Decisions
Hypothesis seven stated that after Dodd-Frank Act, strategic default likelihood should
be lower or larger negative relationship between bondholder’s bargaining power and
credit spreads. After Dodd-Frank Act, strategic default likelihood should be lower,
because the Dodd-Frank Act reduces overall risk of financial industry. We should see
more negative of association between size of bondholding and credit spreads. Table
2.15 shows the results for the regression of size of bondholding on credit spreads before
and after Dodd-Frank Act. Dodd-Frank Act was passed by Obama administration in
2010, thus I use the sample from 1999 to 2009 as the period before the rule. The
period after the rule is from 2010 to 2013. After Dodd-Frank Act took an effect in
2010, bondholders require less premium to hold bonds. The required premium to hold
bonds post Dodd-Frank Act is twice as low as pre Dodd-Frank Act. Specifically, every
ten percent higher of major bondholders, bondholders accept 13.91 (39.07) basis points
lower during pre (post) Dodd-Frank Act.
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7.9 The Effects of the Financial Crisis 2007 on Strategic Default
Decisions
Bondholders should require more strategic default premium during a crisis. The results
that we expect to see for hypothesis eight is stronger effect of bondholder’s bargaining
power and credit spreads during a crisis. My sample is the time period from 1999 to
2013 which covers the 2007 financial crisis. I use the period from 2007 to 2009 as a crisis
period. Non-crisis period is the sample combining 1999-2006 and 2010-2013. From
Table 2.15, during the crisis, the bargaining power of bondholder is highly significant
but during non-crisis, the effect is not significant. This implies that strategic default
is not important during non-crisis. The insignificant effect shows that bondholders
are not worried about strategic default during non-crisis; therefore, the changes in
bondholding cannot explain the change in credit spreads.
7.10 Industry Effects
To this point, the results so far have shown that bondholder’s bargaining power is
important to determine the credit spreads. Next, question is which type of holder is
the most important or is there a type of holder that is more important than another. To
understand which type of holder is important to determine debt price, I break down
the Top holder variable into five types of holder: insurance, mutual fund, pension
fund, government, health care, and other. Then, I ran the tests similar to the main
section of Top holder. The result is that insurance company is the only holder that
consistently show significant explanatory power on credit spreads. Mutual fund holding
is significant in most of the tests but failed to pass GMM endogeneity test. Table 2.32
shows the GMM test. Insurance holdings are the largest holder of most of the bonds
on average. From Table 2.2, the insurance company type is the largest holder of
bonds issued on average. Health care holdings are also significant with expected sign
in the GMM test but they failed to pass in other robustness tests. The result is
quite interesting because if we look at the trading transactions, mutual funds traded
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much more than insurance companies but, in the end, insurance holdings are a better
determinant than mutual fund holdings. Fidelity example in the first chapter might
be one of the reasons of this finding. Some mutual funds might be better than another
in terms of trading bonds. However, the funds with bad performance may average out
the good performance and result in no effect on credit spreads from the overall mutual
fund holdings. Table 2.33 shows the main regression result with all control variables
for insurance holdings.
8. Bondholder’s Bargaining Power and the Probability of Bankruptcy
To this point, the results are highly consistent with our hypothesis that the bond-
holder’s bargaining power is an important variable to explain credit spreads of a firm.
However, some people might argue that the significant negative association between
bondholder’s bargaining power (i.e. Top holder) and credit spreads may capture some-
thing else other than the implicit strategic default factor, because strategic default is
likely to happen when a firm is in distress. But, the tests so far are during the normal
stage of the firms. To ensure that the results can be generalized, it is necessary to test
the association specifically during the time of financial distress. One of the ways to do
this is to find a model that helps predict the bankruptcy probability of a firm. Then,
test the Top holder variable on different levels of bankruptcy probability. If the result
is consistent with the general case for firms with high bankruptcy probability, we have
more confidence to say that the main results can be generalized. I came up with two
ways to test this: Campbell et al (2008) bankruptcy probability measure and Acharya
et al (2007) industry distress. Each measure reflects different perspective of default
probability. Campbell et al (2008) focuses on individual firm bankruptcy probability
both short-term and long-term predictions. Acharya et al (2007) concentrate on the
industry distress.
The reason that we need to analyze industry distress along with individual distress
is that, occasionally, the prediction of a firm distress probability may be low at a given
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time while a bad prospect is looming over the majority of the firms in the industry.
For instance, if JP Morgan Chase announces bad previous quarter earnings, it is very
likely that all banking stocks on that day would be tumble. Investors would predict
that if JP Morgan Chase, which is one of the largest bank, is struggle, the rest should
also be struggle under the same environment even though other banks still have not
yet announced their earnings.
8.1 The Campbell et al (2008) Model
First, I will start with Campbell measure. Campbell et al (2008) came up with a new
way to find bankruptcy probability of a firm. The reason that I chose this measure
over “distance to default” (DD) of Merton (1974), one of the most popular probability
of default models, because Campbell measure has higher explanatory power than DD.
Campbell et al (2008) estimate a dynamic panel model by using logit model. This
method followed Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2008), and others. Moreover,
Campbell et al (2008) extended the previous literature by considering broader range
of independent variables.
To create explanatory variables at the individual firm level, following Campbell et
al (2008). I use the quarterly accounting data from COMPUSTAT and monthly as
well as daily equity market data from CRSP. From COMPUSTAT, I create standard
measure of profitability: net income to total assets. Previous authors used book value
for total assets; however, following Campbell et al (2008), I use market equity plus book
liabilities and call this variable Net Income to Market-valued Total Assets (NIMTA).
The original one with the book equity is Net Income to Total Assets (NITA). The
reason for the market equity instead of book equity is it has higher explanatory power
than book equity when it is used to predict the bankruptcy of a firm. This might result
from the fact that market prices more rapidly incorporate new information about the
firm’s prospects or more accurately reflect intangible assets of the firm. COMPUSTAT
is also used to construct a measure of leverage: total liabilities relative to total assets.
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Again, the market-valued version of this has higher explanatory power. The leverage
with the market equity is TLMTA while the original one with book equity is TLTA.
Besides the profitability and leverage measure, the measure of liquidity is also included.
It is the ratio of a company’s cash and short-term assets to the market value of its
assets (CASHMTA). I also calculate each firm’s market-to-book ratio (MB).
Following Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003), I adjust the book value of assets
to eliminate outliers. That is, I add 10% of the gap between market and book equity to
the book value of total assets. This results in increasing book values that are extremely
small and likely mismeasured. Without the adjustment, the outliers may impact the
result of the model. The book value of equity is also adjusted in a similar manner. In
my sample, under 1.3% of firm-months still have negative values for book equity even
after the adjustment, I replace these negative values with small value of $1 to ensure
that the market-to-book ratios for these firms are in the right tail, not the left tail,
of the distribution. To better cope with the outliers, I winsorize the market to book
ratio and all other variables in the model at the 5th and 95th percentiles.
Moreover, I add several market-based variables as another set of explanatory vari-
ables. I calculate the monthly log excess return on each firm’s equity relative to the
S&P 500 index (EXRET), the standard deviation of each firm’s daily stock return over
the past 3 months (SIGMA), and the relative size of each firm measured as the log
ratio of its market capitalization to that of the S&P500 index (RSIZE). Lastly, I add
the firm’s log price per share, truncated above at $15 (PRICE). This PRICE variable
is to capture the likelihood that distressed firms are traded at low prices per share. A























I correct both NITA and TLTA by taking the difference between market equity
(ME) and book equity (BE) to adjust the value of total assets:
TotalAssets(adjusted)i,t = TAi,t + 0.1(MEi,t −BEi,t) (2.7)
The volatility of a firm’s stock returns is







Instead of using volatility from rolling 3-month mean, following Campbell et al
(2008), I use volatility centered around zero for daily variation of returns calculated
as an annualized 3-month rolling sample standard deviation. For some firms with few
observations, I set them as missing if there are fewer than five nonzero observations
over the 3 months used in the rolling window. In addition, to estimate regressions,
I replace missing SIGMA observations with the cross-sectional mean of SIGMA. The
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similar method is also applied to NIMTA and EXRET in creating the moving average
variables NIMTAAVG and EXRETAVG.
From Table 2.19, the overall sample has 0.5% NIMTA per quarter or 2% at an an-
nual rate. We can see that mean and median of NITA are both higher than NIMTA.
The difference between the two calculations is the market equity. The lower NIMTA
relative to NITA is the reflection of market equity is on average larger than book
equity. The average value of EXRET is 0.7% per month. The average value of the
annualized firm-level volatility SIGMA is 38%
Model to predict bankruptcy
Following Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2008), I use the logit model to
estimate the probabilities of bankruptcy over the next period.
Assume that the marginal probability of bankruptcy over the next period follows
a logistic distribution and is given by
Pt−1(Yit = 1) =
1
1 + exp(−α− βxi,t−1)
(2.9)
Where
Yit = the value is one if the firm goes bankrupt or fails in month t
xi,t−1 = a vector of independent variables
If α + βxi,t−1 is high, it implies a higher probability of bankruptcy.
In Campbell et al (2008), there are two models and each has three different time
periods. I chose the model with highest R-squared which is Model 2 with Failure
prediction of the period 1963-2003.
Model 1 follows Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2008) with five standard
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variables: NITA, TLTA, EXRET, SIGMA, and RSIZE. For the second model, the
traditional NITA and TLTA are replaced by NIMTA and TLMTA, respectively. The
difference between the original and the two new variables are the original model uses
book equity whereas the latter uses market equity. Second adjustment from Model 1 is
the added lagged information about profitability and excess stock returns. Campbell
et al (2008) shows that a long history of losses or a sustained decline in stock market
value are better predictors than the one large losses in a period. Therefore, they









(EXRETt−1 + ...+ φ
11EXRETt−12)
(2.10)
Where φ = 2
−
1
3 , this implies that the weight is halved each quarter. The third
variable added is CASHMTA to capture the liquidity of the firm. A firm with high
CASHMTA has available liquid assets to pay for their promised interest. Hence, the
bankruptcy maybe further away in the future given high CASHMTA. The fourth
variable added to Model 1 is market to book or MB which captures the value of
firm’s equity in view of accountants. Since the profitability and leverage ratio use
market equity, if book equity is still important, MB could be a correction factor in the
model. Bankruptcy firms maybe overvalue so positive relationship between MB and
bankruptcy could be expected. Finally, the log price per share of the firm or PRICE is
also part of the Model 2. Previous literature suggested that price per share is relevant
below $15, and so I winsorize price per share at this level before taking the log.
The regression model used to predict the bankruptcy score (BRC) in Campbell
et al (2008) has different prediction horizons. I chose to do the short-term and long-
term prediction which are 1 month and 36 months respectively. This is to ensure that
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the result is not because of the horizon chosen. 36-month is the longest horizon in
Campbell model. The regression model I used to predict the bankruptcy probability
for the short-term horizon is
BRCST = −9.08− 29.67(NIMTAAV G) + 3.36(TLMTA)− 7.35(EXRETAV G)
+1.48(SIGMA)+0.08(RSIZE)−2.4(CASHMTA)+0.054(MB)−0.937(PRICE)
(2.11)
The model for the long term prediction is
BRCLT = −10.53− 14.06(NIMTAAV G) + 0.643(TLMTA)− 2.56(EXRETAV G)
+1.33(SIGMA)−0.18(RSIZE)−1.41(CASHMTA)+0.125(MB)+0.279(PRICE)
(2.12)
After we have the BRC scores then we find the bankruptcy probability by input
in the logit equation to output the probability of bankruptcy. Then I separate the
probability into three quantiles.
From Table 2.20, Panel A shows the mean probability of default of firms for short-
term horizon. The third quantile has highest probability of bankruptcy with 0.07
percent chance. The lowest quantile for short-term bankruptcy prediction has the
probability almost zero percent chance. One interesting point for the third quantile
is the much higher standard deviation than the first two quantiles. This implies that
there is high variation in the third quantile. Some of them have really high probability
of bankruptcy for the third quantile.
For the long-term prediction of bankruptcy probability in Table 2.20 Panel B, over-
all the probability is higher for all three quantiles comparing to short-term prediction.
This implies the financial situation of a firm today does not imply the same probability
of bankruptcy in the future. Firms may make a mistake along the way if not today.
Then for each quantile both short-term and long-term prediction, I run regression to
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see the variable Top holder whether the variable still has the same sign and significant
as the general case. If the result is the same, that means variable Top holder is a good
proxy for the bondholders’ bargaining power for strategic default case. In other words,
Top holder does not capture something else other than what it is supposed to capture
which is the bargaining power of bondholder through strategic default mechanism.
Table 2.21, 2.22, and 2.23 show the regression results for the short-term bankruptcy
prediction ordering from lowest probability of default to the highest one. We can see
that for the lowest probability of default, Table 2.21, the coefficients are not signif-
icant in any of the nine specification. The second quantile where the probability of
bankruptcy is medium, the coefficient is significant. Finally, for highest probability of
default, Table 2.23, the sign is negative the same as the general case and all coefficients
for all specifications are highly significant. This consistent with the main idea of the
general case that the variable Top holder is capturing the bondholder’s bargaining
power.
From Table 2.24 to Table 2.26, the regression results are for the case of long-term
prediction of default. In this case, the horizon is 36-months prediction. The results tell
the same story as short-term prediction. The highest probability of bankruptcy group
has negative coefficient and is highly significant in Table 2.26. This makes the case
of Top holder proxied for the bondholders’ bargaining power in the strategic default
framework stronger.
Next, I introduce the second method to test on the bankruptcy likelihood, be-
cause the results might only work for the Campbell et al (2008) bankruptcy measure.
The second candidate to check for the consistency of Top holder variable is based on
Acharya et al. (2007) industry distress.
8.2 The Acharya et al (2007) Industry Distress Model
The Acharya et al (2007) bankruptcy proxy is different from Campbell et al (2008) in
that the former is industry wide distress while the latter one is individual firm distress.
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The two measures are complement to see the effect of bankruptcy and consistency of
Top holder variable in both perspective: industry and individual. In Acharya et al
(2007), there are three types of distress with the meaning of each one as follow
Distress1 (D1): a dummy variable that takes the value one if the median stock re-
turn of all the firms in the three-digit SIC code of the firm is less than -30%, and zero
otherwise
Distress2 (D2): a dummy variable that takes on the value one if Distress1 is one
and if the median sales growth of all the firms in the three-digit SIC code of the firm
is negative in any of the two years before the bond transaction date
Distress3 (D3): a dummy variable that takes on the value one if the average credit
rating of other firms in the three-digit SIC code of the firm is below investment grade,
and zero otherwise
The idea to test Top holder variable is I interact each dummy of distress with Top
holder and see if the results are still consistent with the general case. If the result is
the same, it will give us more evidence that Top holder is one of valid variables to use
as strategic default proxy for creditors.
Based on the results of Table 2.27, 2.28, and 2.29, we can see that the sign is
the same as the general cases and the significance is still there for all three types of
distress. Except D2, the explanatory power to explain the credit spreads is high at 1
percent significance. For D2, for some specifications, the significant drops to 5 and 10
percent significant level. One explanation could be that D2 measure is based on the
sale growth which could mislead the firm’s financial situation. Sale might still be high
though the firm is in distress. Moreover, sale number does not take into account the
cost of the operation or cost of capital. If we use operating profit or net income, we
may have different outcome.
To conclude this part, both models of bankruptcy prediction give us a strong
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evidence that the main results could be generalized, because the same results can be
found in the case when strategic default likelihood is the highest.
9. Robustness Checks
9.1 Trading Frequency Bias
Since I use real bond transaction data, the issue of overrepresentation of sample by
large firms is possible. Large firms tend to issue more bonds and their bonds are traded
more frequently owing to high liquidity. These facts may bias the results toward large
firms. However, from Table 2.16, this issue may not be a concern. Table 2.16 shows
the top ten sample both by bonds or 9 digit CUSIP and by issuer or 6 digit CUSIP.
For Panel A, the highest transaction by complete CUSIP is only 1.64 percent or 514
transactions out of 31,296 transactions. For Panel B, the highest transaction by issuer
is only 3.39 percent. However, 3.39 percent is a relative sense. If we compare with
the lowest transaction group (bottom ten lowest) which each contributes to only less
than 0.5 percent of the sample, some might say that 3.39 percent is large. To reduce
the concern, I create a robustness check by allowing only one transaction for each firm
in each period. Specifically, I randomly select one transaction of each firm for each
month. Then, I perform the analysis to see the relationship between Top holder and
credit spreads with control variables following specification (2), (5), (6), and (8). The
analysis is repeated for 100 times for each specification. The results can be found in
Table 2.17. The average observations are reduced to around 6,000 observations for
each analysis because of the new rule of permission of one transaction per firm. We
can see that the result is consistent with the previous finding that Top holder is still
significantly negatively related to credit spreads. This implies the same conclusion that
the higher the bargaining power of bondholders, the lower the credit spreads through
the strategic default mechanism.
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9.2 Endogeneity
The model specification could create endogeneity. The dependent variable is the credit
spreads of bonds and the focus explanatory variable is bondholders’ bargaining power
or Top holder. There might be an argument that if the credit spreads reduce, this might
attract bondholders to buy the bond because they may want to buy less risky bonds
or vice versa. This has nothing to do with the story of bondholders’ bargaining power
and credit spreads. I handle the endogeneity using two-step GMM. Two-step GMM
obtains parameter estimates from the initial matrix, computes a new weight matrix
based on those estimates, and then estimates the parameters again based on that
weight matrix. I use the lag of all bondholders as instrumental variables. The result
after GMM is still consistent with my main finding that bondholders’ bargaining power
has significant negative relation with the credit spreads. The results can be found in
Table 2.18. The significant negative relationship between the bondholder’s bargaining
power and credit spreads is still maintained.
9.3 Liquidity Concerns
Liquidity-control variables are added to the model. The theoretical motivation is from
Ericsson and Renault (2006) that show a good amount of credit spreads is explained
by liquidity of the bonds traded. Houweling et al. (2005) compared nine different
proxies for corporate bond liquidity from previous literature (issued amount, listed,
euro, on-the-run, age, missing prices, yield volatility, number of contributors and yield
dispersion) and illustrated that the issued amount and yield dispersion are the most
two important factors. I put the two variables in the model and the bondholders’
bargaining power still has significant explanatory power on the credit spreads. The
two variables are significant and show expected sign consistent with the literature.
Issued amount and yield dispersion have negative and positive sign, respectively.
A complete result is in Table 2.30. With liquidity controls, Top holder for all speci-
fications is still highly significant and exhibits a consistent negative sign as in the main
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result. In other words, higher bondholder’s bargaining power still plays an important
role on the credit spreads after taking into account the liquidity aspect. Liquidity con-
trol variables are also significant with expected sign. Issued amount (or AmountIssue)
was first suggested by Fisher (1959). Fisher (1959) showed that large issues should
trade more often. We would expect to see higher issued amount resulting in lower
credit spreads because of lower liquidity premium. For yield dispersion, it reflects the
agreement of market participants on the value of a bond. Tychon and Vannetelbosch
(2002) derived a model showing that when there is a heterogeneity in investors’ belief,
the liquidity premium is higher. Following Houweling et al. (2005), the yield dispersion
of bond b on day t is defined as the standard deviation of percentage yield differences










where ybts is the quoted yield by party s, ȳbt is the average yield and nbt is the
number of contributors. The yield dispersion can only be calculated if we have at least
two quotes for a bond in a given day.
For the yield dispersion, we expect to see positive relation with the credit spreads.
Based on Table 2.30, the result shows consistent outcome as we have significant positive
relation between yield dispersion and credit spreads of bonds.
9.4 The Effect of Invesment Horizons
Further analysis on the second chapter is to analyze how holding horizons, such as
long-term VS short-term, affect credit spreads and which type of holders are more
important to determine credit spreads of bonds. The main analysis of the second
chapter is how bondholders’ bargaining power affects the bond credit spreads. The
proxy for bondholders’ bargaining power is Top holder which is a categorical variable
from 0 to 9 where 9 represents highest bargaining power. Top holder captured both
percentage holding and types of holder (e.g., insurance, mutual fund, etc.). However,
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another interesting aspect lies in the period of bondholding. Three types of investor
are considered: Long-Term (LT), Medium-Term (MT), and Short-Term (ST) investors.
To identify the type of holder, I first calculated the average maturity of bond portfolio
using value-weighted in a given quarter. Then, if the average holding is less than
one year, the investor is categorized as short-term investor. If the average holding is
between one year and five years, the investor is categorized as medium-term investor.
For long-term investor, the average holding exceeds five years.
We would expect that LT investors should exert more influence on the credit spreads
of corporate bonds, because they incur higher risk than MT and ST investors from
investing their funds in those bonds longer. The result is consistent with our con-
jecture that LT investors are more important than MT and ST investors in terms of
commanding the credit spreads of bonds. From Table 2.31, LT investors show nega-
tive significant relation with credit spreads of bonds whereas MT and ST investors are
much less important statistically. The negative sign of LT investors on credit spreads
is also consistent with Top holder variable in the main result.
10. Conclusion
Following the main hypothesis, bondholders’ bargaining power exhibits negative re-
lationship with the credit spreads. This implies that the higher the bondholders’
bargaining power, the lower premium required to compensate for strategic default
likelihood. Since strategic default renegotiation is between equity holders and debt
holders, leaving out debt holder’s bargaining power when examining strategic default
framework results in an incomplete picture of strategic default on credit risk. Based
on my results, the bondholders bargaining power is an important factor used to ex-
plain credit spreads of a bond. In renegotiation, if bondholders and equity holders
interact, bondholders will require more premium to hold bonds. In addition, bond-
holders require more premium when they interact with CEO. This implies that CEO
might be the real mastermind behind the strategic default decision since CEO works
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in the company every day and knows the company inside out. For different events and
regulations, if the likelihood of strategic default is lower, bondholders required lower
credit spread premium. Similarly, some characteristics of issuer render in lower chance
of strategic default. I find that firms with high fixed assets and high rating have lower
strategic default likelihood as indicated by lower premium required by bondholders.
Understanding the relationship between the bargaining power of bondholders and
equity holders on strategic default prospect is important for investors both individual
and institutions, because, if some patterns persist, retail investors can avoid unnec-
essary strategic bankruptcy by not buying bonds from firms with high prospect of
strategic default. High bargaining power by top holders such as insurance and mutual
fund helps public screen companies with high or low strategic default prospect. Cur-
rently, our financial system has done a good job of publicizing information regarding
top shareholders of firms. For instance, the information about the percentage of insti-
tutional holding for a company or free float of a company can be found easily. However,
the information about top bondholders in a firm is very difficult to find. We would
want to know whether the bondholders are quite concentrate or dispersed so that we
know the likelihood of strategic default. Other than making bondholder information
accessible, regulators or related parties should provide more incentives for institutional
to hold bonds that have yet no major bondholders. This should help balance the eq-
uity bargaining power and results in the lower likelihood of strategic default. In other
words, institutional bondholders act as a cushion for retail bondholders; otherwise, the
threat of strategic default by equity holders will loom over the investment in bonds.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Bond Issuer
This table shows summary statistics of bond transactions by types of institutions. Bond
transactions are from Mergent FISD. Types of institutions are based on SIC industry
code (first two digit).
Industry Frequency Percent Cumulative Frequency Cumulative Percent
Manufacturing 15697 50.16 15925 50.89
Transportation 6100 19.49 30818 98.47
Retail trade 4232 13.52 21397 68.37
Services 3321 10.61 24718 78.98
Mining 1240 3.96 17165 54.85
Wholesale trade 478 1.53 31296 100
Construction 228 0.73 228 0.73
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Table 2.2: Percentage of Bond Held by Types of Bondholders
This table shows average percentage bondholding by each holder. Insurance includes
life, property & casualty, reinsurance, and diversified insurances. Mutual fund in-
cludes both closed- and open-end, balanced, money market, fund of fund, and equity
mutual fund. Both corporate and government pensions are in Pension. Other con-
sists of annuity, foundation/endowment, and other categorized by eMAXX. Health
are hospital and health care system.
Variable N Mean Median Mode Maximum Minimum
Insurance 31296 40.6436141 40.0712727 0 100 0
Mutual 31296 7.1074916 3.9136 0 76.4086111 0
Pension 31296 5.3012755 1.1166667 0 56 0
Other 31296 1.1132148 0.0975 0 100 0
Government 31296 0.3111004 0 0 31.5 0
Health 31296 0.0276657 0 0 4.04 0
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics of Bondholders
This table shows two important things. First, the number of bonds (N) held by a
particular type of holder. Second, Mean, the average percentage holding of a bond.
For instance, Life insurance held 31,226 bonds and for each bond it held around
34.07% of the total amount dollars of bond outstanding on average. The unit below
is in decimal percentage
Variable N Mean Median Maximum Minimum
Insurance Co-Life/Health 31226 0.3407 0.3199 1.0000 0
Pension Fund-Government 24754 0.0670 0.0252 0.5600 0
Open-End Mutual Fund 28145 0.0645 0.0331 0.7197 0
Insurance Co-Prop & Cas 29816 0.0613 0.0441 0.9911 0
Foundation/Endowment 1183 0.0303 0.0136 1.0000 0
Government 4411 0.0221 0.0167 0.3150 0
Annuity/Variable Annuity 17909 0.0175 0.0070 0.2845 0
Mutual Fund-Balanced 18631 0.0138 0.0036 0.3100 0
Reinsurance Company 18868 0.0130 0.0067 0.3000 0
Closed-End Mutual Fund 8464 0.0105 0.0046 0.1821 0
Mutual Fund-Equity 8926 0.0069 0.0014 0.5739 0
Pension Fund-Corporate 485 0.0027 0.0010 0.0400 0
Mutual Fund-Money Mkt 491 0.0015 0.0003 0.0371 0
Health Care Systems 5707 0.0015 0.0008 0.0404 0
Insurance Co-Diversified 5754 0.0014 0.0006 0.0328 0
Mutual Fund-Fund of Funds 1461 0.0006 0.0001 0.0448 0
Hedge Fund 72 0.0004 0.0001 0.0016 0
Hospital 127 0.0003 0.0002 0.0012 0
Other 688 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0
Pension Fund-Union 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0
Unit Investment Trust 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.5: Summary Statistics on Credit Spreads
This table shows summary statistics of credit spreads for fixed-coupon bonds during
the period 1999-2013, by remaining time to maturity and rating. The benchmark
risk-free yield is the yield on a cash flow matched portfolios of constant maturity
Treasury from FRED. The Treasury yields are observed as of the trade date, and are
linearly approximated for dates between the maturity dates of two Treasury rates.
The credit spreads are shown in annualized term and in basis points. NR is non-rated
firms. na is no data point available.
All AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC C
Panel A: Credit spreads for All Maturities
Mean 383 195 228 270 344 553 687 1170 3813 4881
Median 272 174 216 227 272 399 518 714 3126 5659
Std 574 121 144 301 430 741 787 1232 2311 2033
P5 40 25 29 32 40 72 130 219 792 331
P95 880 427 465 556 726 1408 1678 4333 8762 6945
N 30712 1295 3063 9104 11172 2890 2322 754 103 9
Panel B: Credit spreads for Maturity 1-7 Years
Mean 400 194 219 275 356 533 713 1169 4774 4890
Median 291 174 200 242 287 399 522 771 4673 5810
Std 574 121 152 256 394 612 807 1143 2524 2584
P5 35 28 21 26 34 70 121 188 133 331
P95 996 416 461 588 822 1435 1888 3676 9303 6757
N 16680 625 1901 4462 5832 1765 1658 381 51 5
Panel C: Credit spreads for Maturity 7-15 Years
Mean 329 198 245 230 275 498 649 1207 3388 5816
Median 243 194 249 206 221 359 556 668 3484 5816
Std 471 110 127 147 310 646 700 1402 1146 1597
P5 38 19 52 32 33 73 116 275 2145 4687
P95 716 352 492 488 576 1318 1562 4614 4544 6945
N 6442 346 646 1985 2217 693 372 176 5 2
Panel D: Credit spreads for Maturity 15-30 Years
Mean 390 195 241 290 369 721 594 1138 2816 3925
Median 265 160 225 226 276 434 455 690 2669 3925
Std 647 131 130 427 548 1200 773 1240 1655 470
P5 56 35 35 56 55 85 161 273 831 3592
P95 751 459 464 529 678 3486 1386 4685 6069 4257









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.7: Summary Statistics on Control Variables
This table reports summary statistics on independent variables by trade. Non-fixed assets
are one minus the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total assets. Market-
to-book is the ratio of the quasi-market value of assets to their book value. R&D is the
ratio of research and development expenses to total investment expenditure. CEO and
Institutional shareholding are the percentages of common equity owned by the CEO and
institutional investors. No. of issues is the number of bond issues outstanding on the trade
date. CEO tenure is the number of years since the CEO’s appointment as of the date of
trade. Herfindahl is the Herfindahl index of public issues outstanding. Short-term debt is
the ratio of debt in current liabilities to total debt. Asset volatility is the leverage-weighted
average of the firm’s 1 year historic equity volatility and average bond volatility for the same
rating. Time to maturity is the remaining time to maturity at the trade date. Risk-free rate
is the 5 year constant maturity Treasury rate. Book total assets are in billions of dollars.
Variable Mean Median Std Dev 5th Pctl 95thPctl N
Nonfixed assets (%) 64.768 69.922 22.578 17.067 91.186 24607
Market-to-book-ratio 1.662 1.366 0.892 0.924 3.465 24671
R&D (%) 3.112 0.361 6.081 0.000 18.213 24672
CEO shareholding (%) 0.466 0.090 2.494 0.002 1.347 24392
Institutional shareholding (%) 64.823 71.350 24.288 0.004 94.265 26678
CEO tenure 6.053 4.422 6.573 0.299 16.099 25958
No. of issues 28.435 25.000 19.040 6.000 67.000 30712
1-Herfindahl index 93.206 95.240 6.872 79.688 98.266 30712
Short-term debt (%) 7.404 4.555 7.865 0.041 24.689 24672
No. of inst. shareholders 771.512 648.000 531.683 2.000 1845.000 26678
Leverage (%) 49.532 49.835 20.951 15.969 84.810 24671
Asset volatility 0.363 0.233 0.438 0.073 1.053 24093
Book total assets 67.484 21.901 151.626 2.477 278.554 24672
Time to maturity 9.509 6.318 7.620 1.526 24.477 31296
Risk-free rate (%) 3.907 4.140 1.487 1.110 6.420 31296
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Table 2.8: Non-Strategic Determinants of Credit Spreads
This table shows the output of regression analysis of credit
spreads on non-strategic proxies, for the whole sample. The
dependent variable is the annualized credit spreads in basis
points. Leverage is calculated as the book value of total debt
divided by the sum of the book value of debt and the market
value of equity on the observation date. Log (Assets) is the
logarithm of the total book assets of the issuing firm in bil-
lions of dollars. Risk-free rate is the 5-year constant maturity
Treasury rate.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
Leverage 10.60*** 10.66*** 9.95***
(27.14) (27.21) (22.65)
Asset volatility 175.84*** 176.84*** 162.65***
(9.01) (9.05) (8.53)
Time to maturity 3.01*** 3.20***
(7.49) (7.71)
Book total assets -0.53**
(-2.43)




Constant -181.31 -226.71 -192.16
(-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00)
Observations 24,093 24,093 24,093
Adjusted R-squared 0.4077 0.4091 0.4109
Industry FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Robust t-statistics in parentheses































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.13: Summary Statistics of Invoice Price and Yield to Maturity by
Year
This table shows mean, min, and max for invoice price of
the bonds traded and their yield to maturity calculating for
each bond invoice price. Yield to maturity is in decimal
percentage. 0.01 is 1 percent.
Invoice Yield to Maturity
Year Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
1999 1047.09 957.08 1181.14 0.07 0.06 0.08
2000 982.6 210 1336.52 0.09 0.05 0.68
2001 1009.24 164.33 1339.67 0.09 0.03 0.99
2002 1042.37 160 1401.34 0.08 0.02 0.95
2003 1100.5 197.45 1508.6 0.07 0.01 0.63
2004 1125.75 230 1459.98 0.07 0.02 0.49
2005 1119.7 152.5 1504.88 0.07 0.03 0.82
2006 1049.42 232.5 1651.4 0.07 0.03 0.72
2007 1053.56 347.92 1395.11 0.07 0.03 0.59
2008 1016.41 256.5 1381.82 0.07 0.03 0.9
2009 1016.3 207.5 1373.16 0.07 0.01 0.85
2010 1089.7 621.59 1505.43 0.05 0.01 0.45
2011 1091.19 878 1493.38 0.05 0 0.48
2012 1130.6 498.43 1581.04 0.05 0 0.45























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.16: Top Ten Sample by Bond and Issuer
Panel A shows top ten sample by bond. Complete CUSIP is based on 9 digit CUSIP.
No. of transactions are the total transactions represented in the sample. Percent of
overall transactions are out of 31,296 transactions. Panel B shows top ten sample
by issuer or 6 digit CUSIP.
Panel A: Top ten sample by bond
Obs. Complete Cusip No. of Transactions Percent of Overall Transactions
1 369604BC6 514 1.64
2 369604AY9 490 1.57
3 254687AM8 270 0.86
4 539830AE9 254 0.81
5 655844AH1 245 0.78
6 345370CA6 233 0.74
7 713448BH0 231 0.74
8 039483AJ1 218 0.70
9 708160BQ8 213 0.68
10 126408BL6 211 0.67
Panel B: Top ten sample by issuer
Obs. Issuer ID No. of Transactions Percent of Overall Transactions
1 3250 1062 3.39
2 2232 1048 3.35
3 4447 1040 3.32
4 1769 1004 3.21
5 268 999 3.19
6 4533 878 2.81
7 662 743 2.37
8 6229 679 2.17
9 1662 666 2.13
10 4268 586 1.87
267
Table 2.17: Robustness Check on Large Firms Dominated Transactions
To reduce the influence from large firm transactions, a firm is allowed only one
transaction per month. The transaction sample is randomly selected for each
firm in each month. Then, run the regression of all the selected sample for 100
times for each specification. Sampling # is the number of time we perform the
routine. Avg Obs is the number of average observation for each routine.
Variable (2) (5) (6) (8)
Top holder -31.345*** -36.281*** -37.432*** -34.970***
(-10.70) (-12.23) (-12.89) (-12.17)
Market-to-book 105.257***
-10.83




Nonfixed assets 0.720*** 0.623** 0.640**
(-2.75) (-2.43) (-2.52)






Intercept -601.23*** -297.02*** -305.64*** -362.13***
(-14.78) (-7.97) (-8.76) (-11.59)
Sampling # 100 100 100 100
Avg Obs 6188.9 6367.66 6303.51 6168.75
R-squared (%) 25.52 24.95 24.6 24.58
Robust t-statistics in parentheses



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.20: Summary Statistics of Bankruptcy Probability
Panel A shows the summary statistics of short-term
bankruptcy probability for each quantile. As for
Panel B, the summary is for long-term prediction of
default likelihood. Quantile 1 is the lowest probability
of default.
Panel A: Short-term default probability
Quantile Mean Std Dev Freq
1 0.00087566 0.00029915 8,246
2 0.00270153 0.00089185 8,244
3 0.07446869 0.19271611 8,239
Total 0.02600346 0.1163929 24,729
Panel B: Long-term default probability
Quantile Mean Std Dev Freq
1 0.03402049 0.0053678 8,245
2 0.05055644 0.0054353 8,243
3 0.12924796 .12739005 8,241
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Appendix A
Strategic Default Service Model
Strategic default service model [ Fan and Sundaresan (2000)]
The model is continuous-time model with the following assumptions
1. A firm has equity and single perpetual debt with coupon rate c per unit time
2. We focus on default risk, and assume flat default-free term structure. The risk
free rate is r per unit time.
3. The firm has a tax benefit of (0 ≤ τ < 1). For this model, this is the only motive
for issuing debt. The firm will lose tax benefits during the default period.
4. There is a cost for liquidation. The fixed cost is k (k ≥ 0) and the proportional
cost is α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1). Assume strict absolute priority upon bankruptcy. When
the value of the firm reaches Ṽs, the bankruptcy trigger point, outsiders will
come to take a cost of min(Ṽs, αṼs + k) debt holders receive the remaining
max[0, (1−α)Ṽs−k)]; but equity holders receive nothing. At equilibrium, based
on the model, creditors will receive less than the contractual coupon and still let
equity holders run the firm. This results in deviations from absolute priority.
5. The asset value of the firm devoted by V, Follows the lognormal diffusion process
dV = (µ− β)V dt+ σV dBt
where µ is the continuous time expected rate of return on the firm gross of all
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payout, σ2 is the instantaneous variance of the return on the firm and Bt is a
standard Brownian motion. β is the firm’s cash payout ratio. Without tax,
firm’s asset value, V, and the firm’s value, v(V ), are the same
The situation is that when the determined trigger point is reached, debtors accept
reduced level of debt service. This will be temporary until the cash flow situation
is better. Assume trigger point for strategic debt service Ṽs, both equity and debt
holders will bargain the total value of the firm, devoted by v(V ). Note that the total
value of the firm v(V ) is always larger than the asset value of the firm V. In other
words, the negotiating value that both parties bargain over is larger.
For any V ≤ Ṽs
Ẽ(V ) = θ̃v(V ), D̃(V ) = (1− θ̃)v(V )
Where E(·) and D(·) are the values of equity and debt, respectively. θ̃ is a parame-
ter indicating the sharing rule for the residual assets between equity and debt holders.
In this model, θ is variable between 0 and α +
k
v(V )
Denote η as the equity holders’ bargaining power, and 1 − η is the debt holders’
bargaining power. We solve for Nash solution θ∗ in the following manner: the value
for equity holder by continuing as opposed to liquidation is θ̃v(V )− 0
The incremental value for debt holders if accept strategic debt service instead of
forcing liquidating is [(1− θ̃)v(V )−max(1− α)V − k, 0]
The Nash solution to the bargaining game can be characterized as
θ̃∗ = argmax{θ̃v(V )− 0}η{(1− θ̃)v(V )−max[(1− α)V −K, 0]}1−η
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σ2
λ = elasticity of the probability of default with respect to the value of the assets
of the firm
θ̃∗ = sharing rule
Here we assume the following numbers for each parameter following Fan and Sun-
daresan (2000).
α = 0.2, V = 100, K = 10, r = 7.5%, β = 7%, σ2 = 3%, τ = 35%, c = 5%
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Figure A.1: Numerical Represent of the Relationship between Bondholders’
Bargaining Power and the Sharing Rule.
We can see that after some reasonable parameters, the result shows negative re-
lationship between the bondholders’ bargaining power (1 − η) and the sharing rule
(θ). Assume that the bondholder’s bargaining power is higher, so we have lower value
of sharing rule. Consequently, the value of debt D(Ṽ ) increases and this will render
in lower credit spreads. From this sequence, we have negative relationship between
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